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ContentsWith six articles focused on migration, the pres-
ent issue of the Romanian Journal of European
Studies precedes the publication of a specialist
Journal of Migration Studies, a new initiative in the
academic environment of Timiºoara.
Some of the articles in this issue were already pre-
sented at the International Colloquium “Romania
and the EU in 2007” held in Timiºoara on the 6th of
May 2005 through the joint efforts of the West
University, the School of High European
Comparative Studies and the Centre of Excellence
'Jean Monnet'.
I hope that all readers will enjoy this special issue.
Grigore Silaºi, Professor 
Editorial Board Coordinator
ForewordBeing a short-term migrant to Romania, I feel
honored to contribute to this journal's issue and
therefore would like to thank the editors for this nice
opportunity.
European studies as a subject, analyzing
European developments in the present, past and
future, certainly can't avoid the multi-facetted sub-
ject of study called 'migration.' Decision-making on
migration issues is still defended by Member States
as their prerogative as migration directly affects the
grounds on which European 'nation-states' have
been created. The reluctance of Member States to
transfer decision-making power to supranational
European institutions is maybe one of the most
important indicators that the European Union is
struggling hard on its way forward. Like in other
aspects of the integration process there are two (or
even more) velocities involved: while the polity and
trade area of the European Union have been expand-
ing quickly, the mental picture of a 'common Europe
and identity' for most citizens remains rather unde-
veloped and is often blurred by exaggerated expecta-
tions or already nearly destroyed by a growing EU-
pessimism. Although Europe's final borders and the
future neighborhood are currently discussed and the
'frontier' thereby slowly becomes demarcated, the
overall progress towards a stronger European self-
identification has been extremely limited. The conse-
quences of a globalizing world and the uncertainties
of the 'EU-project' are raising fears among European
citizens. The possible negative effects of globalization
and enlargement have often been illustrated by using
the picture of 'uncontrollable waves of migrants'
landing at Europe's shores and threatening the
income and social security of native citizens —
cheaper and cheaper, everywhere available Samsung
Editorial
Migration and European challengesTV sets seem for our 'globalized European village'
less worrying. 
One can say that the fear of uncontrollable migra-
tions and resulting resentments against future fellow
(EU or non-EU) citizens and neighbors, unfortu-
nately, is and has been a close companion of the
European project. Policy-makers and EU bureau-
crats failed to prepare their constituency, maybe
should have given the enlargement more time and/or
neglected opportunities to make the whole 'project'
more socially sustainable and mentally manageable
for individual citizens. On the other hand, policy-
makers repeatedly have been quick to react to public
fears against potential immigrants (from the new
Member States or from elsewhere) and to gain votes
out of this fear-induced pre-form of xenophobia: they
quickly agree on restrictions — although destroying
hereby the original ideal of free movements between
new and old Member States and introducing a sec-
ond class of EU citizens. Unfortunately, however,
decision-makers seem rather incompetent and slow to
accept mid-term and long-term European realities
and neglect new historic opportunities to actively
prepare their citizens for Europe's severe transforma-
tions - resulting from extremely low fertility rates, a
quickly ageing European population, a decreasing
European competitiveness and an implosion of social
protection systems e.g. Of course, the solution can't
exist (solely) in increased immigration to Europe,
but to a certain extent Europe will be depending from
a labor influx in the near future. Despite this fact,
migrants from the new Member States or from Third
Countries still have to pay the negative side-effects of
restrictive policies that are based on election-inspired
rhetoric and a generally badly informed electorate
rather than these policies are fact-based and future-
inspired. 
In summary, Europe should (and is) more than a
political construct and trade bloc - it has to be filled
with a common dream and spirit and the EU citizen-
ry should be prepared by time to welcome and
include people from other countries: Polish plumbers
in France, Romanian agricultural workers in Spain
or retired Germans in Spain are an important feature
and first step of a Europe growing together and a
Europe that tries to deal with (rather than denies and
neglect) future challenges. 
Migration is crucial for Europe's future develop-
ment and an interesting subject for the discipline of
European studies. I am therefore happy to introduce
to a journal that is full of interesting articles, high-
lighting important features of the migration phe-
nomenon in Europe, and having a special focus on
Romania as a new Member State:
The bigger European picture is drawn by Ruspini
who questions and outlines the linkage between
national and supranational governance on the way
to a common immigration policy that will be the
underpinning framework of the evolving post-
enlargement space. The impact of international
organizations and mostly informal consultation
processes that led to the pre-construction of an area
of Justice, Freedom and Security is portrayed in the
article of Geiger. Baldwin-Edwards dedicated his
article to the next EU enlargement in line: the former
Yugoslavia and Albania as an area that was and part-
ly still is synonymous with voluntary and forced
'mass emigrations.' This year's 'Year of Worker's
Mobility', promoted by the EU Commission, in the
context of the whole European project is reflected in
the article of van Krieken. Paradoxically, although
the mobility of workers inside the EU is actually still
very low, the new (mostly unfounded) fear of mass
movements from the new Member states recently led
to the introduction of mobility restrictions inside the
enlarged EU. The challenge for the EU in the near
future certainly has to be to promote, encourage and
tolerate more mobility inside the EU and across its
external borders. Finally, two articles highlight the
case of Romania: Romanian emigration patterns and
the context of EU accession are portrayed by
Nicolescu and Constantin, while Ghetau in his con-
tribution analyzes the demographic impacts of
migratory movements on different regions and the
whole of Romania by focusing on intra-regional com-
parisons and changes in the sex and age.
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Guest EditorThis paper is a preliminary attempt at investigating the link between the post EU enlargement migration space and the
ongoing process of the forming of a common EU immigration policy, now in its second phase, the ‘Hague Programme’
having been agreed upon in November 2004. The main subject I mean to discuss centres around a series of juxtapositions
which are the result of an interrelation between the national and supranational levels of EU policymaking: ‘enlarge-
ment(s) and restrictions’, ‘visible and invisible borders’, ‘pendulum and pillar’ defining the area of Justice, Freedom and
Security, implemented since the meeting of the European Council in Tampere in October 1999. The theoretical framework
in this paper relies upon the ‘pendulum model’ developed by Helen Wallace and includes a close study of the EU poli-
cymaking process. The model shows how this process results in an uninterrupted oscillation between two dimensions of
governance – national and supranational – particularly in the field of immigration where prerogatives of national sover-
eignty often tend to prevail. The conclusive argument advances the idea that the EU should involve all the qualified
actors either from old or new member states or neighbouring countries in an effective ‘open method of coordination’,
aimed at harmonizing immigration and asylum policy. 
Keywords: immigration, EU enlargement, borders, policymaking, European identity.
What is Europe? Is it a geographic, eco-
nomic, political entity, a category of thought or
rather the space of ‘freedom, security and jus-
tice’ and for the movement of goods and citi-
zens belonging to the European Union? Regard-
ing people, is this movement indeed ‘free’, ‘just’
Forms and Features 
of the Post-Enlargement Migration
Space
Paolo Ruspini, PhD 
Associate Fellow, Centre for Research in Ethnic
Relations, University of Warwick∗
∗ Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom, e-mail: P.Ruspini@warwick.ac.uk, ph. (+4424) 7652 4869, fax (+4424) 7652 4324, home page:
http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/CRER_RC/staff/paolo. This paper first appeared in Italian as “Da dieci a venticinque: il nuovo spazio
europeo”, in Fondazione ISMU, Decimo Rapporto sulle migrazioni 2004. Dieci anni di immigrazione in Italia, Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 317-330.and ‘safe’ for all the citizens that live in this
space?
Since its foundation the transnational exper-
iment named European Union (EU), has tried to
provide a political form to the ancient idea of
Europe. This has been attempted by establish-
ing a set of rules opposing the entropy of the
international system, setting up a common mar-
ket, therefore continuing the process of political
integration sanctioned by Treaties. These rules
have generated a dense network, which has
grown up, surprisingly, beyond all proportions,
entangling ‘goods and persons’, at times delay-
ing the overall growth of the system. The geopo-
litical space of the European Union has expand-
ed or decreased because of historical social fac-
tors and the political willingness, or not, of the
ruling coalitions of its member States.
In more than forty years of its recent history,
Europe has been a divided entity reproducing
variables of political thought and socio-econom-
ic systems in contrast one with the other: East
and West, a planned economy against the free
market, totalitarianism and democracy. To a
great extent, they are dichotomies refuted from
the historical overthrows of more recent years1. 
The collapse of the Soviet paradigm in 1991
and the following gradual reunification of the
European continent have not only altered forev-
er a vision of the world, but they have also
sparked movements of populations for long
appeased, thus putting under discussion migra-
tion regimes and the impermeability of Euro-
pean borders. At the beginning of this process,
Western European migration scholars started
off on the wrong foot, sometimes lacking the
knowledge and explanatory instruments neces-
sary to comprehend the migration dynamics,
generated from, up until then, a little studied or
even ignored reality. The intellectual curiosity,
instilled by the ongoing epochal upheavals, has
however prevailed on stereotypes and wide-
spread misconceptions. The exchanges of scien-
tific knowledge, which proceeded simultane-
ously with each stage of European integration,
has therefore intensified between East and
West, who represented, to each other, only until
recently, two very distant worlds. 
The idea mooting this paper is the need to
look at the transformations of the EU migration
space in the time that starts in the 1980s, goes
through the 1990s, until the decisive appoint-
ment of 1° May 2004, the day that sanctioned
the fifth and more imposing EU enlargement.
The last date is actually a starting point for the
continent that urges to look beyond, trying to
identify the empirical form and political fea-
tures within today’s migration scenario of the
enlarged EU.
The path of European integration is not
straightforward at all. The history of the Euro-
pean Union has seen periods of acceleration fol-
lowed by a slowing down, in the process of the
formation of a common economic and political
space. It is true that this path, though still far
from being completed, has never actually arrest-
ed and it can be said that it has also reinvented
itself in generating new political and institu-
tional frameworks, which are the subject of
deep interest on behalf of IR scholars, particu-
larly those of the ‘neofunctionalist’ school. 
Social phenomena and political processes,
often complementary, have propelled the
enlargement of the common European space:
the processes of globalisation and economic
interdependence on one side together with the
evident impossibility to adopt national immi-
gration policies without externalising the con-
trol of borders. Europe, or better, the European
Union, has therefore experienced an awareness,
albeit unwillingly, which for some States proves
to be a miraculous ‘panacea’ where for others it
represents an improvident solution by which to
mitigate the malaises and the stiflement suf-
fered due to systems of national governance. 
What might seem a bold pragmatism in this
last statement, does not mean to convey a non-
appreciation of the propulsive role of the ideas
and the sometimes ideological afflatus lavished
over time by the advocates of European integra-
tion. This paper is not aimed at a philological
reconstruction of the development of European
integration in the migration sphere, but, rather,
it means to encourage thought and clues to a
more complete understanding of the dynamics.
Some contextualization is, however, necessary
in order to make a correct analysis. 
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1 ‘Enlargements’ and ‘restrictions’ in the European UnionThe 1980s, starting point of our discussion,
saw an acceleration of the political union with
the introduction of the concept of ‘variable
geometry’ and the publication of the ‘White
Book’ of the Delors Commission, which
includes detailed proposals for realizing a com-
mon market. The accession of Greece in 1981,
together with that of Spain and Portugal in 1986
gave us 10 EU member States. The same last
year the European Single Act has been enacted.
It modifies the Treaty of Rome by introducing
the ‘qualified majority voting’ for the harmo-
nization of legislations. This Act, fervently
encouraged by Kohl and Mitterand, opened the
road to the creation of a big common market
without frontiers, expected for the 1st January
1993 (Motta, 2003). The Delors Plan, adopted in
1989, prepared the setting up in three stages of
the Economic and Monetary Union, while the
Schengen Convention, which includes the total
abolition of border controls, was signed to on
19th June 1990. The last objective was reached
only in 1993, after the signing of the Treaty of
Maastricht (7th February 1992) that sanctioned
the freedom of movement for persons, goods,
services and capitals. 
The historical reconstruction aside, the
development of the European integration
process has been distinguished by two enlarge-
ments to three southern European countries,
only five years one from the other and by the
signing of the Schengen Convention that closes
the 1980s and smoothes the way for the impor-
tant institutional turning points of the 1990s. 
It is interesting to note that the economic sit-
uation of Greece, Spain and Portugal at the time
of their EU accession, compared with that of the
member States was not so dissimilar to that
between the EU-15 and the new Central and
Eastern European (CEE) members in 2004. Cer-
tainly, one should proceed with caution in mak-
ing comparisons between socio-economic mod-
els when taking into consideration their diverse
historical experience. In the case of CEE coun-
tries, these models have been shaped over time
by planning mechanisms historically absent in
the West. It is worthy to note however, that cal-
culations may be made through a fear, classifi-
able as irrational, and emphasised then, as now,
with the purpose of raising distinctions and
therefore restricting the freedom of movement
of workers from the new member States, for
subsequently re-negotiable transitional periods,
so as to avoid an imbalance in the labour mar-
kets of the old member States. The scarce migra-
tory flow, once the freedom of movement for
workers of the three Mediterranean Countries
was sanctioned (van Selm, Tsolakis, 2004), has
proved these fears to be groundless. 
On a contemporary level, restrictions have
proved worthless, considering by all the projec-
tions, sector studies and econometric calcula-
tions carried out before the 2004 Eastward
enlargement. Past and recent estimations how-
ever, seem not to be enough to prevent a sort of
‘domino effect’,  on the eve of the May 2004
enlargement, where member States were urged
to apply the restrictions. The ‘invasion syn-
drome’ and recurrent use of hyperbola like
“big-bang” borrowed from astrophysics, inex-
orably unmask the hypocrisies of national
immigration policies and the selfishness of
member States when their own prerogatives of
national sovereignty are at stake. 
In our opinion, it will be more interesting to
look at the eventual reproduction of return
migration scenarios, such those regarding
Greece, Spain and Portugal, when the internal
economic conditions became competitive com-
pared with those of the destination countries.
They are hypotheses to be verified on the
ground of the characteristics of the CEE migra-
tory regimes and the logics of the pre- and post-
enlargement scenario.
One observation must be added regarding
the openly evident contrast between the EU set
standards that advocate the freedom of move-
ment for all the workers who live and reside in
the Union, and the distinctions exercised by the
member States in reproposing the transitional
periods. They seem to deny and contradict the
freedom of movement in selective terms, i.e.
where the Union has accepted countries whose
economic development is inferior to the mem-
ber States average, and where the relative
migratory potential was only ‘apparently’
increased by virtue of projections based on their
history of emigration countries. 
It is actually worth remembering that, when
in 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the
Union, the need to adopt restrictive measures
was not apparent, and again in 2004 for Malta
and Cyprus. Moreover, we should be wary of
myopia, while writing analyses and forecasts
based only on wage differentials. It is worth
remembering that migration is, in fact, a more
complex phenomenon. The migratory potential,
i.e. the intention to carry out a migratory proj-
ect, sometimes does not materialize because of
the existence of a series of multiple factors
11 The Romanian Journal of European Studieswhich characterise the job market2, the absence
of well-established ethnic networks or the pres-
ence of cultural and linguistic barriers in the
countries indicated as probable destination
(Kaczmarczyk, 2004). 
On the importance of seeing the bigger pic-
ture, we cannot but be in complete agreement
with the statement made by Claire Wallace
(1999): “Being poor is not enough to become a
migrant”. 
With these issues in mind, the partial nega-
tion of the Treaties’ postulate, which has sanc-
tioned the freedom of movement, throws a
gloomy light on the EU Charter of fundamental
rights (i.e. the nucleus of the European Consti-
tution) and raises questions on the compatibili-
ty of any unborn political union with criteria of
democratic inclusion typical of a federal struc-
ture.
A ‘Copernican revolution’ took place, within
the EU, in the middle of the ‘90s, which would
have soon transformed the global migration
regime of the continent. In 1995, for instance,
the Schengen Convention came into force ten
years after its signature, covering common
external borders, common rules in visas and
asylum, control of external borders and free
movement of persons. The ‘Schengen Informa-
tion System’ (SIS) has been established to match
freedom and security. It is directed to the gath-
ering and exchange of personal identification
data and the description of lost and stolen
objects. Limited to the five 1985 founding States
(France, Germany and Benelux), the Schengen
space has progressively extended to nearly all
EU member States (with the exception of the
United Kingdom and Ireland). Furthermore, the
southern European member States, belonging to
the Mediterranean model born at the beginning
of the 1980s, grouping common migratory char-
acteristics and experiences, followed paths sim-
ilar to those of the CEE countries, adapting their
mechanisms of borders control. The reactive
character of many of these legislations has since
been considered unsuitable for implementation,
in its ignorance of historical contingencies and
existing immigration policies (Ke (pin ´ska, Stola,
2004).
The need to satisfy parameters established
from above, at the EU level, without the advice
of the directly interested countries, has pushed
on several occasions to postulate policies that
are often inadequate in taking into account the
historical characteristics of the CEE region and
the problems, as a consequence of population
movements in the past century, which have aris-
en in the displacement of ethnic minorities out-
side their borders of origin. The management of
CEE ethnic minorities therefore, cannot be con-
ceived on the basis of the Western European
experience, because conditions are rarely analo-
gous and the range of rights which the minori-
ties of these regions aspire to and those that the
governments of their countries of origin would
be willing to grant are much wider compared
with Western European standards (Górny, Rus-
pini, 2004). 
It may be that in the process of EU enlarge-
ment, ad hoc meetings and exchanges of experi-
ences at the EU level between all the actors con-
cerned with the policy-making process, would
have been useful, including those of immigrant
communities and ethnic minorities from East-
ern and Western Europe. This would have
enabled migration experts of the candidate
countries to be actively and effectively involved
in the formation of immigration policy. Such
active involvement would certainly have served
as a stimulus to facilitate a search for solutions
and compromises in the diplomatic controver-
sies arose during the enlargement process.
The above observations are not aimed at dis-
claiming the important role of the ‘reactive’ ele-
ment in spurring on the formation and harmo-
nization of member and candidate countries
immigration policies. This is certainly a first
goal, though not definitive, however important,
when such diverse starting premises are consid-
ered. The alleged facts also testify to the influ-
ence that politics, and not only market rules,
give to the importance of shaping the flow of
migration and to the space of that singular
model of supranational political integration that
is the European Union. This (re)shaping has not
always occurred in the right and desired direc-
tion, aimed at matching the general with the
specific interests of immigrant groups and eth-
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2 ‘Permeability’ and ‘impermeability’ of the enlarged EU bordersnic minorities. At any rate, the fact that policy-
making process has started, is an important suc-
cess in itself.
On the basis of what is set out above, the
importance, therefore, of the role that the Schen-
gen acquis or convergence criteria play in shap-
ing the EU borders is self-evident. An unexpect-
ed freedom of movement on behalf of CEE citi-
zens towards the West generated by the
removal of the exit controls in the 1990s, has
been enjoyed. Many took advantage of the con-
cession of temporary permits, staying perma-
nently in Western European countries, in partic-
ular where the geographic proximity, the histor-
ical and cultural ties and the economic attrac-
tion of the labour markets made the stay rea-
sonable and employment possibilities more
advantageous. Absence of exit controls together
with the adoption of liberal immigration poli-
cies by several western European countries was
responsible for a flow of migration towards the
West and may have often even sparked this
flow.
Moreover, in the decade preceding the
beginning of the 1990s, the CEE migration terri-
tory worked nearly exclusively according to
internal rules; population movements were
mainly restricted to the CEE region, as a direct
consequence of the lack of exit controls and
passport visas for accessing the West. These
dynamics were functional to Western Europe.
The region acted, in fact, as ‘buffer zone’
between East and West and so it was until 1°
May 2004. The Schengen barrier played the role
of propeller for CEE migratory flows for a long
time. Flows were circular, ‘incomplete’, trig-
gered by the exploitation of wage differentials
at the time of the transition of the CEE
economies and at the same time a backwardness
and the progressive decline of the bordering
former-Soviet republics.
An ‘epos’ came about, made of peddlers,
small ‘entrepreneurs’, asylum seekers, ethnic
networks and dubious legal trading between
bordering regions of Eastern Europe, the fasci-
nating study and research of which has
remained unchanging regardless of the time
which goes by. Therefore, what at first was tem-
porary mobility, slowly became a transforma-
tion towards settlement implying permanent
stay. The rate of mixed marriages between Poles
and Ukrainians, for instance, increased as a
result of the prolonged stay and the new and
continuing flows from the East, thus demon-
strating the significance of a particular kind of
flow within the overall character of migration
originating in the former Soviet Union (Górny,
Ke (pin ´ska, 2004).
CEE countries will soon show characteristics
and profiles similar to Western Europe in their
way of experiencing the migratory phenome-
non. Castles and Miller (1993) identified the
constant factors associating countries that
reached various stages of their immigration
experience so as to include: 
 A dynamic process of migration, which
transformed the temporary entry of work-
ers and refugees into permanent settlers
who form distinct ethnic groups;
 The economic and social marginalization
of the immigrants;
 Community formation among immigrants;
 Increasing interaction between immigrant
groups and the local population;
 The imperative for the state to react to
immigration and ethnic diversity (Castles,
1995: 293).
These are stages which Castles and Miller
have found, through different sources, in all the
Western European countries, and that global
migratory dynamics are gradually exporting to
the CEE region. This hypothesis can be verified
on the grounds of how the enlarged migration
territory is synthetically analysed herein. The
territory is delimited by new borders, and
diverse migratory experiences will increasingly
tend to converge until the similarities as listed
by Castles and Miller will prevail over the dif-
ferences. 
The debate in question is not the next con-
vergence on migration, but, rather, it is the ques-
tion of the identity of the European migration
territory and its borders. The reshaping of this
territory and the Eastward shift of the EU bor-
der has actually generated dynamics of inclu-
sion and exclusion to be carefully observed. 
In this regard, this research diverges from
that which declares the superiority of the mar-
ket laws on politics, supporting the ‘uninter-
rupted’ porosity of the EU border without mak-
ing any distinction between the time before and
after the EU enlargement (Favell, Hansen, 2002).
There is no objection as far as the porosity of the
borders in the fifteen years before the enlarge-
ment is concerned. There is, rather, the convic-
tion that migration dynamics and regional net-
works have suffered meaningful consequences
because of the EU enlargement, and they
require political interventions to face the
13 The Romanian Journal of European Studiesprocess of reshaping the borders and the ongo-
ing mechanisms of enclosure. 
In other words, I would argue that factors of
inclusion and exclusion generated by the 2004
enlargement created ‘visible’ borders, like the
one between Poland and Ukraine, and equally
‘invisible’ borders, as those generated by the
simultaneous existence of wage differentials
and the new boundaries of entry and mobility.
The differences of socio-economic development,
though inherent to the expansion processes,
endanger the cohesion and social tissue of cul-
turally and geographically similar communities
and the well-established exchange and mobility
practices between borders. 
As a matter of fact, it is not only question of
East-West borders, but of North-South geopolit-
ical spaces, as remarked some months before
the Eastward enlargement, by some Maghreb
colleagues who complained at the insufficient
attention given to EU processes of “inclusion”
on the Southern side of the Mediterranean.
There is not doubt that the process of European
integration is made of tight interdependent
variables (Wallace H., 2001), but one should not
forget that the meaningful, though not com-
plete, solution of the East-West differences with-
in the EU enlargement, leaves the North-South
difference unsolved. 
Though mistrusting the porosity of the CEE
borders, it is difficult to imagine Europe as a
‘Fortress’.  More realistically, the Union should
strive to re-establish an absence or “forever lost”
socio-economic equilibrium. For example, the
EU should aim at preventing an expansion of
the bridge demarcating the border between
Narva in Estonia and Ivangorod in Russia; two
urban agglomerates which were a single city up
until 1° May 2004 (Visetti, 2004). Metaphorically
speaking, this represents a deep moat between
Catholicism and Orthodoxy, European Union
and Russia.
The pendulum fluctuates, attracted, as it is,
by two opposite magnetic fields. Helen Wallace,
herself, (1996: 13) sharply noticed the fluctua-
tions resulting from the shifts in interests and
loyalties in the process of policy coordination of
the EU field of Justice and home affairs. These
fluctuations happen during the policy forma-
tion/harmonisation between the national and
transnational/supranational dimension. The
European institutions on one side and the
national level governance on the other (with the
minor ‘magnetic fields’ of the regional and local
dimension) are two opposite poles in competi-
tion for the overall field of decisional spaces.
The probability that one or the other dimension
prevails and the policies adopted depend on the
strength of the two magnetic fields: if both sides
are weak, no coherent policy will emerge either
at the supranational or the national level.
Helen Wallace’s “pendulum” is based on a
series of premises, which we have indirectly
pointed out, like the political inadequacy of the
national States, the impact of globalisation and
the specific features of the European region
(Apap, 2004). The pendulum movements illus-
trate, with precision, the opposite tensions
under way during the process of European inte-
gration: its progresses at times regular, other
times irregular, the fluctuations and the immo-
bility. Wallace’s metaphor is also useful to illus-
trate the contrast, which became more and more
intense from the second half of the 1990s, in the
creation of the EU immigration and asylum pol-
icy between the intergovernmental and supra-
national dimension. A contrast which, in the
light of the structural characteristics of the
model, does not anticipate a definitive solution
in favour of one or the other dimension, but
rather a continuous fluctuation with sometimes
the prevailing of one, sometimes of the other,
depending on the historical circumstances and
the political and economic interests at stake.
In this context, some more precise informa-
tion is necessary in order to contextualise the
fluctuations in this field of policy. After the
entry in force of the Treaty of Maastricht, the
1990s saw the 1996-97 European intergovern-
mental conference that prepared the Treaty of
Amsterdam. On 2nd October 1997, the treaty
was signed and on 1° May 1999 came into force.
The European Union became ‘a space of free-
dom, security and justice’. Justice and home
affairs acquired a wider field of action and more
specific objectives; the European institutions a
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3 The ‘pendulum’ of Helen Wallace 
and the ‘pillar’ of Justice and home affairsmore balanced role and a more effective and
democratic method of work had been planned
(CE, 2002a). Moreover, the European Commis-
sion acquired wider prerogatives and a new
Title (IV) included in the Treaty encompassed
freedom of movement, immigration and asy-
lum. The Schengen agreements were integrated
in the legal frame of the acquis of the European
Union. Aims to be achieved are “free movement
of persons” (EU and third country residents)
and “security through the fight of crime and ter-
rorism” (art. 2 of the Single European Act). The
introduction of a scoreboard, the so-called
“Scoreboard to Review Progress on the Creation
of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in
the European Union” should guarantee the
periodic control of the work in progress.
It is the beginning of the ‘communitarisa-
tion’ of the immigration policies. The praxis of
intergovernmental consultation however, seems
to fade definitively on the horizon. In fact, in the
five years from the entry in force of the Treaty of
Amsterdam (2004), the decisions on immigra-
tion and asylum will have to be adopted only
with a qualified majority. Besides, the European
Council will have to assure the effective free-
dom of movement, the control of the borders
and the implementation of all the other meas-
ures in the field of immigration and asylum
(Geddes, 2003). 
In October 1999, a special European Council
gathered in Tampere with the aim to make the
EU into ‘an area of freedom, security and jus-
tice’. One of the priorities of the Tampere Coun-
cil is the invitation to the EU member States to
elaborate a common policy on asylum and
immigration. The aim of the common policy in
these specific fields implies the creation of “a
harmonized and common way for immigrants
and asylum seekers to obtain entry to all EU
States” (CE, 2002b). The main intervention areas
to reach these goals have been carefully listed
(for instance, Górny, Ruspini, 2004: 251). 
In short, with the signing of the Treaty of
Amsterdam and the following meeting of the
European Council in Tampere, a new institu-
tional revolution seemed to overturn from their
foundations, the European institutions and start
an unprecedented acceleration in the EU
process of decisional coordination in the field of
asylum and immigration. Unfortunately, this is
not exactly true of the current situation. 
The subsequent European Councils, in the
years from 2001 to 2003, showed a deceleration
(Laeken) in asylum and immigration policy, fol-
lowed by the determination to go on (Seville) or
again by the acknowledgment of the progresses
made with the approval of so long waited direc-
tives, like the one on ‘family reunification’ or
‘the status of third-country nationals who are
long-term residents’ (Thessaloniki). In fact, it is
clear from the analysis of the documentation
produced in these and other venues, that the
member States’ are determined not to abdicate
from their own prerogatives of national sover-
eignty by keeping control of such a sensitive
field as immigration. The resounding declara-
tions of principle included in these documents
often clash with the daily practices of the
national governments, urging the European
Commission on more than one occasion, to
invite the member States not to adopt legisla-
tions in the migratory field which might, to a
certain extent, contrast or hinder the ongoing
supranational harmonization. 
The metaphor of the Wallace ‘pendulum’
thus seems to find in these statements and in the
contradictory results listed so far, a reason of
being and a true confirmation. In spite of the
efforts at harmonizing, it is however, legitimate
to argue that progress in this area is, at the end
of the day, the result of a combination of inter-
governmental and supranational political deci-
sions (Jordan, Stråth, Triandafyllidou, 2003). 
On 1° May 2004, the conclusion of the first
imposing phase of the process of the EU
enlargement with the accession of 10 new mem-
ber States, took place at the same time as the
entry in force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The
enlargement, with the revision of the borders
and the external relations of the Union, had
raised hopes in the setting aside of another
aspect of the member States sovereignty and the
intensification of efforts for the common policy
formation even in areas like immigration and
asylum policy (Ruspini, 2002). In fact, the num-
ber of directives adopted in this field is, all in all,
scarce in comparison with the legislative pro-
posals put forward since Tampere, while the
decisional mechanisms, at the moment, have
not been changed as originally expected. The
inability of the European Convention to impose
the qualified majority voting on national States
as condicio sine qua non in some sensitive deci-
sional fields of the new European Constitution3,
showed unavoidable repercussions on the
expected deadline for the entry in force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam. The agreement reached
by the European leaders on the so-called ‘The
Hague Programme’ during the 4th and 5th
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new 2010 deadline for the adoption of common
policy solutions in the field of asylum and
immigration. 
The approval of this new agenda has
allowed the adoption of qualified majority deci-
sions in the field of border controls, illegal
immigration and asylum starting from 2005.
The area of legal immigration remains instead
subject to the unanimity rule and the right of
veto until the European Constitution is not
approved. There is a predominant feeling, that
counterbalances, deceleration and distinctions
on principles will influence future political
choices, allowing the ‘pendulum of Wallace’ to
fluctuate again.
Having witnessed the conclusion of the first
phase of expansion of the EU migration space, it
is interesting to note how the post-Tampere
agenda will be effective and what the impact
this will have in the forming a common immi-
gration policy. I would limit suggestions to a
few remarks regarding the migratory phenome-
nology of the enlarged EU and to the identifica-
tion of variables while providing a view of the
future scenario. For clarity’s sake I would first
focus on a series of points. 
 The EU migration territory has been
enlarged and it will be further increased to
the Southeast;
 The ‘buffer zone’ between East and West
moved further eastwards;
 The borders are not porous as before, at
least in this EU border zone;
 Russia and the former-Soviet republics are
still lacking suitable laws and infrastruc-
tures to carry out the role of  ‘buffer zone’,
long represented by the CEE countries
before the EU enlargement;
 Migrants coming from the former-Soviet
republics and the extremities of the Asian
continent travel in the huge geographic
spaces of Russia and the Soviet former-
republics looking for a landing place in the
West;
 Centrifugal migratory dynamics (towards
the West) are added to centripetal dynam-
ics (towards the ‘core’ of Russia) making
the overall Eurasian migration space
extremely fluctuating.
In this context, the demographic and eco-
nomic differentials between border regions of
the post-Soviet universe spark the migratory
flows. The absence of controls in entry and the
strict controls in exit towards the West, some-
times transform the transit in the post-Soviet
space in stay of indefinite length. According to
the most reliable estimations, 4/5 million immi-
grants are irregularly present in the territory of
the Russian Federation (Ivakhniouk, 2003). It is
an irregularity-settling tank that should raise
greater interest from the EU side. 
At the southern borders of the European
continent, the Mediterranean Sea separates
opposite poles of economic development. The
Maghreb presses to tighten closer ties with the
countries of the north side of the Mediter-
ranean, while migrants coming from sub-Saha-
ran Africa try desperately to move towards the
Schengen space (Barros, Lahlou, et al., 2002).
The Maghreb countries are therefore assuming
characteristics of transit typical to migratory
phenomenology already seen in other geo-
graphic areas of the European continent.
Which is the EU answer to these dynamics?
The concession of ‘facilitated transit’ settles con-
troversies like the one involving the Kaliningrad
region, the enclave between East and West of
the enlarged Union, and allows the Russians of
Ivangorod to visit their neighbours of Narva,
but are only extemporaneous solutions for con-
troversies of small or medium size intensity.
These solutions certainly indicate the best prac-
tices in facing similar cases in other EU zones,
but their complexity and their limited opera-
tional sphere show undoubtedly several limits. 
The ‘neighbourhood policy’ prepared for the
EU expansion is still too vague. The Union has
planned ad hoc budget lines for implementing
these policies by taking advantage of experience
gained from with other financial instruments
like Phare, Tacis and MEDA (CEC, 2004). In any
case, though important, the problem not only
lies in identifying and displaying adequate
financial instruments for policy implementa-
tion. Overall, the policies proposed by the Euro-
pean Commission, aimed at smoothing the way
for the neighbourhood policy, still lack a real
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4 Forms and features of the post-enlargement migration spacevision. They do not seem able to avoid the
methodological superficiality and scientific
vagueness of expressions like “ring of friends”
to define the countries bordering the European
Union. It is actually not always a question of
“friends”, if one considers the strongly authori-
tarian regime of Alexander Lukashenko in
Byelorussia and his scornful and definite scarce-
ly conciliating attitude, not only towards the EU
but also towards Russia.
The existence of an unstable and uncertain
world on its doorstep should put pressure on
the EU to take political action, as well as eco-
nomic measures, in order to meet the challenges
and problems of the “neighbouring” areas.
Closer to our immediate interests, i.e. immigra-
tion policy, one should be thinking now about
multilateral solutions that can effectively
involve all interested parties in the policy-mak-
ing process. A solution could be to use the
“open method of coordination” (CEC, 2001) for
the EU immigration policy, not only in ‘horizon-
tal’ way, i.e. by involving all the actors at nation-
al level in the setting up of immigration policy,
but also in a ‘vertical’ way by involving the non-
governmental and international organizations,
the migrant associations and the ethnic minori-
ties operating at transnational level. This coor-
dination should be established by stimulating
participation in the process of harmonization on
behalf of all actors in the interested countries,
old and new EU members and those neighbour-
ing countries whose membership is probably
not imminent.
The challenge of a further expansion is
awaiting us: the expected 2007 participation
extended to Rumania and Bulgaria, and possi-
bly the one to Croatia in 2008 and that to Turkey
whose accession date has still to come. Turkey
seems to raise more problems, because of its
demographic potential and, above all, its Mus-
lim identity overlapping the East and the West.
It is worth remembering that, only few years
ago, the fear that some million Turkish citizens
resident in Germany were able to acquire, over
time, a double nationality and consequently a
significant electoral power, forced the adoption
of a compromise model in reforming the citi-
zenship law. The new law adopted some ele-
ments of jus soli, but the hypothesis of a double
passport originally included in the reform sup-
ported by the red-green coalition, has been
rejected. In the following years, advocated by
the Christian-democratic and social Christian
party a new debate started concerning national
identity and the concept of Leitkultur, a ‘domi-
nant culture’ whose roots date back, according
to the exponents of the two parties, to the Chris-
tian tradition of Germany. 
The German case is only one example. Other
western countries are experiencing equally
strong conflicts on issues of identity which the
September 11 tragedy particularly exacerbated.
The conditions of immigrant communities and
ethnic minorities living in the European Union
became harsher. The multicultural practices are
constantly under discussion and face more and
more difficulties in being really implemented
(Rex, 2004). The Turkish issue is added to this
composite picture, forcing the European Union
to rethink itself, its identity and its borders.
Finally, only when the debate on the identity of
the European Union is entirely exhausted will
the practical problems of the national and
supranational political spheres aspire to a suit-
able solution.
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lan, Basingstoke, pp. 1–22.In the course of an intensifying cross-border and trans-societal inter-connectedness the sovereignty of nation-states and
especially their capacity to effectively govern policy issues in a unilateral way have been eroded. In the mid-80s, trying to
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to co-ordinate their approaches in order to find multi-lateral solutions as an exit-strategy out of declining national regulat-
ing capacities. Until today a complex, but somehow still embryonic, regional regime of inter-governmental collaboration
has evolved. In addition to nation-states, trans-state expert panels and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) have
become the avant-garde in the promotion of new techniques to manage migration and asylum ‘in a more orderly way.’ 
With regard to theories of international relations, the article will outline why and how inter-governmental organisa-
tions have become embedded as new ‘managers.’ The role and contribution of these organisations then will be evaluat-
ed with regard to aspects of democratic transparency, accountability and policy effectiveness.
In the EU (European Union) context, IGOs provide additional possibilities for negotiations but serve as well as a ‘fast-
track exit strategy’ for individual Member states to avoid complex and rather slow common decision making processes.
Characterised by low levels of policy transparency but a high involvement in the implementation of restrictive policies,
it is questionable if IGOs respect the interests of EU citizens and immigrants. Rather, the approaches currently applied
by IGOs undermine the project of tolerant, more open-minded receiving societies. As will be argued, it is due to intra-
organisational financial interests, the IGO´s own political struggle for global/regional or issue-specific (asylum/migra-
tion) leadership as well as the power inequality between receiving and sending states that in the near future a new – more
just – global or regional framework for the movement of people is unlikely to be established.
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Introductionconcerned how the perspective on migratory
movements within this new management para-
digm seem to have become generalised and
simplified, and this rather technocratic para-
digm is mainly disrespecting the highly com-
plex nature of (cross-border) population move-
ments and the kaleidoscopic combination of
their political, social and economic motivations,
giving in reality every single migratory move-
ment an unique individuality. It is intended to
critically evaluate this new management para-
digm, generally subsuming (more economically
and socially motivated) migratory and (more
politically caused) refugee movements under
one single category of population movements
‘to be managed.’ The author therefore prefers to
use the rather neutral and theoretically better
founded term of ’governance.’
The term governance, with regard to theo-
ries of international relations, refers to a process
through which a single policy actor (or a multi-
tude of policy actors) intends to change the
behaviour of another actor (actor-oriented con-
ceptualisation). Simultaneously governance can
be conceptualised as an intervention of one or
more actors in social systems with the aim to
impose a change on the specific setting within a
specific policy-area or part of the society con-
cerned (setting-oriented conceptualisation).1
In the following it will be revealed that, in
addition to nation states and their specialised
government departments, increasingly non-
state/private as well as trans-state (including
IGOs) actors take the place of these traditional
actors in shaping the way migration movements
are governed. In addition, the embryonic inter-
national regime to govern (or manage) migra-
tions, having emerged within the last twenty
years in Europe as well as in other world
regions, is characterised by the struggle of these
traditional state actors in keeping the capability
to solve their nationally experienced migration
‘problem’ by joining forces with other govern-
ments and thereby defend their regulatory
capacity. The intentions of non-state, trans-state
and traditional state actors to govern migration
movements hereby include the intention to mit-
igate the root causes leading to emigration in
other (mostly non-European) countries; gover-
nance is hereby directed towards (state) actors
in sending and transit countries as well as the
specific setting existing within the societies of
these states.
The general discourse about globalisation
encloses the paradigm of nation states that, in
the course of intensifying cross-border and
trans-societal internationalisation processes,
have lost most of their former regulatory capac-
ity, authoritative power and sovereignty.2 While
non-state organisations (NGOs etc.) are increas-
ingly acting trans-nationally, far-reaching liber-
alisations in the field of trade and financial
transactions have led to the fact that private cor-
porations are able to effectively circumvent
national regulations.3 National governments –
with regard to the challenge to govern policy
issues that hardly respect the territorial borders
of their polities – are confronted with the need
to co-operate with other nation states and their
actors in order to find cross-border and trans-
polity solutions and to co-ordinate their indi-
vidual actions in a given cross-border policy-
area with those of these foreign forces. 
In the field of environmental protection,
trade or the use of nuclear power, this has led to
a new quality of cross-border negotiations and
bargaining. By collaborating on the internation-
al level, national governments nowadays seek to
find solutions for problems they either cannot
solve due to their cross-border character or con-
sist in issues that by unilateral action can only be
tackled in a less effective way than by multilater-
al action. Not least of all, governments, by
intending to bridge and close widening gaps in
the implementation of policies by substituting
or combining unilateral action by/with multilat-
eral efforts, aim at securing their former author-
itative position or at pretending to still possess
full regulatory capacities.4
Despite these new intentions for internation-
al collaboration, state actors are struggling hard
to keep up with new actors that have become
involved in cross-border governance beyond the
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1. Bridging the gaps in policy implementation: 
From unilateralism to multilateralism and supra-nationalism in
migration governancenation state: international non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), private corporations and
inter-governmental organisations (IGOs, being
formed by nation states). 
In addition to the terms of international or
global governance, referring broadly to new
forms of multilateral negotiations and bargains
in often over-lapping policy issues, the concept
of international regimes is mostly used to
describe a specific setting of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actors’ expectations
converge in a given (and specific) issue-area.5
Regimes hereby can be conceptualised as institu-
tional as well as normative arrangements to
facilitate co-operation and co-ordination among
rational, ego-centric and from each other inde-
pendent policy actors with the aim to circum-
vent or mitigate negative side-effects of solely
unilateral policy actions.6 In contrast to ad-hoc
agreements, international regimes are arrange-
ments with a certain capacity to resist to/to cope
with short-term shifts regarding the power rela-
tions and interest constellations among the
regime members.7 Within a regime, the inten-
tions of actors to influence the governance of
policy issues can either be directed towards the
setting of the regime itself or towards other
actors inside or outside this collaborative
arrangement.
Embedded in the globalisation paradigm is
the assumption that migratory and refugee
movements are directly resulting from fading
national regulatory capacities of receiving,
sending and transit countries. Already in the
1980s, several states started with the project of a
new international regime to govern migration
and refugee movements on the regional level
(Europe as the main example), the UN Secretary
General now again reinforced these intentions
by calling out a Global Commission on Migra-
tion8 in order to discuss a new global, more just
framework for the movement of people.
Like will be outlined in the following chap-
ters, Member states of the European Union (EU)
have been successful in achieving a high level of
institutionalised collaboration with other (non-)
European states in certain fields of migration
governance. Among EU Member states multi-
lateral collaboration has now reached the level
to become even supra-nationalised (the shift
from inter-governmental collaboration towards
the governance of migration and asylum issues
exercised by supra-national institutions of the
EU). Inter-governmental organisations and
cross-border expert panels have been crucial to
achieve this high level of intra-EU as well as EU-
overlapping international collaboration – the
evolvement of a migration and asylum regime
that has become extended to neighbouring
regions (like Northern Africa). However, it has
to be emphasised that this regime – established
within the last twenty years – hardly can be
regarded as an all-encompassing, complete
arrangement as it focuses until today nearly
exclusively on border controls, the restriction
and avoidance of further immigration to EU
core states.
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With the beginning of the 1980s and then
later, with more emphasis, towards the end of
the twentieth century, a trend in mid- and West-
European receiving states gained momentum to
severely restrict and avoid further in-coming
migration and refugee movements. Following
decades in that the former Federal Republic of
Germany, the Benelux-states, Switzerland and
France have been in need to recruit foreign
guest-workers, and refugees were able to bene-
fit from a certain, ideologically founded open-
ness (‘The free west’), the beginning of a global
economic crisis and the implosion of communist
regimes in Eastern Europe and Asia led to a
turning point. Within the field of migration and
asylum, as outlined by JOLY, LAVENEX and
BLASCHKE, a new realism followed former more
humanitarian or economically-rational
approaches. Being based on the scenario of
uncontrollable mass immigration from East
Europe, European receiving societies developed
the fear to become flooded with migrants and
asylum seekers in a time when a profound crisis
of their welfare systems started to evolve.9
Especially against the background of the
outbreak of violent inter-ethnic conflicts, war-
fare, mass displacement and the split up of the
multi-ethnic republic of Yugoslavia, the threat
2. New realisms, the project of a European migration and asylum
regime and the European Dilemma of decision-makingof an implosion of the Soviet empire and its
satellite states, potential Western European
receiving countries acted, in a first step, unilater-
ally by imposing harsher immigration and asy-
lum regulations and increased efforts to prevent
mass movements.10 Indeed, the more restrictive
realist approach of receiving states had a certain
success: the vast majority of refugees from the
territory of Yugoslavia, only granted with a
temporary refugee status, returned shortly
afterwards; in addition, the common restrictive
hard-line of EC Member states (European Com-
munity) opened the floor for new multilateral
approaches with the goal to guarantee an effec-
tive further restriction of in-coming migration
and refugee movements. Member states hereby
coincided in their perception of migratory
movements as being a (potential future) threat,
endangering the construct of ethnically homo-
geneous nation states, their social cohesion and
security. 
Firstly, the development of an embryonic
Western European (EC) ‘control regime’ was
due to the common perception among the mem-
bers of the EC that multilateral action was now
needed in order to prevent migration and
refugee movements from becoming out of con-
trol and to allay native fears of deepening social
inequalities caused by immigration.11 Until
today consisting as an inter-governmental gov-
ernance model, this regime provided the collab-
orative background for a far-reaching ‘harmon-
isation’ (a close substantial convergence) of
national legislations concerning the possibilities
for so-called ‘Third Country Nationals’12 to get
access, permissions to stay and work or asylum
within the European Community/European
Union. 
Secondly - in addition to a shared need to col-
laborate on the inter-governmental (multilater-
al) level - the harmonisation process in the field
of migration and asylum resulted from a sec-
ond, (more functional) need, steming as a logi-
cal consequence from the progress in European
integration: following the Schengen Treaty
(1985) and the Single European Act (1987), the
new freedom for EC citizens to circulate and
migrate between different Member states had to
be flanked by common regulations concerning
the controls of the external borders, their fortifi-
cation.13 In this context, new Member states,
like Spain – due to the policy pressure exercised
by core states like Germany or France – had to
implement foreigners’ bills that acknowledged
the interests of these core states to realise a
restrictive governance of migration flows. This
shows that the interests of some ‘partners’ with-
in this multilateral bargaining process were able
to outweigh weaker parties.14
In addition to the establishment of a collabo-
rative arrangement (regime) in the field of
migration control, following the Treaty of
Dublin (1990), a regional regime to co-ordinate
and harmonise the asylum policies evolved
among the EC Member states. Intending to reg-
ulate which Member is responsible to decide
about a possible asylum status, this regime
encloses the concept of so-called ‘Safe Third
Countries’ as well as a list of states declared as
being politically stable and free of politically
motivated forms of persecution. To enforce the
implementation of control measures, the restric-
tions on the access of unwanted migrants
(including potential asylum-seeking migrants)
in general, the regulations of Schengen and
Dublin enclosed the formulation of carrier sanc-
tions for airlines and other transport companies
failing to ensure that their passengers possess
valid documents and are allowed to enter the
EC and/or that they do not overstay their visas.
Although migration and asylum issues in
the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) now were offi-
cially transferred from the third (inter-govern-
mental co-operation, Treaty of Maastricht, 1992)
to the first pillar of EU decision-making (com-
mon EU decision-making), EU Member states
remain reluctant to transfer substantial deci-
sion-making powers to the supra-national level.
So far, migration and asylum issues – as a poli-
cy area in the intersection between the national
and the European level – remain chiefly gov-
erned by national governments and the coordi-
nating mechanism of the European Council. The
European Parliament, in contrast, does not thus
far possess any decision-making and politically
binding power; actions of the Commission
remain limited to initiatives and proposals
directed to the Council. 
Migration and asylum issues can be regard-
ed as one of the last, but heavily defended
issues touching a decidedly sensitive part of the
whole Europeanization process and posing a
severe dilemma for the development of a (sub-
stantially advanced and effective) European
Political Union. This sentiment continues to
exist, despite the fact that with regards to coop-
eration–theory, the step towards further inter-
governmental co-operation and then supra-
nationalization is likely to take place given the
congruent interests among EU member States,
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that migration will be crucial for the future
wealth and development of European societies
that now begin to experience a drastic decrease
of their native work force and a `greying´ of
their population, a transformation of the current
restrictive control regime seems advisable. 
In 2005, the EU Commission presented a first
version of a Green Paper towards initiating a
common European recruitment scheme that is
offering immigrants new possibilities to work
and live legally within the EU.16 Against the
background of the current crisis of the EU (Rat-
ification of the EU Constitution) and a new
wave of ‘Realpolitiken’ of individual EU Mem-
ber states, however, it remains uncertain as to
when such a common approach could be
reached, let alone implemented. At the moment,
the inter-governmental governance model to
avoid and restrictively control a further influx of
immigrants and asylum seekers, in contrast,
seems likely to gain momentum, given the
shared perception of immigration to be closely
linked with the issue of terrorism (following the
devastating attacks of Madrid and London).
Despite the general discourse, arguing that
European receiving states do only possess limit-
ed regulatory capacity to effectively govern
migration and asylum issues in the national
context (often this discourse confuses hereby
the issues of integration with those of illegal
migration, border controls and the fight against
terrorism), Europe as a regional context can
serve as an example that migration in deed can
be effectively limited, although not completely
avoided. The exodus from East Europe and Asia
in most cases has been governed effectively,
restrictively limited/avoided in large parts and
the majority of migrants and refugees, coming
from the crisis area of the Balkans, has returned.
The main problem has more to be seen in failing
national policies to actively promote the equal
participation of Third Country Nationals in
European societies and does – in contrast to the
general image of mass media and political dis-
course – not consist in the fact that borders are
too porous. However, migrants willing to cross
borders can do so (even if these borders are
heavily fortified/technologically secured) by
risking their lives and investing high amounts
of money.
The effectiveness in restrictively limiting
mass movements is, in addition to the close pol-
icy co-ordination among EC/EU Member states
and the harmonisation of national approaches
and legislations, mainly due to the extension of
a collaborative institutional and normative
arrangement towards main sending and transit
states in neighbourhood to the territory of the
EC (EU), especially the territory of the Schengen
Treaty. Within the framework of various, partly
overlapping, consultation and co-operation
processes, Member states of the EC, starting at
the end of the 1980s, developed a common
approach towards these neighbouring states to
convince them to closely co-operate with them
in the restriction of further immigration. Simul-
taneously, EC states within these processes have
been successful in transferring vast extents of
the costs for limiting and controlling migratory
and refugee movements to their neighbours.17
Within the so-called ‘Budapest Process’
(established in 1993, following the consultative
processes of Berlin and Vienna), representatives
of Eastern and Central European post-commu-
nist transformation countries (later as well from
the territory of the Community of Independent
States (CIS) and other transit and sending coun-
tries) held informal meetings to discuss with
officials of EC and EFTA (European Free Trade
Area, including Switzerland) Member states
measures to strengthen border surveillance and
approaches how the ‘migration pressure’ on EC
states could be reduced. For their co-operation
in taking back rejected asylum seekers and ‘ille-
gal’ (unwanted) migrants or (as safe countries)
processing asylum seekers within their territory
and repatriate rejected persons to other neigh-
bouring countries, these Central and Eastern
European states were granted with financial
and technical assistance.18
However, given the highly informal charac-
ter of these consultative processes and the fact
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3. Bringing new actors in: Expert panels and inter-governmental
organisations Consultative Processes on migration and asylum:
Budapest and Barcelonathat (officially) no resolutions of politically
binding character were formulated, the effect of
these forums on the evolvement of a regional
migration and asylum regime can only be
roughly estimated.19 The high significance of
this process, however, becomes evident with
regard of the development of this consultative
forums: until today there has been a continuous
growth by incorporating more and more receiv-
ing, transit and countries in these consultations,
in addition, the consultative forum became rep-
resented by the establishment of its own inter-
governmental organisation, the International
Centre for Migration Policy Development
(ICMPD) – therefore it seems likely that the
member states of this organisation and forum
regard the Budapest Process as a politically utile
platform for inter-governmental negotiations on
issues of migration and asylum.20
In retrospective, it can be assumed that this
inter-governmental political dialogue was of
crucial importance not only for the East-ward
extension of the EC-control regime (by avoiding
a direct access and claim-making of migrants
and asylum seekers on EC/EU territory, their
processing on the territory of Eastern and Cen-
tral European states and the repatriation and
border control measures of these states), but
also for the preparation of the EU-accession of
some of these states. The new ten Member states
of the EU, following the Budapest process and
other bilateral and multilateral negotiations,
adopted and implemented national regulations
that went conform to the Schengen Acquis and
the interests of their more powerful EC/EU or
EFTA neighbours.21 Their accession to the EU
therefore could be somehow regarded as being
a reward of their willingness for close co-opera-
tion in these matters.
The eastward extension of the EC migration
and asylum control regime was replenished to
the South by the set-up of consultative forums
with neighbouring transit and sending coun-
tries of Africa, especially the Maghreb states. In
the framework of the so-called ’Barcelona-
Process’ (initiated in 1992) – the European-
Mediterranean Partnership – issues of develop-
ment aid, the promotion of human rights and
the establishment of a free trade area (to become
realised between the Member states of the EU
and their African counterparts in 2012) were
linked with the extension and intensification of
border controls and cross-regional (mostly
police) co-operation to impose strict limitations
on migratory movements originating from
Africa. Most African members of this process
promised to take back rejected asylum seekers
and ‘illegal’ migrants after being expulsed from
European territory, while approaches to grant
more possibilities for their citizens to accede to
EU states on a temporary basis have been dis-
cussed (mostly on a bilateral basis, for example
between Morocco and Spain), but, however, in
most cases not have been implemented so far.
These mostly informal consultative process-
es on migration and asylum issues, mostly
embedded in broader and multiple issue-policy
frames (like the European-Mediterranean Part-
nership), with regard to international regime
theory, do not necessarily have to lead to long-
term institutional and normative arrangements
(regimes). In some cases, their policy outcome
and effect is limited to short-term/ad-hoc agree-
ments without any politically binding character
– however, the initiation of such consultative
processes is seen as a necessary step for the
preparation and initiation of a regime in a spe-
cific issue area. 
Consultative processes, based on negotia-
tions between government officials, scientific
experts and representatives of IGOs (as well as
in some cases of actors of the civil society), can
be described with the concept of ‘policy net-
works’ Policy networks are providing the
framework for first contacts between decision-
makers from different (national, scientific or
political) background, they serve in stabilising
and relativising actor’s expectations and are
crucial in establishing of a formal equilibrium
among actors that mostly differ greatly with
regard to their capacities.22 In the context of pol-
icy making processes that increasingly disre-
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4. The new avant-garde in migration governance:  
Inter-governmental organisations (IGO´s)
and trans-state expert panelsspect national borders, policy networks provide
the platform for harmonising states’/ actor’s
unilateral approaches with those of other
states/actors and the achievement of inter-gov-
ernmental deals/bargains to achieve a multilat-
eral/multi-party solution of a policy problem.23
To initiate and promote learning processes
(towards the achievement of a common stand-
point) so-called ‘epistemic communities,’24 con-
sisting in a trans-state dialogue of scientific
experts and certain renowned individuals (as
structures parallel to these networks), are of cru-
cial importance. In addition, inter-governmental
organisations often serve in stabilising and/or
intensifying the collaboration among states
towards the establishment of a long-term
regime. Sometimes these organisations are on
their own a direct outcome of policy-networks
and inter-governmental consultations (like in
the example of the ICMPD). In other cases,
regimes are containing inter-governmental
organisations as members or important stake-
holders (being nearly equal to states). The new
quality and character of governance, increasing-
ly taking place ‘beyond the nation state,’
becomes evident with regard to the fact that
policy networks/inter-governmental negotia-
tions and international regimes have become set
up by IGOs instead of individual state govern-
ments.25
The field of migration and asylum serves
hereby serves as a remarkable example: the
majority of today’s existing regional consulta-
tive processes in deed have been set up and are
(indirectly or directly) governed by inter-gov-
ernmental organisations like the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM), the agency of
the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) or the ICMPD (limited in its
activities mostly to the regional context of
Europe). Each of these organisations hereby is
acting simultaneously as a ‘forum organisation’
(in organising trans-state policy dialogues and
acting as the administrative co-ordinator or sec-
retariat within these consultative processes26) as
well as a more technically oriented ‘service
organisation’27 (by supplying their member
states with expertise and technical knowl-
edge28). 
While UNHCR is providing receiving, tran-
sit and sending countries with a broad reper-
toire of support measures in the field of
refugees and asylum seekers (consisting in
financial and technical support as well as policy
advice), the IOM is active in the field of
migrants’ voluntary return, repatriation and
resettlement. Both organisations as well as the
ICMPD and other smaller organisations are
aiming at a specific form of ‘capacity building’
in their member states, they provide trainings
for experts, decision-makers and practitioners
(including border police officials) in the specific
national context, and support governments
technologically as well as financially in their
efforts to better ‘manage’ (or control) migration
and refugee movements.
Especially in the context of Europe and inter-
governmental negotiations on migration and
asylum issues between EU Member states and
African, Asian or East European sending and
transit countries (including authoritarian
regimes like in the case of Libya), the advantage
of inter-governmental policy networks and
organisations can be seen in the fact that they
are officially not bound to the EU-framework
but allow, due to the membership of both
receiving and sending countries, for informal
and formal consultations without the need for
‘official’ bilateral or multilateral talks. It seems
likely that modes of governance in the field of
migration and asylum in Europe will still be
based on a multitude of European, bilateral and
multilateral approaches implemented by indi-
vidual states and/or additional inter-govern-
mental actors.29 Against the background of
lengthy and complex EU decision-making
processes and the current crisis of the European
integration process, IGOs and policy networks
can serve governments to circumvent some of
these hurdles and find at least some short-
term/ad-hoc solutions for their national ‘migra-
tion problem.’ 
Contrary to the efforts of the EU-Commis-
sion to construct a ‘more open’ regime (among
others through the newly proposed ‘Hague Pro-
gramme’ calling for national quota and immi-
gration liberalizations), the field of migration
currently is simultaneously characterised by a
new ‘re-nationalization:’ EU member States
(like Italy and Spain), seeking to find such a
quicker solution to their national migration
problem, enter in rather questionable agree-
ments (in some parts facilitated by IGOs) for the
repatriation of illegal immigrants (for example
the agreement between Italy and Libya, or the
repatriation of unwanted migrants from the
Canaries (Spain) to the Moroccan occupied
West Sahara). Especially the inter-governmental
organisation of IOM has developed into a
regional (as well a global) key actor in the new
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chapter), and has somehow become not only an
‘assistant’ for its member states but rather as
well a ‘managing director’ in providing expert-
ise and facilitating sometimes rather question-
able formal and informal agreements.
Despite the contradictions contained within
its institutional framework, Member states of
the EU (with the help of IGOs) nonetheless
attempt to communicate a ‘common restrictive
migration and asylum approach’ towards
neighbouring states and regions (among others
via the newly established ‘European Neigh-
bourhood Policy,and its migration-related ini-
tiatives). By incorporating transit and receiving
states a variety of non-state actors (including
private corporations like airline companies),
and inter-governmental organizations and
expert panels outside the official EU frame-
work, the EU and its member States to some
extent hereby ‘peripheralize’ their regional or
national ‘migration problems’ to Third coun-
tries and delegate a vast extent of responsibili-
ties (for example given by the Geneva Conven-
tion) to third states and the organisations such
as IOM, UNHCR or for example the Red Cross.
Although migration and refugee movements
in most cases are politically unwanted, the real-
ities of Europe as well as other regions show
that migratory movements, in general, are hard-
ly to be avoided. Despite accepting this reality,
public and political discourse in most EU states
is concentrated in a daily reconstruction of the
image of a migration ‘crisis’ (mostly represent-
ed as consisting in hordes of illegal migrants
arriving in boats at the coasts of Southern Spain
or Italy). The fear of ‘uncontrollable’ migration
movements hereby is directly linked to aspects
of a fading national identity (see for example the
discourse of the German Christian Democrats
(CDU) in 2004) in an enlarging European Union,
the postulation of a drastic decrease in public
security, reflected by an increase in terrorist
activities, being committed by not-enough-con-
trolled illegal/non-enough-integrated immi-
grants.
Because the European Union’s efforts to cur-
tail immigration thus far have not brought the
desired results, it must be asked whether the
perspective on immigration issues should be
changed. According to GHOSH,30 the adopting of
a new ‘regulated openness’ could lead to a de-
criminalisation and de-illegalisation of immi-
grants by providing them with more opportuni-
ties to live and work legally within the territory
of receiving states. 
Since the mid-1990s a new concept as well a
new trans-national discourse (or philosophy)
has evolved that is based on the general
assumption of migration as a problem that can
be brought to a solution by ‘managing’ migra-
tion flows in a new, more orderly and rational
way. Migration movements are hereby regarded
as an unavoidable fact and curtailing migration
seems inappropriate due to economic and
demographic reasons (for example the fact that
in certain sectors labour shortages exist (or are
foreseeable) or receiving societies suffer from a
drastic ageing of their native population and
work force). The long-term goal of states and
inter-governmental actors is the establishment
of a new international governance model, being
based on a close co-ordination between sending,
transit and receiving countries, and consisting
as a politically binding global regime (frame-
work), embracing regional- and sector-specific
sub regimes.31
Problematically, the term ‘migration man-
agement’ has now become the catch word of a
broadly generalised discourse in policy-making
and scientific debate. Although management
has become a generally used term – thanks also
to the promotion of this term by representatives
and advisors of IOM and IOM’s own scientific
journal (‘International Migration’) – however, so
far, no general turn in the perception of (and the
political response towards) the migration phe-
nomenon has occurred (given for example the
case of the EU).32
It is especially this inter-governmental
organisation, the IOM, that due to its growing
importance in the regional (Europe) as well as in
the global context became heavily criticised for
the pragmatic and mostly technocratic imple-
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5. Managing migration for the benefit of all:
Towards a new philosophy in migration and refugee governance mentation of its management approach. Under
the slogan ‘Managing migration for the benefit of
all’33 IOM sees its intra-organisational responsi-
bility and challenge in assisting its members –
currently 105 governments - “in meeting the
growing operational challenges of migration man-
agement”.34 Against the background of an esti-
mated operational budget of 640 million $US,35
IOM sees itself as the globally leading interna-
tional organisation in migration issues and as
one of the most important focal points for dis-
cussions on migration policy and management.
In addition to the Mediterranean Transit Migra-
tion Dialogue (MTM), the organisation is acting
as the co-ordinating agency within the Manila-
Process, the South American Migration Dia-
logue, the Migration Dialogues in Southern as
well as in Western Africa and various other pan-
els. IOM within these dialogues facilitates
expert networks among stakeholders in receiv-
ing, transit and sending countries and supports
them to find “pragmatic and action oriented mech-
anisms” and to develop “institutions and infra-
structure for a humane, safe and orderly migration
management.”36
In addition to IOM, also the UNHCR is earn-
ing criticism for its move from a former exclu-
sively humanitarian ideal and mandate to a
rather pragmatic/technocratic management
approach: for most critics UNHCR, since the
formulation of its ‘Convention Plus’ (2003),37
moved in the direction to rather serve the inter-
ests of receiving states (in avoiding the influx of
asylum seekers and refugees and to process asy-
lum applications outside their territories) than
those of refugees/asylum seekers. Similarly to
IOM, UNHCR is increasingly regarded as a
’implementation’ partner for receiving states
that, under current real politics, are more inter-
est in control and prevention than an humani-
tarian ‘management,’ centred on
migrants/refugees and their interests. 
While out of intra-organisational interests
(to promote their international standing and
significance as well as to defend their issue-spe-
cific competence) IOM, UNHCR as well as other
inter-governmental organisations (like for
example the ICMPD) are competing with each
other for scarce resources and are trying to take
over the lead in consultative processes (espe-
cially with regard to IOM), these organisations
at the same time are threatened to fall back to
the status of independent and involuntary
henchmen of states seeking to achieve short-
term solutions for their individual ‘migration
and asylum problems.’ 
Increasingly, the most important financial
contributors to these organisations (the G7-
countries) link their payments to the implemen-
tation of specific programs and measures, like
the prevention of illegal movements and border
enforcement. Instead of contributing to the set-
up of a more adequate regime, based on the
realisation of the benefits of migration, IGOs are
more likely to support the further existence of
traditional patterns of control. While some IGOs
(like IOM) in the interests of potential receiving
states have to deal with (or manage) unwanted
(‘illegal’) migrants and organise their return as
‘pragmatic service providers,’ other IGOs (like
UNHCR) have to ‘manage’ refugees/asylum
seekers by processing them outside the territory
of potential receiving countries (extra-territorial
processing) and selecting the ‘really endangered
refugees’ from ‘only’ economically motivated
migrants.
Against the background of the European
framework of migration management that cur-
rently consists of restrictive controls, one must
ask if the efforts of international organisations
result in a more orderly and more humane
migration management. Migration manage-
ment must tackle highly complex issues and
challenges that result in a heightened need for
inter-governmental and international coopera-
tion. Although IGOs like the IOM and regional
consultation processes intend to establish a
global framework for the orderly movement of
people, processes which de-link migration from
the nation-state level, the `real´ problem behind
migration management does not exists in a
surge of population movements that are less
predictable as before; rather states and their
societies pose the main barrier to the develop-
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6. Critique and conclusion: Inter-governmental organisations as service
providers and managers in the orderly movement of peoplement of such an international framework. This
occurs within a general reluctance of states to
transfer real binding power on questions of
national sovereignty and security – such as
migration that touches the very fabric of nations
– to other entities. Co-operation in migration
issues, so far, consists foremost in the transfer of
control tasks to sending and transit states and
the granting of rewards to these states whose
co-operation in managing/control efforts are
matched with development/financial aid or
political and military support. 
Regional migration management in the
European as well as other contexts suffers from
immense differences regarding power and
interests between receiving, transit, and sending
countries. Mostly the individual interests, orien-
tations and expectations of the people migrating
are somehow forgotten and are not taken into
account. The approach to manage migration
and to reduce illegal migratory movements by a
change in perspective, so far, lacks from the
support of European receiving states to actually
grant more migrants the opportunity to enter
the EU and secure access to the labour market
under circumstances of legality.
While EU states continue to block immigra-
tion - except those belonging to a ‘very fine
selection’ of economically welcomed migrants -
authoritarian states like Libya have now become
included and accepted as partners to exercise
control. Tolerated by other EU states, Italy con-
tinues with its approach and co-operates with a
regime that is internationally accused of disre-
specting human rights, internationally isolating
itself for decades, lacking any legal, democratic
framework as well as the capability to deal with
migration in a humane manner.
Italy’s actions occur due to the general
dilemma of the EU harmonisation process and
the general unwillingness of European and
national policy-makers to develop a `manage-
ment approach´ based on a more realistic per-
ception of the root causes of migratory move-
ments: deepening economic imbalances
between Europe and migrant sending regions
and the pull-effect of European (informal)
labour markets for foreign labourers. Quick
fixes, resulting in the transfer of the perverse
side-effects of failing policies to the shoulders of
migrants, so far are the only remaining answer.
Any long-term perspective of migration man-
agement, has therefore to be said, is still miss-
ing.
Inter-governmental organisations like the
IOM could provide a solution to this situation
by their engagement in the governance of
migration and refugee governance. European
Union member states and other nation states
already benefit from their involvement and
their contribution to standard setting, technical
cooperation and (in)formal consultations.
However, the role of organisations like IOM
within this process is highly questionable.
An institutional framework for the manage-
ment of migration, based on IGOs as its dynam-
ic actors, has its main constraint in that these
organisations do not possess any formal man-
date to deal with normative or regulatory
aspects of international migration. Informal
meetings and inter-governmental panels are
mostly non-transparent, and the positions and
strategies of the ‘managers’ of migration (con-
trol) remain unclear to the public and the elec-
torate of member states.
In- and outside the framework of the UN
unfortunately no organization or committee, so
far, has a sufficiently broad mandate to claim to
be the `co-ordinator´ of migration management
on the global level. This applies also to the IOM,
although this organisation does possess certain
financial resources, is supported by a great
number of states and, seems to be the most like-
ly candidate able to fill the institutional vacuum
on the global level.
It must be criticised that most approaches of
the IOM, while intending to tackle the root caus-
es of migratory movements in emigration coun-
tries, have forgotten to pursue a change of per-
spective in receiving states who are the main
financial contributors to the IOM. Migration
management thereby is developing in another
direction than to direct orderly and humane
processes. The globally evolving institutional
regime is likely to be based on a pure utilitarian
ideology or political rationality where popula-
tion movements will be allowed only when they
seem economically warranted. Migration man-
agement in this sense remains limited to the
world-wide extension of control policies that
nation states are no longer able to exercise on
their own. 
Although migration management was for-
mulated to reduce the net-costs of migration,
most residents of receiving societies still fear
‘waves of immigrants’ and immigrants remain
the scapegoats for deepening social inequalities
and rising crime rates. The need to import for-
eign labourers, due to a rising demand in
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ic and demographic transformations in the near
future, has not resulted in a change of perspec-
tive. Nor do politicians see the necessity `to pre-
pare´ residents to face this near-future challenge
or to accept a co-existence with immigrants.
Migration management that remains limited to
control – as is thus far in the interest of all EU
member states – will further increase the costs
and negative side-effects of increasing irregular
movements.
Instead of de-politicising and technocrising
migration issues by adopting the neutral term
‘management,’ IGOs should engage more
actively in the protection of migrants´ rights. A
just system of migration management should
not only serve the purposes of wealthy receiving
societies. `Managing migration,´ according to
PAPADEMETRIOU,38 should not only intend to seek
‘perfection’ as migratory movements result
mostly from individually made decisions that
due to their nature are highly uncertain and far
from being predictable. Rather, it should lead to
international agreements that are truly bi-direc-
tional and balanced and are based on moral and
democratic values. Inter-governmental organisa-
tions, when pursuing this approach, would pro-
vide an escape out of antiquated national poli-
cies and failing or missing common approaches
in the context of the European Union.
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38 See Papademetriou, pp. 53-55.The Balkans constitutes one of the most
remarkable regions of the world for the com-
plexity and extent of its recent refugee and
migration movements. Between 1990 and 2000,
over 10 million people — out of a total popula-
tion of some 80m in the Balkan peninsula1 —
had moved. Furthermore, these population
movements, unusually, had ramifications for
security within the Balkans and also for western
Europe, thus implicating both the European
Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) (Widgren, 2000: 3). What has
changed in the intervening years?
The Balkan region is complex, with several
distinct categorizations of country according to
economic development, recent migration histo-
ry, and formal relationship to the EU. Among
the constituent republics of the former Yugoslav
Federation, one (Slovenia) has acceded to the
EU, another (Croatia) is a candidate country
although its application was delayed until Octo-
ber 2005 owing to unresolved war crimes issues
(EC 2005a: 6). The remainder — Serbia and
Montenegro (SCG), Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH), Kosovo, and Macedonia (fYRoM) —
might be characterized as having serious politi-
cal structural problems; Macedonia, however,
has achieved a degree of stability such that it is
now recommended as a candidate for EU mem-
bership (EC, 2005b). 
Balkan Migrations and The
European Union: 
Patterns and Trends
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The Balkan countries exhibit a wide range of migration types, levels of economic development and formal rela-
tionship to the EU. Four types of migration — forced migrations, ethnic migrations, trafficking and temporary
migration - are examined in some detail for the whole region. It is concluded that forced migration has generally
ceased, although return of refugees remains a major issue; that ethnic migrations have largely discontinued, with
the partial exception of Roma; trafficking appears to be in decline; and that temporary migration has been an
option only for Romanians and Bulgarians. There is little evidence of a major problem with transit migration, bor-
der controls are now operating efficiently, and all countries of the region are rapidly adapting to the EU acquis com-
munautaire. The prognosis is that migration patterns are becoming more “normal”, with trends of temporary
labour emigration and asylum-seekers from outside the region. The real problem is exclusion (of some countries)
from the Schengen white list, and the existence of a Schengen wall comparable with the former Iron Curtain.
Keywords: forced migrations, ethnic migrations, trafficking, temporary migrationThere remain around one million refugees
and displaced persons in these countries, pre-
dominantly in Serbia. Some refugees have
returned to the region, but not without prob-
lems and recently at a dwindling rate (Blitz,
2005; Philpott, 2005; ECRI, 2004a). With the
exception of Croatia (and, of course, Slovenia),
economic development is still at a low level,
with per capita GDP ranging from €930 in Koso-
vo, €2,230 in Serbia and reaching €5,745 in Croa-
tia for 2003 (EC 2004: 13).  Informal economic
activity, organized crime and trafficking of
aliens are endemic in the region, and constitute
a major threat to political stability and chances
of future EU membership. 
Of the remaining four Balkan countries, two
— Romania and Bulgaria — are applicant EU
countries, and expected to accede in 2007; Alba-
nia and Moldova, on the other hand, have eco-
nomic and political infrastructure so far below
the EU level, that their possibility of EU acces-
sion is some way off. Nevertheless, in principle
all Balkan countries are seen as possible future
members of the EU (EC 2004a: 5), with some sig-
nificant reforms, especially concerning border
controls, being undertaken through the Stabi-
lization and Association Process (Baldwin-
Edwards, 2004a: 11-12). Stabilization and Asso-
ciation Agreements are in force with Croatia
and Macedonia, in the final stages of negotia-
tion with Albania, under negotiation with Ser-
bia and Montenegro, and about to be discussed
with Bosnia and Herzegovina (EC 2005a: 10). 
In terms of economic development, per capita
GDP is extremely low for Moldova (€417 in
2002), for Albania it is lower than all of former
Yugoslavia other than Kosovo (€1,685 in 2003),
and it is slightly above the average for the
region for Bulgaria and Romania (€2,257 and
€2,317) (EC 2004b; Jandl 2003). The current
number of emigrants from Moldova is various-
ly estimated at between 600,000 and 1,000,000
persons (IOM 2003a: 4; Scanlan 2002: 16), consti-
tuting 25-45% of current population. Human
trafficking has been, and remains, extensive
from Moldova, with merely an estimated 80,000
migrants working legally in their country of
destination (Jandl, 2003). Albania is thought
now to have a minimum of 900,000 emigrants
(Barjaba, 2004); however, official data from just
Greece and Italy count over 1m Albanians with
residence permits, so an estimate of 1.1m (34%
of the population) is more plausible. 
In the case of Romania, by far the largest
country in the region with a population of some
22m, the statistical service seems to have been
unable to calculate emigrants from the census
data. Nor are there any other state data on tem-
porary migration (IOM 2003b). Comparing 1992
and 2002 census data, a calculation of 800.000
‘missing’ persons can be made2: this figure sits
well with recent IOM survey data, which sug-
gest that 15% of the adult population has
worked abroad, with currently some 850,000
persons still abroad, and only 53% with legal
employment (IOM 2005). Similar problems with
data exist in Bulgaria, where the census data
show only 196,000 emigrants between 1992-2001
whilst other calculations suggest 600-700.000
(IOM 2003c:17-18). Gächter (2002) in a detailed
analysis, suggests that high nett emigration —
mainly of Turkish Bulgarians — occurred 1988-
1995, with some 479,000 persons. From 1996-99,
Bulgaria had a low level of nett immigration
whereby emigration of Bulgarians was more
than compensated by immigration of other
nationals (Gächter 2002: 4). Thus, a snapshot of
Bulgarian emigration patterns would probably
show less than 10% of the population abroad at
any moment.
Table 1, below, summarizes these data on
population and migration in the region.
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Table 1 
Crude Population data, Balkan region 
 GDP  per
cap.
(€) 
Population
(millions)
Stock of 
recent 
emigrants¶ 
Emigrants/
population
(%)
2003 2003  Most  recent 
data 
Albania 1,685 3.2  1.1  million  34 
BiH 1,897 4.2  *N/A   
fYRoM 2,121 2.1  N/A   
SCG 2,232 8.6  N/A   
Kosovo 930 1.9 N/A   
West.Balkans.  2,053 19.9 N/A   
Bulgaria 2,257 7.8  650,000  8 
Croatia 5,745 4.4  N/A   
Romania 2,317 21.8 850,000  4 
Moldova§ 417 600,000-1 
million 
25-45 
SOURCE: EC (2004b) 
Notes:
* Emigration data concerning nationals are not applicable for the 
former Yugoslav countries, owing to the complexities of refugees 
and returns, along with IDPs. See Tables 2 and 3, below. 
§ Data for Moldova are from Jandl (2003), IOM (2003a: 4), Scanlan (2002: 
16) 
¶ Estimated data from various sources (see text for details) Across the Balkans, we can identify four
very different sorts of migration, which require
separate treatments: 
 forced migrations, associated with war and
‘ethnic cleansing’, including IDPs3; 
 ethnic migrations, which are of a voluntary
nature but inspired either by racial exclu-
sion [e.g. Turkish Bulgarian migration to
Turkey] or sometimes by better opportuni-
ties abroad [e.g. Greek Albanian migration
to Greece]; 
 trafficking. This is endemic in the region, but
affecting different countries rather different-
ly;
 temporary or incomplete migration. This is the
most common form of migration over the
last few years, and is particularly difficult to
measure. Census data do not properly cap-
ture the reality, and can overstate or under-
state the extent and meaning of migrations.4
Forced migrations
By the end of the 1991-95 war, some 300-
350,000 Croatian Serbs had left their homes in
Croatia, mostly for Serbia or Bosnia (Ivanisevic
2004: 351); from Bosnia, at the end of the 1992-95
war, a massive estimated 2.6m people were dis-
placed — more than half the pre-war popula-
tion (Philpott, 2005: 1) — and about 1.2m found
refuge abroad (Ivanisevic, 2004: 351). In Kosovo,
350,000 people fled their homes as IDPs or
refugees in 1998, and in 1999 some 450,000 eth-
nic Albanians fled to Albania, 250,000 to Mace-
donia (fYRoM) and 70,000 to Montenegro. With
the end of war in June 1999, 600,000 people
returned to their homes in Kosovo, only to be
followed by a reverse exodus of 230,000 Serbs
and Roma who sought safety in Serbia and
Montenegro. Two years later, conflict in Mace-
donia in 2001 led to 150,000 ethnic Albanians
fleeing, mainly to Kosovo (UNHCR, 2001: 7).
By end 2003, UNHCR calculated around
540,000 refugees or asylum-seekers outside of
the Yugoslav region, around half in Germany
(Table 2). Within the region, there were some
600,000 IDPs and over 300,000 refugees (Table
3); IDPs were located mainly in Bosnia or Serbia
and refugees almost exclusively in Serbia.
Owing to the ethnicized nature of these forced
migrations over the last decade, the paradoxical
consequence is that Serbia-Montenegro has
become not only one of the world’s leading
source countries for refugees, but also one of the
leading host countries for refugees.5
The dramatic reduction in refugee numbers
is mainly the result of returns — one of the pre-
ferred ‘durable solutions’ favored by UNHCR.
Looking simply at the number of returning
refugees, these vary greatly across the region. In
the case of Bosnia, by mid 2004 just under 1 mil-
lion had returned, of which 440,000 were minor-
ity returns, (Black and Gent, 2004: 11). For
returns to Croatia, the figure is 110,000 (Blitz,
2005: 363), with 6,600 from Serbia and 850 from
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Tableȱ2ȱ
Stocksȱofȱrefugeesȱandȱasylumȱseekersȱfromȱtheȱregion,ȱendȱ
2003ȱ[000s]ȱ
andȱlocatedȱinȱ[principalȱ
countries,ȱonly]:ȱ
Originatingȱ
from:ȱ
t
o
t
a
l
ȱ
S
C
G
ȱ
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
ȱ
U
S
A
ȱ
S
w
e
d
e
n
ȱ
U
K
ȱ
BiHȱ 300.0ȱ 99.8ȱ 38.7ȱ 61.8ȱ 25.8ȱȱ
Croatiaȱ 230.2ȱ 189.7ȱ 3.8ȱ 6.3ȱȱȱ
fYRoMȱ 6.0ȱ 1.4ȱ 3.2ȱ 0.1ȱ 0.3ȱ 0.4ȱ
SCGȱ 296.6ȱ ȬȬȬȬȱ 169.0ȱ 16.8ȱ 27.9ȱ 21.3ȱ
TOTALSȱ 832.8ȱ 290.9ȱ 214.7ȱ 85.0ȱ 54.0ȱ 21.7ȱ
SOURCE:ȱUNHCRȱ(2004)ȱ
Note:ȱtotalsȱdoȱnotȱaddȱupȱbecauseȱonlyȱmajorȱsubcategoriesȱ
areȱshownȱhereȱ
Tableȱ3ȱ
StocksȱofȱrefugeesȱandȱIDPsȱinȱtheȱregion,ȱendȱ2003ȱ[000s]ȱ
ofȱwhichȱ[principalȱ
nationalitiesȱonly]:ȱ
ȱ
I
D
P
s
ȱ
R
e
f
u
g
e
e
s
ȱ
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r
o
a
t
i
a
n
ȱ
S
e
r
b
i
a
n
ȱ
B
o
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n
ȱ
M
a
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e
d
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n
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a
n
ȱ
BiHȱ 327.2ȱ 22.5ȱ 19.5ȱ 3.0ȱȱ ȱ
Croatiaȱ 12.6ȱ 4.4ȱȱ 0.5ȱ 3.9ȱȱ
fYRoMȱ 0ȱ 0.2ȱȱ 0.2ȱȱ ȱ
SCGȱ 256.9ȱ 291.4ȱ 189.7ȱȱ 99.8ȱ 1.4ȱ
TOTALSȱ 596.7ȱ 318.5ȱ 209.2ȱ 3.7ȱ 103.7ȱ 1.4ȱ
SOURCE:ȱUNHCRȱ(2004)ȱ
Types of Migration in the BalkansBosnia in 2004 (UNHCR 2005a, Table 16). In
Bosnia, mostly affected by IDPs, in 2004 there
were some 20,000 persons returning to their
place of origin (UNHCR, 2005b: 417). Within
Serbia, rather than returns the policy solution
favoured is naturalization: UNHCR expects the
refugee population of 275,000 at end 2004 to
halve through this mechanism, along with the
recent closure of 58 refugee camps (UNHCR,
2005b: 417). The apparently intractable problem
lies with Kosovo, where fewer than 10,000 of the
230,000 refugees who fled since 1999 have
returned, and there remain thousands of IDPs
within Kosovo or Serbia (HRW 2004a). The
increased violence against minorities in Kosovo
in March 2004, which created another 4,000
IDPs (mainly Kosovar Serbs and Roma), is also
explicitly connected with 2,240 Kossovar
refugees in Macedonia (mainly Roma), who are
denied local integration (UNHCR 2005b: 416;
HRW, 2003). However, 725 refugees returned
from Kosovo to Macedonia in 2004 (UNHCR
2005b: 417).
Although refugee return to the Balkan
region is a clear policy choice of the European
Union and its national governments, and the re-
integration of ethnic minorities along with
strong legal protection of minority rights is seen
as necessary legitimation for post-conflict soci-
eties, there remain many unresolved fundamen-
tal issues concerning refugee return. Richard
Black and Saskia Gent contribute the concept of
“sustainable return”, with a range of factors
determining such (Black and Gent, 2004: 17).
Similarly, Brad Blitz in his study of returns to
Croatia suggests that different historical paths
of refugee flight and return lead to vastly differ-
ent outcomes, with five scenarios of return
migration. In particular, it seems that the major-
ity of Serbian returnees are elderly, with a spe-
cific type of return — the “return of retirement”
(Blitz, 2005: 380). Other scenarios include “reset-
tlement as ethnic colonization” (Bosnian Croats
who fled to Croatia), “displaced persons and
refugees returning from Bosnia” (Croatian
Serbs who remained and did not flee to Serbia
apparently have had worse treatment), “settle-
ment through repossession” (housing reposses-
sion through judicial intervention), and a final
category of “no return”, where marginalized
former tenancy holders6 lack support structures
and exist on the margins of Croatian society.
Overall, the return of refugees has not
undone the realities of ethnic cleansing, and it is
not clear that this should in fact be an objective
of international agencies. One obvious impedi-
ment to refugee return has been housing:
whereas 93% of claims had been sorted out in
Bosnia by June 2004 (ECRI 2004a: 14), restitution
of property rights does not mean return. More
important, is the existence of jobs (Philpott,
2005: 21). In Croatia, continued discrimination
in the labor market and society is seen as one of
the most outstanding impediments to re-inte-
gration: Blitz contrasts the full incorporation of
Croats from Bosnia with the situation of the Ser-
bian minority — the former as recipients of gov-
ernment grants and aid and displacing Serbian
local workers (Blitz, 2005: 381). As the Interna-
tional Commission on the Balkans points out,
multiethnic harmony and re-integration of
refugees must be achieved at the local level,
especially as the result of population move-
ments has been to create regional concentra-
tions of minority ethnic communities. This is
particularly visible in Macedonia, where local
communities have become almost ethnically
homogenous (ICB, 2005: 32-33). To these reali-
ties should be added the phenomenon of mas-
sive urbanization, which has occurred across
the entire Balkan region: this obscures the
meaning of international migration, and addi-
tionally makes more spurious the goal of
refugee returns. It may be that we have more or
less reached the end of the road with this policy
solution to forced migration in the Balkans.
Asylum-seekers continue to be produced by
the Balkan countries, even from Romania and
Bulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro is now the
leading producer of asylum-seekers in industri-
alized countries, after massive declines in Rus-
sians and Iraqis since 2003, although there is a
continued slow decline in numbers. Bosnia and
Hercegovina also continues to produce asylum-
seekers, and the numbers have been increasing
rather than diminishing; Bulgaria too produces
rather more asylum-seekers than would be
expected from an EU candidate country, again
with significant increases over the last two
years. Romania, Macedonia and Albania all con-
tinue to produce significant numbers of asylum-
seekers, but in continuous decline (UNHCR,
2005c: Table 4). 
Ethnic migrations
The Balkan region can be characterized as a
region dangerously affected by ethnic conflict,
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national majorities and sizable ethnic minorities
(Atanasova, 2004: 357). The wide distribution of
different ethnic minorities constitutes not only a
problem of political management by  the state,
but is also an issue of diaspora relations impact-
ing on a national state’s relations with other
neighbouring states. One author (Tóth, 2003:
201) describes the Hungarian diaspora in the
Balkan region (in Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
and Romania) as “kin-minorities” connected to
the “kin-state”: clearly inter-state relations are
intimately affected by the presence of such
minorities.
In the twentieth century, the solutions
favored for managing the issue of large ethnic
minorities have been ‘exchanges of [minority]
populations’, forcible [often violent] assimila-
tion into a national culture, and toleration of
ethnic and regional difference within the broad-
er framework of a socialist planned economy.
The two Balkan countries outside of the com-
munist bloc — Greece and Turkey — relied on
the first two mechanisms. On the other hand,
most of the communist bloc in the Balkans and
Eastern Europe tolerated ethnic difference: the
problems came primarily with collapse of their
regimes, and the open hostility based on ethnic-
ity which appeared subsequently.
One ethnic group7 which ended up being
neither exchanged, assimilated nor tolerated
was that of the Roma. Although they had bene-
fited from special measures in the early post-
war communist bloc, and had actually achieved
minority status by the 1980s, traditional preju-
dices against them emerged and exploded into
violence after 1989 (Crowe, 2003: 86). This trig-
gered a new wave of Romani migrations fleeing
persecution, both in wartime and also from sta-
ble countries such as Romania. Thus, Roma con-
stituted a massive proportion of asylum-seekers
from the Balkans over the 1990s, but have not
been systematically recorded as Roma. In the
period in the early 1990s of mass Romanian asy-
lum-seeking, for example, more than 60% of
them were Roma (Ethnobarometer, 2004: VII.3).
Comparable data for other countries is not
available, as UNHCR does not record ethnicity
as such.
Now, with the returns of refugees to Serbia
and other countries of the war-zone, there are
serious and unreported issues concerning
Roma. The vast majority of recent returnees to
Serbia and Montenegro have been Roma
(CNGOS, 2005: 16); in May 2005, Germany start-
ed to forcibly return members of certain minor-
ity groups from Kosovo — mainly Bosnians,
Ashkali and Turks — whereas Roma and Serbs
are spared deportation for the moment (Grupa
484, 2005: 21). This has been done despite the
warning of independent observers that Serbia is
not yet a safe place for minorities (HRW 2005).
Other than Romani migrations and refugees
from war-zones, the principal ethnic migrations
from Balkan countries since 1989 consist of the
following:
From Romania: emigration of ethnic Hun-
garians, Germans and Jews
Over the decade of the 1990s, these are
recorded as 105,000 Germans, 37,000 Hungari-
ans and 3,000 Jews. Earlier periods saw much
larger ethnic emigrations, though (Ethnobarom-
eter, 2004:VIII). By 2002, the Romanian Census
showed that only the Hungarians had retained
a significant presence of  just under 1.5m (6.6%,
of total population) and almost exclusively
located in the region of Transylvania (Ethno-
barometer, 2004: IV.4). Ethnic migrations have
more or less ceased since 2000.
From Bulgaria: emigration of ethnic Turks
The first pogrom against Turks began in
1984, with a state demand that Turks “Bulgar-
ize” their names; it was accompanied by the clo-
sure of mosques and outlawing of Muslim reli-
gious holidays . Many resisted, with an estimat-
ed death toll of 300—1,500 Turks over one year
(Crowe, 2000:107) and a reported 1,000 impris-
oned (Atanasova, 2004: 364).  This had a knock-
on effect for Roma, who were the victims of
forced assimilation and violence in the 1980s.
In 1989, after blaming ethnic Turks for a
series of bomb attacks, Prime Minister Zhivkov
invited those who “do not feel Bulgarian” to
leave Bulgaria. Some 360,000 ethnic Turks left,
and after pressure from the West and USSR,
Zhivkov was forced to resign (Anagnostou,
2005: 91; Warhola and Boteva, 2003). His succes-
sors immediately rescinded the effects of this
ethnic cleansing, with a l990 law on the restora-
tion of Turkish names, which was utilized by
some 600,000 ethnic Turks in 1991 (Atanasova,
2004: 364). Another law provided amnesty for
victims of the 1980s assimilation campaign,
while two decree-laws and a 1992 law provided
restitution of the housing, property and
employment rights of those who had emigrated
to Turkey but subsequently returned. An esti-
mated 150,000 returned from Turkey after this
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Bulgaria has effectively escaped what many
western commentators view as the dictates of
history and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans
(Anagnostou, 2005), 
From Albania: emigration of ethnic Greeks
The number of ethnic Greeks in Albania was,
and remains, highly contested. The range of fig-
ures starts at 59,000 in the 1989 Albanian Census
and goes up to 300,000 claimed by the Greek
government (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004b: 51). Pet-
tifer (2001: 4) gives a figure of 100,000, which is
plausible. The number who actually migrated to
Greece is also highly problematic to estimate,
for several reasons. First, the ethnic Greek
migration was contemporaneous with mass ille-
gal migration of ethnic Albanians as temporary
labour in Greece in the 1990s. Secondly, the
Greek state did not systematically record those
who had been given entry visas as ethnic
Greeks. Thirdly, there are accounts of Albanians
with different ethnicities (e.g. Vlach) being
encouraged to assume a Greek “identity” and
apply for special status, either in the Greek con-
sulates or within Greece itself. Thus, by 20048
the Greek state had surreptitiously issued some
200,000 ‘ethnic Greek identity cards’ (Baldwin-
Edwards, 2004c: 3), whilst there did not seem to
be significantly smaller ethnic Greek communi-
ties still residing in Albania! It does not appear,
therefore, that the ethnic composition of Alba-
nia was much altered by the ethnic migration of
Greeks: the emigration of the general Albanian
population was much more important.
Trafficking of migrants in the Balkans
For some time now, European policy-mak-
ers, practitioners and academics have identified
a “Balkan route” for trafficking and/or smug-
gling9 of migrants (e.g. Salt and Stein, 1997: 475-
7; Budapest Group, 1999; IOM  2001), with clear
links made between older drug trafficking
routes, their interruption by war and organized
criminal gangs branching out into people-
smuggling and trafficking (Kolakovic et al.,
2001: 7-9; Budapest Group, 1999; Lindstrom,
2004). Simultaneously, the United States
embarked upon its global attack on trafficking,
issuing an annual report and tiered classifica-
tion (using unknown and rather suspect crite-
ria) of how well other countries of the world
were attempting to limit the phenomenon. Their
global estimates of the extent of trafficking start-
ed out with a maximum estimate of 4m in 2002,
reduced to 800.000 for both 2004 and 2005;
again, the mechanism by which these figures
are reached are unknown, and should be treat-
ed with extreme suspicion. 
Alongside methodological problems con-
cerning the estimation of the extent of traffick-
ing, there remain fundamental definitional
problems concerning the issues of migration,
prostitution and agency (Kelly, 2005:237). The
clear distinction between trafficking and smug-
gling which is embodied in the UN protocols is
not so visible in practice, and it would be more
correct to view them both as part of a continu-
um of behaviours, changing over the migrant’s
journey in time and space. Essentially, measure-
ments and interpretations of trafficking data are
practitioner-based, and inclined to view all ille-
gal migrants as victims without agency, rather
than as frequently willing participants in com-
plex interactions with other persons and/or
criminal organizations in their migratory expe-
riences. Yet another deficit is the focus of inter-
national organizations on trafficking for sexual
exploitation and of children, whilst ignoring
other forms of exploitation (Kelly, 2005: 237). 
In the case of the Balkans, some of the most
detailed investigation of any region in the world
has been made since 2000, with research under-
taken or financed by the IOM, the Stability Pact
for South Eastern Europe, the ILO, UNICEF and
the OSCE, amongst others. One of the most
authoritative recent reports identified 6.256 vic-
tims between January 2000 and December 2004,
with the primary countries of origin as Albania,
Moldova and Romania (and to a lesser extent,
Bulgaria and Kosovo) and the primary coun-
tries of destination or transit as being Croatia,
Bosnia, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro
(Surtees, 2005: 12-17). Table 4 reproduces their
summary data. 
Over the period 2000-2004, 90% of victims
were from only 5 countries (28% from Albania,
26% from Moldova, 17% from Romania, 10%
from Bulgaria and 9% from Kosovo). There is
also a significant number from the Ukraine
(6%), but from other countries the numbers
identified and assisted are very small indeed.
According to an earlier report (for the period
2000-2003), first trafficking experiences
occurred as minors for 65% of Albanians and
50%  of Bulgarians, although most were 18-24 at
the time of identification (RCP, 2003: 14). The
identified trends, confirmed by other recent
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2005) are of decreasing
visibility or extent of traf-
ficking and increased traf-
ficking of minors — the
latter, especially without
crossing country borders
(so-called ‘internal traf-
ficking’).
According to the Sec-
ond RCP Report, around
70% of assisted victims
from the SEE region (in
other words, excluding
those originating from
other countries) are traf-
ficked solely for sexual
exploitation, along with another 10-20% for a
mix of sexual services and other employment.
Table 5 below shows summary data for forms of
trafficking. Of the small proportion of persons
trafficked for labour, begging or delinquency
(11%), in some countries such as Albania and
Kosovo the majority were male and minors
(Surtees, 2005: 13). The statistical data presented
for the SEE region do not show gender or minor
status, but to date no males have
been assisted as victims of sexu-
al exploitation. 
Within the south east Euro-
pean region, it is alleged that
90% of foreign women working
in the sex business are victims of
trafficking, with 10-15% under
the age of 18 ((El-Cherkeh et al.,
2004: 22). However, more recent
reports note that raids on bars
(the most prevalent form of anti-
trafficking action) are no longer
producing results  and that
many women offered assistance
as victims of trafficking deny
that they are such, and say that
they are working voluntarily
(Limanowska, 2004: 50). Child
trafficking, not only for sexual
services but also for organized
begging,10 is an increasing prob-
lem across the region and also
within the EU (IPEC 2005 and
2004 country volumes). Howev-
er, the limited empirical evi-
dence suggests the following set of characteris-
tics:
 ‘victims’ frequently do not see themselves
as such, and often refuse help
 ‘victims’ tend to come from seriously
underprivileged backgrounds, and are pre-
ponderantly from ethnic minorities,
including Roma
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Tableȱ4ȱ
Numberȱofȱidentifiedȱandȱassistedȱtraffickingȱvictimsȱ2000Ȭ04,ȱStabilityȱPactȱ
Countryȱofȱoriginȱȱ
ofȱvictimȱ
2000ȱ 2001ȱ 2002ȱ 2003ȱ 2004ȱ Totalȱ
Albaniaȱȱ 219ȱ 445ȱ 375ȱ 345ȱ 366ȱ 1,750ȱ
Moldovaȱ 319ȱ 382ȱ 329ȱ 313ȱ 300ȱ 1,643ȱ
Romaniaȱ 163ȱ 261ȱ 243ȱ 194ȱ 193ȱ 1,054ȱ
Bulgariaȱ 46ȱ 96ȱ 164ȱ 172ȱ 143ȱ 621ȱ
Kosovo,ȱProvinceȱofȱ 54ȱ 67ȱ 165ȱ 192ȱ 90ȱ 568ȱ
BiHȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 8ȱ 17ȱ 39ȱ 54ȱ
Serbiaȱ 0ȱ 1ȱ 10ȱ 13ȱ 21ȱ 45ȱ
Croatiaȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 1ȱ 1ȱ 6ȱ 8ȱ
Montenegroȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 2ȱ 3ȱ 5ȱ 10ȱ
fyRoȱMacedoniaȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 0ȱ 14ȱ 12ȱ 26ȱ
SEEȱcountriesȱsubtotalȱ 801ȱ 1,252ȱ 1,297ȱ 1,264ȱ 1,165ȱ 5,779ȱ
Ukraineȱ 68ȱ 97ȱ 104ȱ 47ȱ 41ȱ 357ȱ
Russiaȱ 7ȱ 22ȱ 21ȱ 5ȱ 4ȱ 59ȱ
Belarusȱ 8ȱ 9ȱ 1ȱ 2ȱ 1ȱ 21ȱ
Georgiaȱ 0ȱ 3ȱ 2ȱ 0ȱ 2ȱ 7ȱ
Otherȱȱ 3ȱ 0ȱ 5ȱ 11ȱ 14ȱ 33ȱ
Otherȱcountriesȱsubtotalȱ 86ȱ 131ȱ 133ȱ 65ȱ 62ȱ 477ȱ
Totalȱnumbersȱofȱvictimsȱ
traffickedȱinto,ȱviaȱorȱfromȱ
SouthȱEasternȱEuropeȱ
887ȱ 1,383ȱ 1,430ȱ 1,329ȱ 1,227ȱ 6,256ȱ
SOURCE:ȱSurteesȱ(2005:ȱ31Ȭ32)ȱ
Tableȱ5ȱ
FormsȱofȱtraffickingȱamongȱassistedȱSEEȱnationals,ȱ2003ȱandȱ2004ȱ
2003ȱ 2004ȱ
FORMȱOFȱTRAFFICKINGȱ
Nȱ %ȱ Nȱ %ȱ
Sexualȱexploitationȱ 824ȱ 65.2ȱ 864ȱ 74.2ȱ
Labourȱ 91ȱ 7.2ȱ 48ȱ 4.1ȱ
Beggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 51ȱ 4.0ȱ 75ȱ 6.4ȱ
Adoptionȱ 0ȱȱ9ȱ 0.8ȱ
Sexualȱexploitationȱandȱlabourȱ 245ȱ 19.4ȱ 97ȱ 8.3ȱ
Sexualȱexploitation,ȱbeggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 10ȱ 0.8ȱ 27ȱ 2.3ȱ
Labour,ȱbeggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 11ȱ 0.9ȱ 2ȱ 0.2ȱ
Sexualȱexploitation,ȱlabour,ȱbeggingȱandȱdelinquencyȱ 1ȱ 0.1ȱ 0ȱȱ
Potentialȱvictimsȱ 31ȱ 2.5ȱ 43ȱ 3.7ȱ
TOTALȱ 1,254ȱȱ 1,164ȱȱ
SOURCE:ȱSurteesȱ(2005:ȱ33)ȱ ‘victims’ tend to be very young, and the
trend is increasing for minors
 the crossing of borders is not a necessary
part of trafficking
 sexual exploitation is not a necessary part
of trafficking
In conclusion, we should note that the num-
ber of persons identified by the Regional Clear-
ing Point is very small relative to the extent of
migration in the region (both voluntary and
forced) and raises serious questions about the
real significance of the phenomenon of traffick-
ing in the Balkans. The RCP Report itself notes
that it is only a standardized record of assis-
tance, and there is no way of estimating the
actual extent of trafficking: furthermore, high
numbers of assisted victims in a particular
country may reflect pro-active policy to tackle
the phenomenon, rather than the existence of a
greater problem than elsewhere (Surtees,
2005:25). Trafficking and prostitution are large-
ly demand-driven, and extremely problematic
and extensive in UN-managed Kosovo, as well
as associated with supply side social and family
problems in the countries of the region. Further-
more, little if any evidence has been adduced to
show that trafficking is big business in the
Balkans: rather, the evidence suggests that it is a
cottage industry (Nicholson, 2002: 4). This, com-
bined with the increasing phenomenon of
“internal trafficking”, might lead us to conclude
that this is a problem of social policy, which has
developed to extend beyond national borders. 
Thus, trafficking is not per se an issue of
migration, but rather one of economic survival
strategies on the part of both traffickers and
those being trafficked or smuggled; on the other
hand, the demand side of prostitution, cheap
labor and organized street begging is a signifi-
cant socio-economic problem not only in the
Balkans but also across Europe. These two
aspects –the supply side of underdevelopment
and unequal income distribution, and the
demand for sexual services, forced labor and
informal employment in EU countries and else-
where — might be more appropriate foci for
government policies.
Temporary or incomplete migrations
Also known as circular migrations, these are
typical of voluntary population movements
from the CEE region since 1989 (Kaczmarczyk
and Okoloski, 2005: 18). They have two defining
characteristics:  they are predominantly irregu-
lar, with employment in the shadow economy;
they do not conform to the definition of migra-
tion. This ‘incomplete migration’ appears to be
extensive in the CEE region, with very large
numbers participating, and mainly involving
semi-skilled and unskilled persons. Owing to its
clandestine character, data and interpretation of
numbers are highly questionable and problem-
atic. In the Balkan region, three countries are
predominantly involved with this migration
type — Albania, Romania and Bulgaria.
The 1990s Albanian migrations to Greece
and Italy were clearly of this type, even if the
mass deportations by the Greek state constitut-
ed a peculiar variant of the return strategy
(Reyneri, 2001). Subsequent to the first Greek
legalization campaign, and after a legal opinion
from the Ombudsman denouncing the deporta-
tions as unlawful, Albanians found it increas-
ingly difficult to engage in circular migration.
With tighter and more aggressive, even violent,
border controls, alongside the Greek state’s
insistence on full-time social insurance contri-
butions for legal residence, by the early 2000s
Albanians living in Greece had adopted a typi-
cal strategy of permanent settlement (Baldwin-
Edwards, 2004b: 62). The early migrations had
been undertaken by men, later to be joined by
their wives and children: after the 2001 immi-
gration law, some 67,000 permits for family
reunification were given by the Greek state
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2004c: Table 2). By 2004,
official records indicated just over 400,000 adult
Albanians, up to 100,000 schoolchildren, and
some 200,000 classed as ethnic Greeks: although
some of these may have returned to Albania or
moved to Italy, there is no evidence to suggest
that this was in large numbers. Thus, Greek
government policy — by reinforcing the border
with Albania — managed to change temporary
migration into permanent settlement for the
great majority of Albanian migrants. In Italy, a
similar pattern has been noted, with a high pro-
portion of Albanians taking Italian citizen-
ship.11  By end 2004, ISTAT12 had recorded
317,000 Albanians with residence permits, mak-
ing them the leading immigrant nationality in
Italy.
The situation pertaining to Romanians and
Bulgarians is rather different from Albanians.
This is not because of any massive difference in
strategy by those migrants, nor because of dif-
ferent treatment by receiving countries. It is,
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incorporation of these two countries into the EU
and Schengen regime. In the case of Romania,
although circular migration had existed in the
late 1990s, primarily to Italy, it was with the
removal of the Schengen visa requirement in
2002 that circular migration of Romanians as
‘false tourists’ really took off. Travelling legally
under 3-month Schengen tourism provisions, a
2005 survey shows that around 9% of house-
holds have one member abroad at any one time
(around 850,000 people). Their destinations are
principally Italy and Spain, with reports from
Italy of up to 2.5 million Romanians there, or
(from Romanian authorities) of 1.4m in both
Spain and Italy. These extraordinarily high
numbers arise, as I show elsewhere (Baldwin-
Edwards, 2006) from flawed interpretation of
information caused by imposing a traditional
view of migration on the complex and well-cho-
reographed circular migration patterns. Thus,
although many Romanians — up to 15% of the
adult population — have participated in migra-
tion, at any one time there is not such a large
number abroad. The latest data show 249,000
Romanians with permits in Italy, and 175,000 in
Spain. There is also limited legal temporary
labor migration — primarily to Germany, but
also to Italy and Spain. Available data suggest
that this is well under 100,000 in total, per year
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2006).
Bulgarian temporary migration has targeted
Greece, Italy and Spain — but without the visi-
bility of either Albanian or Romanian migra-
tion. Furthermore, there is no consensus on the
extent of emigration in recent years: one report
suggests that it increased after 2001 when the
Schengen visa requirement was removed
(OECD-SOPEMI 2005: 165) whilst another
claims a stabilization over recent years (Beleva
and Minev, 2005). A 2001 IOM survey suggests
that the primary destinations for Bulgarian sea-
sonal work at that time were Greece, Spain,
Italy, Germany and the Netherlands (Guentche-
va  et al., 2003: 5). Unlike Romanians, who
migrated to Germany in large numbers as eth-
nic Germans and also as contract workers, Bul-
garians hardly appear in German immigration
data. In southern Europe, Bulgarians are more
visible: from residence permit data, they consti-
tute the second largest nationality in Greece (at
59,000), and some 2% of the immigrant popula-
tion in Spain (52,000), although have only a
small presence in Italy at 15,000. Given that
many Bulgarian migrants are female and
employed as housekeepers, it is likely that their
illegal employment is considerably higher than
the official data suggest. There is, however, a
serious information deficit on temporary migra-
tion movements of Bulgarian economic
migrants, compounded by their ease of travel
within the Schengen zone.
Despite massive problems with data, it is
possible to discern some clear trends. First, the
flight of refugees from the region has more or
less stopped, with the partial exception of Serbia
and Montenegro. The continued asylum-seek-
ing from the Balkans appear to be mainly by
Roma, although there are no hard data, and the
numbers from Serbia — around 15,000 for 2000
— are openly criticized by the European Com-
mission (Frattini, 2005).
Secondly, the issue of refugee returns is actu-
ally dominating the scene, with serious issues
about who is forcibly returned to where, and the
reception and nature of voluntary returns. Even
for candidate country Croatia, the European
Commission has worries concerning returns to
that country; however, the Sarajevo Declaration
of January 2005 committed Bosnia-Hercegov-
ina, Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro to
resolve the issue of returns before the end of
2006.
Thirdly, ethnic migration looks like a phe-
nomenon of the early 1990s, with the break-up
of communist states. It has largely discontinued,
although again there is a question mark about
the situation of the Roma. There is also a poten-
tial, or actual, issue of asylum applications con-
stituting the only route for unskilled or semi-
skilled labour migration to the West; it is impos-
sible to clarify to what extent this may have
occurred, given the arbitrary way in which
some EU countries evaluate asylum claims.
Thirdly, trafficking figures for the region
show a continuous decline: already small num-
bers are getting smaller. Trafficking, illegal
migration and migration for employment have
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Trends in Balkan Migrationsbeen hardly visible for most opf the former
Yugoslavia, owing to their invisibility in the
context of forced migrations.
Fourthly, incomplete or circular migration
seems ultimately to have been an option for
only two Balkan countries — Romania and Bul-
garia. The result of tighter border controls and
the Schengen zone has been to effect a two-tier
status for border crossing — candidate country
or non-candidate country. Although intended
only for tourism, the Schengen arrangements
have had a predictably aggravating impact on
the informal economies of Europe — particular-
ly those of southern Europe.
Several issues have not been explicitly
addressed so far, and deserve mention. Immi-
gration into, and transit migration through, the
Balkans have been a continuous matter of con-
cern by EU countries. This issue is also partly
linked with trafficking, but it is really only from
the Ukraine that there is any evidence of a prob-
lem. Data on immigration into the region are of
very low quality, primarily because most of it is
illegal. Information from Romania and Bulgaria
suggests that it consists primarily of migrants
from within the CEE region, from CIS countries,
and asylum-seekers and illegal migrants from
Asia. Numbers appear to be low, despite peri-
odic hysteria in Western Europe about hordes of
Chinese preparing to ‘invade’ Europe.
One of the clear achievements in the region
since the early 1990s has been the moderniza-
tion and increased effectiveness of border con-
trols, primarily achieved with EU moneys and
expertise. Information provided by ICMPD and
others suggests a fairly unambiguous improve-
ment in border management, as shown by
apprehension statistics (Futo et al., 2005). How-
ever, as all countries of the region stabilize, it
can be expected that all types of voluntary
migration will increase — especially in the con-
text of mass unemployment and poor quality
employment.
The ‘brain drain’ issue is one which certain
Balkan countries worry over, most obviously
Croatia. Although there clearly has been an exo-
dus of skilled personnel, mass emigration from
the Balkans has represented all sectors of socie-
ty and arguably over-represented the lower-
skilled. The primary issue is not how to deal
with past emigration, but how to encourage and
fully incorporate possible returning migrants
into modern economies. There is, so far, little
evidence that focused strategies are being devel-
oped to address this issue; furthermore, the EU
has provided no guidance or incentives for bet-
ter labor market and migration management. A
legalistic obsession with adaptation to the acquis
communautaire has dominated both financing
and formal relations with potential and actual
candidate countries — to the detriment of other
functional economic issues (Baldwin-Edwards,
2006).
Thus, the Balkan region is rapidly becoming
more typical of semi-peripheral economies,
with an increasing tendency for temporary
labor emigration and also attraction of small
numbers of asylum-seekers — the latter, partic-
ularly as legal systems adopt modern asylum
laws in line with the EU acquis. However, for
those countries not on the Schengen “white
list”, the Schengen wall is almost as great a bar-
rier as the former Iron Curtain, and excludes
whole generations in countries with pro-Euro-
pean visions and aspirations for EU member-
ship. There is an imperative for the EU to reform
and adapt, as well as for the Balkan countries:
this message is rarely heard within European
political discourse.
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Notes
1 For the purposes of this paper, I follow the policy of the International Commission on the Balkans (ICB, 2005) and classify as
western Balkans the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia and
Montenegro. To these must be added the eastern Balkan countries of Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova. Since Turkey occupies
a very special and prominent place in relation to both migrations and the EU, I do not include it in this geopolitical scheme.
2 Own calculation, using census data 2002 and births/deaths published in Constantin (2004:37).
3 Internally displaced persons
4 I am indebted to Beryl Nicholson for her astute comments on Albanian emigration and census figures, which also apply to
almost all voluntary migrations in the region.
5 At end 2004, Serbia was ranked third in the world by UNHCR for its refugee to population ratio. 
6 See HRW (2004b) for the landmark ECHR ruling which determined that tenancy rights to socially-owned property were ter-
minated by war, thereby removing the property rights of all refugees from Croatia, who had occupied social housing in
Croatia.
7 There is much controversy about the existence (or not) of different Romani groups — including Egyptian Roma and Ashkali.
See Marushiakova and Popov (2003) for clarification.
8 By the end of 2005, the author was receiving reports that the Greek state had surreptitiously withdrawn or not renewed these
3-year cards, and was threatening to deport those who could not prove their Greek heritage. 
9 For the distinction, which increasingly is being questioned, see the UN protocols on trafficking and smuggling.
10 See TDH (2003) for detailed research on Albanian children trafficked into Greece 
11 This option is denied them in Greece, even for ethnic Greeks. Masked as a “problem” with Albania’s refusal to permit dual
nationality, it is clearly a political strategy to retain a Greek presence in Albania.
12 http://demo.istat.it/The year 2006 has been designated as work-
ers’ mobility year. This ‘move’ aims at raising
awareness and increasing understanding of —
as it has been put — the benefits of both work-
ing abroad and in a new occupation.1 Working
in new countries and/or sectors — it is claimed
Workers’ Mobility’: 
Europe’s Integration and Second
Thoughts
Dr. Peter van Krieken
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This contribution focuses on following four relationships
(1) labour and capital . Moving labour may amount to a falsification of a market economy. Labour migration is of ben-
efit in only very few cases (like that of highly skilled, innovation-prone experts). Most studies now explicitly deny bene-
fits or, at best, doubt whether there are any benefits to labour-related migratory movements.
(2) migration and social welfare policy. What is needed is a thorough review of the various social benefits systems
and its possible impact on migratory movements, be they intra-European or from third countries altogether. It is sub-
mitted that before migration is offered as a release to many needy labour-markets, those markets should first come to
terms with the need to re-power their unemployed, re-train them and gear them to full participation, before going for the
easy solution of depriving other countries of their potential. Moreover, free movement of labour is only possible with a
flexible social welfare system in place, more geared towards the realities of the labour market and the need for Europe
to remain/become competitative.
(3) globalization and migration. It is argued that in the case of migrants staying at home, all parties might be better
off — the individuals as well as the countries of origin and destination. This is because the transfer of industries, agri-
culture and back-office jobs to low income or more productive countries would be much speedier, which ultimately sub-
stantially benefits the global economic development. It is about moving capital, rather than moving people.
(4) the impact of migration and the receiving community/society. This issue is related to the economic and societal
concept of trust, one of the key elements that should be taken into account whenever a migration policy is formulated or
whenever the possible positive or negative outcome of migration is being debated. Economies tend to boom on the basis
of trust. Migration does not necessarily add to 'trust' , and may hence have a negative impact on growth.
Keywords: migration, welfare policy, globalization, European Union— often provides workers with new skills and
experiences, benefiting both them and their
employers. Current figures show that very few
Europeans work abroad. The percentage of
Europeans residing in an EU country other than
their country of origin has consistently
remained at around a mere 1.5% for the last 30
years. And in 9 countries of the EU15, 40% of
workers have remained in the same job for over
10 years.2
At first sight, focusing on workers’ mobility
looks like a brilliant idea. It promotes the idea of
the European house in which we move freely
and happily. It is about meeting with fellow
Europeans, meeting with complementary skills.
Yet, looking into the issue more carefully should
also give rise to some second thoughts.
Thoughts about individual well-being, about
the dialectics between labour and capital, about
the loss of human capital as migrant workers
often work in positions below their actual pro-
fessional level (the engineer as taxi-driver, the
primary school teacher as orange-picker).3
Regard should also be had to the social welfare
system and the need to make ends meet. But
above all, the idea behind moving workers
around is also about the challenge of a decreas-
ing European population and the urge to
become a fair partner in the globalization
process. It is, indirectly, also about the (non-
)admission of migrant workers from outside the
EU.
The European Union focuses on the freedom
of movement, — movement of goods, capital,
services and, indeed, individuals. The EU15
were on the way to accomplish these lofty ideas
to some significant extent. Remarkably, the 15
have given mixed signals as to the acceptance of
labour from the new member states. Hitherto
only Sweden has allowed unrestricted access to
its labour markets to the eight central and east-
ern European countries that joined the EU in
May 2004. Several others have opened their
markets with restrictions on the number of
workers (Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Portu-
gal), or on the benefits they can claim (UK, Ire-
land). Belgium, Finland, Germany, France,
Greece, Spain and Luxembourg have opted for
a ‘transitional period’.4 A number of countries
(Finland, Spain) are preparing to lift the restric-
tions. Belgium and Portugal are also thought to
be debating the issue, but Austria and Germany
are expected to extend the restrictions (a quota
system of sorts). Question-marks remain as to
France’s and Luxembourg’s position.5
At the same time, migrant workers from out-
side the Union who have obtained a long-term
residence status in any EU15 country would be
allowed to move freely under the Directive
agreed upon on the status of long term resi-
dents. Such a long-term resident (a third coun-
try national who has resided legally and contin-
uously within its territory for five years- art.
4.1), may reside in the territory of an EU MS
other than the one that granted long-term status
on the following grounds: (a) the exercise of an
economic activity in an employed or self-
employed capacity; (b) the pursuit of studies or
vocational training; (c) other purposes.6 It
would appear that some review may be neces-
sary as third country nationals now would
appear to enjoy more freedoms than the fellow
EU citizens from the new Member States.
This contribution, therefore, focuses on fol-
lowing four relationships
1)labour and capital
2)migration and social welfare policy
3)globalization and migration
4)the impact of migration and the receiving
community/society. 
As a matter of principle regard should be
had to one of the overriding principles as laid
down in the preamble of one of the relevant ILO
conventions. In this preamble, the need was
emphasized “...to avoid the excessive and uncon-
trolled or unassisted increase of migratory move-
ments because of their negative social and human
consequences, and considering that in order to over-
come underdevelopment and structural and chronic
unemployment, the governments of many countries
increasingly stress the desirability of encouraging
the transfer of capital and technology, rather than the
transfer of workers in accordance with the needs and
requests of these countries in the reciprocal interest of
the countries of origin and the countries of employ-
ment...”.
This text is not new. It is taken from the 1975
ILO Labour Migration Convention (C143), and
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1. Labour and Capitalit is herewith submitted that this text is not just
valid for relationships between Europe and the
Third World, but is, most probably, also true for
the relation ship between the EU15 and the new
Member States. 
Moving labour may amount to a falsification
of a market economy. Economists will submit
that labour is just one part of the means of pro-
duction and the free movement of labour is inclu-
sive in the globalization and EU-build-up, maybe
as much as a condition for the proper functioning
of a world-wide economy. Yet, economists tend
to concentrate on the work, the production per
se, and they conveniently forget that work
amounts to only some 18-22% of the labourer’s
time. The remainder goes to commuting, sleep,
recreation, religion, social and/or political activi-
ties. The same way the world’s economy was
shocked/surprised by the HDI, the human devel-
opment index, an index that focused on the com-
munity’s well-being, rather than the cold, anony-
mous production and GDP figures, the world of
labour migration is also in need of a migrant /
receiving community index. Such an index
should include production, language skills, inte-
gration, social, religious and political
tension/well-being as well as the effect of the
migratory movement on the community of ori-
gin (brain-drain, broken marriages, remittances,
holiday-behaviour, etc.). What we will most
probably observe is that labour migration is of
benefit in only very few cases (like that of highly
skilled, innovation-prone experts who truly have
some added value to offer). Most studies now
explicitly deny benefits or, at best, doubt whether
there are any benefits to labour-related migrato-
ry movements. It is on the basis of these argu-
ments (labour/capital; loss of human capital;
costs to the community) that the 2006 workers’
mobility equation deserves to be re-thought. The
Commission refers to increased awareness and
understanding of the benefits of both working
abroad and in a new occupation. A lot depends
on the meaning of the word ‘benefits’.
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In early May 2004, a conference on ‘Co-ordi-
nation of Social Security in an Enlarged Europe’
focused on a new employment regulation,
under which unemployed people will be able to
seek work in another EU country much more
easily by ‘exporting’ their social welfare entitle-
ments. Member states may allow unemployed
people to bring their social welfare entitlements
from their home country to the EU country
where they are seeking work. This is an impor-
tant piece of social legislation and it should have
an impact on the employment, unemployment
and intra-European migratory movements, as
well as migration from third countries. This reg-
ulation protects the social security rights of peo-
ple who move, for whatever reason, private or
professional, from one Member state to another.
If the fight against unemployment is indeed
considered to be a priority for the Union, this
new regulation represents a major achievement.
Of great relevance in this context is the level
of social services being provided in comparison
with minimum salaries. In some countries (Den-
mark, Germany, the Netherlands) the incentive
to actively look for a job is quite minimal as the
unemployment benefits are sometimes as high,
or even higher, than the salary of the job one
might be capable to perform. Moreover, many
able-bodied were removed from the labour mar-
ket as ‘incapables’ under most generous inabili-
ty screening cum benefits. Some European coun-
tries enjoyed low unemployment figures, only
because they had such high ‘disability-‘figures.
It took those countries almost a generation (that
is: over 20 years) to redress some of the ills
involved.7 With or without the number of dis-
ability-benefits receivers who, upon careful
scrutiny might be able, under certain conditions,
to re-enter the labour market, the total number
of unemployed amounts to close to 10% (official
unemployment figure for the EU15 has now
decreased to 8.5%). That means that in principle
a great many unemployed should be available
for many of the jobs now being offered to legal
or illegal, regular or irregular immigrants.
What is needed is a thorough review of the
various social benefits systems and its possible
impact on migratory movements, be they intra-
European or from third countries altogether. It
is herewith submitted that before migration is
offered as a release to many needy labour-mar-
kets, those markets should first come to terms
with the need to re-power their unemployed, re-
train them and gear them to full participation,
2. Migration and Social Welfarebefore going for the easy solution of depriving
other countries of their potential.
Apart from the impact of social welfare on
the participation in the labour market (yes, par-
ticipation of men and women alike can be
manipulated), it is also of relevance to look into
the issue of access of fellow-Europeans or even
long-term third-country nationals to the nation-
al social welfare systems. As can now be sub-
mitted, European borders are to a great extent
determined by access to the social welfare
office.
In this respect it is to be noted that long-term
(third-country) residents shall enjoy equal treat-
ment with nationals as regards social security,
social assistance, and social protection as defined by
national law (art.11.1.d of the above quoted
Directive). Art. 21 states that as soon as third-
country long-term residents have received a res-
idence permit in a second Member State, they
too shall enjoy the benefits as defined under
art.11.1.d. This amounts to a remarkably gener-
ous approach, particularly in the light of the
present restrictive approaches to citizens of the
new Member States themselves. Indeed, social
welfare systems deserve a complete make-over,
reflecting on the one hand community-member-
ship and the place of work, and on the other
hand the public/private aspects of any social
security insurance. In fact, once every EU-citi-
zen has his/her own private social security
arrangement with either a public entity or a pri-
vate insurance company, the place of work and
the risk of becoming unemployed is no longer of
great relevance: the person concerned will be
covered, one way or another on the terms
he/she agreed upon with the provider of the
insurances. 
Many unemployment schemes allow the
unemployed to enjoy benefits until they find a
job on their very own level. The present author
fails to understand why a former civil servant or
university lecturer should not be considered
able to work as a guard or a janitor. Of course,
he or she may sign up to an unemployment
insurance to prevent him/her to take up such a
job, but that then becomes a private matter
between the insurer and the insured (and the
costs may be staggering of not prohibitive). 
A similar re-think needs to be carried
through for health insurances and pension
arrangements. Health insurances should partly
remain in the ‘public’ domain, as far as the pro-
vision of minimum benefits is concerned,
because the community as a whole has a utili-
tarian interest in the health of its fellow com-
munity-members. Everything over and above
the minimum treatment should be a private
matter between the insurer and the insured. As
to migrant workers, it does not make a differ-
ence where exactly the insurer holds office.
Likewise, employers and employees should be
entitled to verse funds in a foreign pension fund
for any EU employee, thereby assisting towards
creating a true European (pension-)market.
Yet, the argument presented here is that free
movement of labour is only possible with a flexi-
ble social welfare system in place, more geared
towards the realities of the labour market and the
need for Europe to remain/become competitive.
Europe has during the last two centuries
moved from mainly agriculture to manufactur-
ing and to service industries. Today, thanks to
effective communication and transportation,
most production can take place on far-away
shores. What is needed nearby are health, edu-
cation, infrastructure and retail. Infrastructure
entails construction (roads, offices, housing) but
also communication (trains, aircraft, cars, tele-
com) and general upkeep (repairs, cleaning). Of
the four mentioned here, health and education
are least prone to productivity increases. This
needs to be taken into account, also in view of
the ageing debate.
Coleman (Oxford) submitted at the Cairo+10
UNECE/UNFPA Conference (Geneva, January
2004) that there is no ‘solution’ to an ageing
population short of a return to much higher
rates of population growth or mass age-specific
euthanasia. The problem is that the effect is not
very great and immigration is an inefficient way
of achieving this end. Immigrants themselves
age and the country then requires more immi-
grants, as it were, to replace their number.
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3. Migration and Globalization8Immigration cannot solve the problems of pop-
ulation ageing except at rates of immigration so
high that they would generate economically
and environmentally unsustainable population
growth rates and permanently and radically
change the cultural and ethnic composition of
the host population. The population size conse-
quent on the migration needed to preserve the
current potential in the UK would double to 120
million by 2050 because the UK would be
importing 1.2 million persons per year. By 2100,
up to five million new immigrants would be
needed every year and the UK population
would have risen to 312 million.9
Of course, the retirement challenge needs to
be addressed. Now that most experts agree that
migration is not the answer, consideration must
be given to (a) working up to the age of 65, 67 or
even 70; (b) working longer hours (40 instead of
36); (c) salary decreases beyond the age of 55,
possibly combined with less work (e.g. a 66%
salary for a four-day working week, or a 50%
salary for a three-day working week).10 Most
European Governments have understood the
message. The Trade Unions, however, generally
object. It is worth explaining that non-migration
would ultimately improve the salaries and sta-
tus of their members.
Apart from the idea that bigger populations
means more power (presumably through larger
armed forces or a stronger economy), there is in
principle nothing wrong with decreasing popu-
lations. Of course, people want to become rich-
er, and the fear is justified that with less ‘pro-
ducers’ less products will be on the market. It is
then forgotten that productivity has increased
steadily over the last 500 years or so, and there
is no reason to suspect that productivity would
suddenly stop doing so. Yet, two important con-
ditions then need to be met: (i) sufficient cre-
ative and innovative engineering capabilities
are to be available to replace labour with capital,
that is to introduce new machineries; and (ii)
qualified managers must introduce better pro-
cessing and must continuously streamline pro-
cedures. Innovation is the key word, and
Europe should invest heavily in ensuring that
the replacement of labour by capital will remain
a major option. Subject to that condition
decreasing populations might still enjoy grow-
ing productivity. If only ‘space’ were not such a
scarce commodity.11
Alternatively, it should be appreciated that a
yearly increase in a population by a mere 1%
will result in doubling the population in 72
years. For Europe that would mean that by 2100
the EU-25 will have one billion inhabitants and
that the global population will reach the 25 bil-
lion mark by 2150. 
That having been stated, it is a fact that
health and education are economic activities
that are not easily submitted to increased pro-
ductivity ideas. Yet, most of Europe managed to
spend additional funds for exactly health and
education on – in my eyes non-productive –
middle management. The percentage of ‘hands
at the bed’ in hospitals as well as ‘teaching the
pupils’ at schools have disturbingly changed
over the last decades. If a revolution would be
needed these days, it should be about giving the
hospitals back top the physicians and the
schools back to the teachers.
Moving agriculture, manufacturing and
even, for instance, back-office jobs to countries
outside of Europe creates win/win situations.
Subsidies should be considered as the scourge
of any international economic system. This
comes and goes at the cost of the economies of
many developing or less developed countries.
Countries that should be able to export their
products are now forced to export their work-
force. It is about tomatoes, not about the toma-
to-picker. Or, in other words, should the people
move to where the capital is, or, rather, should
capital move to where the people are? 
The recent Brazil/WTO case (on subsidies paid
to U.S. cotton farmers) is of the utmost impor-
tance in this respect. More than ever, the migra-
tion ‘lobby’ should display an interest in such
cases as it should in the subsidy issue at large. In
the absence of subsidies, more producers will
move production to low-income ‘good weather’
countries. This is already true for the Dutch
flower industry, an industry without subsidies,
and perfectly suitable to make use of the global-
ization processes, thereby benefiting producers,
labour and consumers all at the same time.
As for manufacturing it can be submitted
that once a manufacturer has reached the mar-
gins of profit, and is e.g. faced with labourers
who demand an increase in salary, three alter-
natives are available:
—by hiring migrant labour (including ille-
gals) the manufacturer can avoid the
demand/supply reality and can continue
profitable production, thanks to relatively
low labour costs;
—by replacing labour with capital, the man-
ufacturer can make a sound long-term
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innovation possibilities (thereby also pro-
moting investments in innovative think-
ing at large);
—in the end the manufacturer can move the
site of manufacturing to a low-labour-cost
country.
Of the three alternatives, the first is by far the
worst scenario as it delays the introduction of
innovative processes and procedures and
because it delays moving the site by a couple of
years, at the cost of the consumer. The introduc-
tion of innovative ideas or machinery benefits
all, and the transfer of production is an obvious
blessing for Third World economies as well as
low-cost Eastern European countries.12.
It is probably even more surprising to learn
that also moving so-called back-office activities
(keeping files, administration, accounting,
auditing) to low income countries can be a very
profitable exercise, that is: profitable to all. The
Economist, in its 13 December 2003 issue, calcu-
lated that the transfer of 1 dollar worth of back
office work from the USA to India would give
India 33 dollar cents and the USA no less than
$1.12, making a total profit of 45%. This, it
should be added, includes re-employment.13
It is a well known yet staggering fact that the
total of ODA (Official Development Assistance)
covers a mere 35% of the total losses incurred by
Third World countries because of those coun-
tries not being able to export products to the
North/West as a result of tariffs and other
export/import hindrances. It should then be
added that the OECD has allowed the reception
costs of asylum seekers who have come to the
North/West to be considered as part of the
ODA. It could hence be argued that many coun-
tries would be better off without development
aid, but with their products having access to the
markets of the North/West.
More research needs to be done into the
alternative to non-migration. It is hereby sub-
mitted that in the case of migrants staying at
home, all parties might be better off — the indi-
viduals as well as the countries of origin and
destination. This is because the transfer of
industries, agriculture and back-office jobs to
low income or more productive countries
would be much speedier, which ultimately sub-
stantially benefits the global economic develop-
ment. It is about moving capital, rather than
moving people.
The migration lobby, however, is increasing-
ly focused on a new aspect that, in their views,
would justify migration: remittances. Even the
World Bank appears to subscribe to the idea that
remittances represent a significant positive eco-
nomic feature. Migrants provide huge flows of
remittances to their countries of origin, amount-
ing to an estimated US$ 90 billion annually, or
the second largest source of external funding for
developing countries. However, the total losses
seem to become lost in the debate. Reference
should be made to: (a) the use of the funds con-
cerned; (b) the durability of those transfers; and
(c) the impact of ‘dual loyalty’ on integration
and related processes (the loss of human capital
already having been touched upon herein-
above).
a) Many of the funds made available through
remittances are used for consumption (cars, lux-
ury goods, housing), often as part of a second-
ary pension fund. Of course, more often than
not, the local economy benefits, but in some
areas remittances used for the construction of
housing often results in an increase in construc-
tion costs, which in turn disadvantages those
who do not have migrants in their family.
b) The durability is questionable. Those who
do not marry someone from the same
area/country are not necessarily tempted to
invest in the country of origin of just one part-
ner; often emphasis on educating the children
results in changing saving-patterns. In other
words, the sustainability greatly depends on
newcomers, on ongoing migratory patterns.
Once no new migrants are forthcoming, remit-
tances are bound to decrease. It would be surre-
alistic to insist on ongoing migration for the
sake of remittances.
c) The idea behind remittances portrays an
ongoing link between the migrant and the coun-
try of origin. In the case of permanent migration
(different from temporary migration) this
would be contrary to an all-integration
approach, whereby the migrant focuses for the
full 100% on the country of residence. It could
hence be argued that supporting the transfer of
savings to the country of origin rather than
investing in the country of destination would be
counterproductive to the all-integration-
approach — although no results are available
from research – if any – into this linkage.
What remains to be done in situ, on location,
is mainly limited to education, health, retail and
infrastructure. The latter includes construction,
communication and maintenance. Indeed,
many of the jobs involved are the heavy and
dirty ones, positions now often filled by
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spite of the significant unemployment rates in
Europe as a whole. As usual, market mecha-
nisms should be allowed to play its role. That
means on the one hand that salaries for these
jobs need to be appealing, but also that social
welfare benefits need to be at such a level that
actual work always acts as an incentive. 
In migratory circles it is well known that a
salary difference of 30% and more will trigger
migration. It could be submitted that the differ-
ence between benefits and salaries should also
be in the 30% range to make an impact on the
individual decision-making process.
The balance between nationals and fellow-
Europeans on the one hand, and Europeans and
non-Europeans on the other is a most sensitive,
even dangerous issue. Non-discrimination
stands central whenever one deals with people
with a different background. Yet, the eyes
should not be closed to the realities of the ten-
sion so often apparent in the Paris ‘banlieu’, the
British Midlands, or Berlin Kreuzberg. 
Migration is more often than not looked
upon as result of external pressure: (1) econom-
ics/ecology, (2) war, (3) persecution/repression
and (4) demography can all be causes for migra-
tory movements. It is also of importance to
emphasize that these four main causes are inter-
related: war has an impact on the economy;
demographic developments may have an
impact on the ecological balance, and so on.
Moreover, there is no need to explain that a
gloomy economic situation may result in ten-
sions between the population at large and the
authorities, resulting in repression, or that a
fight on the control of certain natural resources
may result in war. It is also clear that an increas-
ing population may put pressure on economic
developments (a 3% population increase would
need to be off-set by a 7% increase in GDP).
Fairly new is the confirmation of the correlation
of the so-called youth bulge and the likelihood
of armed conflict. It has been submitted by inter
alia population action international that in the case
of the 15-29 old representing more than 40% of
the adult population (15 and above), this results
in a significant likelihood of armed conflict: “our
analysis suggests that states where young adults
comprised 40% or more of all adults experienced civil
conflict sometime from 1990-2000, 2.3 times the like-
lihood of countries below that benchmark.”14 On the
basis of these figures it could be submitted that
a decreasing fertility, combined with a slimming
‘youth bulge’ may create a situation in which
peace may become more likely. 
Apart from ‘migration’ as the result of exter-
nal pressure, regard should also be had to
migration being the cause of tension and/or neg-
ative developments. The Hmong in Laos; Indi-
ans in Fiji; the big-city challenges, — it all adds
up.15 Feller, in a January 2004 Amsterdam
address stated: “...On all continents, mass influxes
of displaced persons have placed onerous burdens on
the physical environment [pollution, deforestation,
competition for natural food and water supplies], on
social systems [health, welfare, housing and employ-
ment and education] and can negatively impact the
demographic balance of a host population, antago-
nizing the host communities.  Similarly widespread
is the growing problem of irregular movement.  It is
not only a problem as between regions, but also for
popular destination countries within regions them-
selves...”.
Indeed, more research needs to be undertak-
en into the probability of migration per se creat-
ing problems next to solving others. More than
ever all the relevant disciplines should join
hands to tackle the various challenges on this
issue.
This issue is related to the economic and
societal concept of trust. In the opinion of the
present author trust is one of the key elements
that should be taken into account whenever a
migration policy is formulated or whenever the
possible positive or negative outcome of migra-
tion is being debated. Economies tend to boom
on the basis of trust. In 1995 Fukuyama, best
known for his ‘The End of History’ (1992) pub-
lished an important book on ‘Trust’. Fukuyama
argues that for an economy to boom and for a
society to prosper aspects like trust and social
cohesion are indispensable. Societal develop-
ments, interaction and group dynamics are far
more important than hitherto believed: “eco-
nomic activity represents a crucial part of life
and is knit together by a wide variety of norms,
rules, moral obligations, and other habits that
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4. Migration and the Receiving Communitytogether shape the society (...); one of the most
important lessons we can learn from an exami-
nation of economic life is that a nation’s well-
being, as well as its ability to compete, is condi-
tioned by a single, pervasive characteristic: the
level of trust inherent in the society” [p. 7].
“There are three paths to sociability: the first is
based on family and kinship; the second on vol-
untary associations outside kinship such as
schools, clubs, and professional organisations,
and the third is the state. There are three forms
of economic organisation corresponding to each
path: the family business, the professionally
managed corporation, and the state-owned or -
sponsored enterprise. The first and third paths,
it turns out, are closely related to one another:
cultures in which the primary avenue toward
sociability is family and kinship have a great
deal of trouble creating large, durable economic
organisations and therefore look to the state to
initiate and support them.” [p. 62] In fact,
Fukuyama displays his doubts concerning mul-
ticultural societies. And indeed, in the migra-
tion debate it is often forgotten that migrant
workers do not only come to work, but are
human beings with their own life-style and
their own interests, goals and ideas. It is here-
with submitted that due to the substantial num-
bers involved, actual segregation has in some
cities taken place, is taking place in others or is
about to take place altogether. This is bound to
have a serious negative impact on interaction,
intercultural relations and hence on trust, with
all the negative results for society and the econ-
omy at large.
Keeping the above into account, it should
become obvious that promoting workers’
mobility does not necessarily amount to a
straightforward win-win situation.
It should be quite obvious from the above
that the present author is not necessarily keen
on promoting workers’ mobility. Modern
economies should strive for the transfer of capi-
tal and goods rather than for the transfer of
human beings. 
Of course, in the absence of in-depth econo-
metric studies on the impact of non-migration,
forcing national economies on even a greater
scale to make use of innovation, outsourcing
and the transfer of activities to low-income
countries, it is no easy task to bring the idea
home. But the idea of importing a tomato-pick-
er rather than tomatoes simply does not sound
right. Whoever has traveled the cotton fields of
Uzbekistan, the USA and Western Africa will
most probably understand the issue at stake.
Also, please meet and compare the peanut
farmers of Senegal and Georgia (USA). As long
as the EU distorts in the most hypocritical man-
ner possible the agricultural realities with subsi-
dies and farm support amounting to more than
Euro 100 million per day (yes, per day), it
should not be too difficult to argue that efforts
to make workers move may amount to a distor-
tion in its own right. True innovative thinking
would aim at innovation.
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2http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/817&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLan-
guage=en (consulted January 2006).
3 ) Migrants tend to work – at least during the first years – below their educational and skills levels. Recent studies in Canada have
indicated that for that country alone the loss involved would amount to some CND$ 5 to 55 billion on a yearly basis (the $5B
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comes from a Conference Board of Canada article and the $55B comes from Jeffrey Reitz at the University of Toronto; source,
Ms Rosaline Frith, CIC).
4 Two of the new member states, Hungary and Poland, have as a matter of retaliation imposed restrictions on EU15 workers. 
5 Source: http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200601/13a724a3-888a-444c-8751-bd74beb3ce9e.htm (consulted January 2006).
6 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003, art. 14.2.
7 Blair announced in January 2006 a ‘benefits shake-up’, aiming to get 1.7 million (of the total 2.7 million) incapacity claimants
back into work (BBC News, 24 January 2006). Again, it should be noted that these ‘incapacity claimants’ normally remain out-
side the unemployment figures.
8 This part is based on chapter B of the introduction to my The Consolidated Asylum and Migration Acquis, The Hague/Cambridge,
2004, pp 19-22.
9 Coleman also refers to the Korea Syndrome: The reductio ad absurdum of all this is what one might call the ‘Korea syndrome’: the
level of immigration required in order to preserve the current potential support ratio in the Republic of Korea and its conse-
quences for population growth. In order to preserve Korea’s present potential support ratio (10: 1) the population would need
to increase to 6.2 billion people by the year 2050. Just by coincidence, this happens to be the entire population of the planet at
the present time, so we would all have to go there.
10 By 55, statistically speaking, most parents can ‘breath’: children leave school, the mortgage has been paid off, and some heritage
money may be coming in.
11 Remarkably, the Netherlands, in 2002-2003, combined increased unemployment with increased productivity.
12 In fact, many Western European firms prefer e.g. Romania to China because of the easy access, the short communication lines
and the legal reliability. 
13 India: labour: 0.10; profits retained in India: 0.10; suppliers 0.09; central government taxes 0.03; state government taxes: 0.01. Net
benefit to India: 0.33. USA: savings accruing to US investors/customers: 0.58; imports of US goods and services by providers in
India: 0.05; transfer of profits by US-based providers in India back to US: 0.04; Net direct benefit retained in US 0.67; Value from
US labour re-employed 0.45 – 0.47. Potential net benefit to US: 1.12-1.14. Source: The Economist, December 13th, 2003.
14 This research excluded countries with persistent or recurring conflict. See: Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion: The Security
Demography; population and civil conflict after the cold war; Population Action International (Washington 2003), p. 48. See also the
2002 WHO World Report on Violence and Health, p. 222.
15 See for instance Hans Magnus Enzensbergers’ Aussichten Auf Den Burgerkrieg (1993).This paper examines the integration mechanisms in the field of migration, focusing on migration flows, specific mecha-
nisms and the institutional - legislative framework created in Romania for external migration administration. These
issues have been approached in close connection with the orientations, requirements and trends materialized at the EU
level, in the context of enlarging the Union towards the center and the eastern part of Europe. Subsequently an inquiry
into the social-cultural dimension is undertaken, highlighting the migrant's profile (emigrant, immigrant), the issues
related to the integration within the host country and the phenomenon perception by  public opinion and mass-media.
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In Romania before 1989 there used to be two
migration mechanisms: permanent migration,
whose motivations were mainly political and
ethnic, and temporary migration, for studying
or working abroad, based only on Romania’s
inter-governmental agreements with other
countries. After 1989, the main reasons behind
migration shifted from the ethnic and political
reason to economic ones. One consequence is
the fact that temporary migration has increased
Romania's External Migration in
the Context of Accession to the EU:
Mechanisms, Institutions and
Social-Cultural Issues*
Luminiþa Nicolescu, Associate Professor 
Daniela-Luminiþa Constantin, Professor 
Academy of Economic Studies of Bucharest
∗ This paper represents a part of the authors' contribution to a study developed under the auspices of the European Institute in Romania
included in the “Pre-Accession Impact Studies — PAIS II” series, funded by a Phare project. All opinions expressed represent authors'
responsibility. 
1. Changes in East – West migration mechanismsboth in absolute terms and as per-
centage in total number of migra-
tions. 
To date, there are certain mecha-
nisms through which migration is
achieved at international level. We
will emphasize those mechanisms
that are found at European level,
namely those used by persons
migrating from Romania to the
European Union. 
a.Legal permanent migration
b.Legal temporary migration: (stu-
dents; personnel/replacement
migration, refugees and asylum
applicants) 
c.Illegal transit migration
d.Illegal migration of persons from
Central and East Europe (from
Romania)
e..Circulatory migration by means
of migratory networks (legal or
illegal)
a. Legal permanent migration repre-
sent migratory flows leaving Roma-
nia to third party countries in order to settle there
through the following methods (see figure no. 1):
—based on emigration visas within special pro-
grams stimulating emigration of persons
holding qualifications that are scarce in the
receiving country or other types of programs
(such as the visa lottery). The EU does not
run this type of permanent emigration pro-
grams. Romanian citizens that emigrate per-
manently are aiming at countries that have
such emigration policies and programs
namely Canada, Australia, New Zeeland and
the USA.
—by marrying a citizen from an EU member
state and changing the place or residence to
the country of their spouse. 
—possibly as refugees or political or war asy-
lum applicants. In the past years this has not
been the case of Romania, but of the former
Yugoslavia states. 
b. Legal temporary migration refers to those relo-
cating on the territory of an EU country for a lim-
ited period of time (from several months to years).
This is taking certain forms (see figure no. 2): 
b.1. On the one hand there are Central and
Eastern European (Romanian) students study-
ing in the European Union countries and which
later on return (at least some of them) to the
countries of origin.
b.2. On the other hand there are the Central
and Eastern European (Romanian) personnel
leaving to work on labour contracts signed
based on bilateral agreements between states. 
b.3. Refugees obtaining the right to tem-
porarily settle in a host EU country or persons
applying for asylum due to political reasons or
who are hiding behind such motivations. This
type of migration is becoming more and more
restricted, and as far as Romanian citizens
migrating to the EU are concerned, its degree of
applicability tends to reach zero level. 
c.Illegal transit migration  is the mechanism
through which persons from third party coun-
tries, outside Central and Eastern Europe emi-
grate to such countries, including Romania so
that they could further emigrate to the European
Union. This is a relatively new phenomena and
it has been found that its main characteristics are
illegality and the involvement of criminal organ-
izations in human traffic. Transit migration
through Central and Eastern Europe (and thus
through Romania as well) consists in a growing
number of illegal emigrants, some of them meet-
ing the criteria for which they apply for asylum,
but who prefer not to do so in Central and East-
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sons, so that they could transit
to the European Union. 
d. Illegal migration of persons
living in Central and Eastern
Europe (Romania) includes per-
sons of Romanian nationality
leaving Romania and staying
illegally in an EU country –
after the legal stay period (3
months) expires, persons leav-
ing as tourists but who, reach-
ing the country of destination,
perform lucrative activities on
the black market or persons
entering and illegally staying
on the territory of an EU coun-
try (see figure no. 4).
e.  Circulatory migration by
means of migratory networks. Cir-
culatory migration refers to the
alternative movement between
the country of origin and one or
more of the countries of desti-
nation. Migrants leaving and
working abroad for a period of
time, return in the country, stay
for a period of time then leave
again for work abroad. In this
context are formed  the migrato-
ry networks, networks through
which those who want to tem-
porarily migrate abroad receive
help and support from previous
migrants (see figure no. 5).
The intent to migrate abroad
seeking a job is more likely
among people living within
communities with a high circu-
latory migration rate. In areas
where others have left before,
more will leave, in places where other migrants
have succeeded and where the signs of success
are apparent, migration will be higher. This way,
are formed migratory networks when previous
migrants resort to members of their families or
their friends and acquaintances in order to work
abroad, supporting the migration process.  
Informal networks and institutions of circula-
tory migration are on the one hand the individ-
uals’ innovating response to the dysfunctionali-
ties of formal institutions such as: the labour
market, the capital market, assurance of prod-
ucts and prices, labour force mediation abroad
by the state and private agencies, while on the
other hand they are the adjusting response of the
community to new situations entering in conflict
with traditional values (Lãzãroiu, 2002).
As migratory processes intensify and legisla-
tion changes, migratory networks will probably
tend to change the functions that they had at the
time they were conceived, that of facilitating
transport of labour force and capital and will
fulfill functions for maintaining community sol-
idarity. 
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influencing the migration phenomena in the EU
is tackled in Chapter 2 Freedom of Movement of
Persons and Chapter 24 Cooperation in the field
of Justice and Internal Affairs. Within the two
chapters, the types of legislation that influences
the migratory phenomena in Europe are related
to laws in three major fields:
a. legislation regarding migration (direct
influence on migration)
b. legislation regarding the labour market
(direct and indirect influence on migration)
c. legislation regarding mutual recognition
of degrees and qualifications (indirect influence
on migration).
a. Legislation regarding migration in EU
For a long period of time, the right to enter
and live on the territory of an EU Member State
was governed by national laws drawn up by
each Member State. One could enter and live on
the territory of a state based on an entry visa
and a residence visa which were granted by
each state. Only in 1999, EU Member States
decided the formulation of a common policy
regarding migration and asylum to become
effective by 2004 the latest.  The common policy
regarding migration includes aspects such as:
free movement of persons, external border con-
trol and the granting of visas, asylum, immigra-
tion and the protection of third party nationali-
ties’ rights and legal cooperation on civil mat-
ters. The common policy in the field of migra-
tion and asylum has in view the adoption of a
joint position of the EU member states, towards
the applications for asylum coming from per-
sons from third party countries, as well as the
control of illegal human trafficking. 
b. Legislation regarding the labour market in the
EU
The legislation and the regulations in the
field of the labour force interest us in the contest
of migration in terms of two aspects: first being
that of recruiting labour force from outside EU
and second being the manner in which the leg-
islation regarding the labour force in the EU
may influence east-west migratory flows once
the applicant countries in Central and East
Europe become EU members. 
The recruitment of labour from outside EU
countries’ border and outside the EU is the man-
ner through which the European deficit in labour
force may be covered where there is such deficit.
In this sense there are regulations that have con-
sidered the recruitment of labour force from out-
side the EU, which encourages replacement
migration1. Replacement migration in the EU
focuses on two major categories of personnel: on
the one hand – highly qualified personnel which
are deficient in the EU countries and on the other
hand the unskilled workers which are required
for the replacement of the local labour force, that
do not want to perform any such works (in agri-
culture for example). The replacement migration
through recruitment from outside the EU is not
regulated at the level of the European Union,
each member applying its own policy. 
The freedom of movement and equal treat-
ment by banning any restrictions regarding
labour force for Member States citizens that
may apply to Central and Eastern Europe states
after joining to the EU, generate fear from the
existing Member States of massive migration
flows of labour force traveling from east to the
west, seeking better salaries and better working
conditions. This is why, separate agreements are
negotiated regarding the movement of the
workforce after joining to the EU with each of
the applicant countries, requesting a certain
period of transition for the liberalization of the
work force movement. The transition period
will generally range from 2 to 5 years and by no
means can it exceed 7 years. 
c. Legislation regarding mutual recognition of
degrees and qualifications
Ensuring the free movement of persons and
workers requires the recognition of the degrees
and professional qualifications. The most
important regulations in this sense, at the level
of the EU, are a group of directives creating the
premises a General System for the Recognition
of Degrees and Qualifications and another
group of directives regulating the recognition of
qualifications of various professions2. 
The Romanian Journal of European Studies 58
2. The creation of the legislative – institutional framework in accordance
with the EU requirements regarding migrationIt is being considered a new directive (a fifth
directive) intended to remain the single direc-
tive, which would simplify the acquis estab-
lished in the previous directives. It is being con-
sidered the application of the principle of auto-
matic recognition of degrees and degrees’
recognition based on coordination of minimum
training conditions. In order to facilitate degree
recognition processes two information net-
works have been set up at the level of the EU,
namely: ENIC (European Network of Informa-
tion Center) and NARIC (National Academic
Recognition Information Centers).
Legislation regarding migration in Roma-
nia. Harmonization with the European acquis
communautaire. The first initiatives for the cre-
ation of a new legislative framework in the field
of migration took place in Romania at the begin-
ning of the 1990’s. Subsequently, with Roma-
nia’s application for joining to the European
Union, this activity has intensified so that, in the
past three years, there have been adopted many
laws and normative acts intended to ensure the
adoption of the acquis communautaire. For most
directives within the two negotiation chapters
that include legislation influencing migration
(chapter 2 and chapter 24), Romania has started
adopting the corresponding legislation. 
Remarkable progress has been made by the
Romanian legislation regarding the regime of
foreign persons in Romania, the regime of the
refugees and their social protection and the pre-
vention and combating of human trafficking.
On the labour force market there has been regu-
lated the granting of work permits. Thus,
according to the principle of free movement of
persons, EU citizens and members of
their families may work on Romania’s
territory without the requirement to
obtain the work permit, unlike other cat-
egories of foreign citizens. 
There are some aspects, where the
Romanian progress was smaller: it is
believed that there still exists discrimina-
tion between EU and Romanian citizens
owing to the fact that Romanians are
given priority when being employed.
Also as far as mutual recognition of pro-
fessional qualification, Romania’s prepa-
rations are thought to be at an early
stage.
Box no. 1 presents the main legisla-
tion regarding migration from Romania.
Progress was also reported with chapter 24.
This way, immediately after the issuance of the
2003 Country Report, the National Office for
Refugees has issued and submitted a draft
amendment for the Government Ordinance no.
102/2000, eliminating all inconsistencies
between domestic legislation and the docu-
ments included in the acquis in force to date and
the continuation of the monitoring and analysis
of the evolution of the acquis for the preparation
of draft laws and their initiation on time. In
addition to such measures, G.O. no.102/2001
was also amended through Government Ordi-
nance 43/2004, updating the definitions of the
forms of protection, eliminating differences in
the treatment of the refugees and those receiv-
ing temporary protection, confers the National
Office for Refugees the capacity to take part in
trials regarding asylum applications, and well
as other aspects. 
As far as the achievement of the objectives
related to the European Union accession is con-
cerned, all requirements for closing negotiations
on Chapter 24 have been met, except for aspects
related to the implementation of Dublin mecha-
nisms and the EURODAC system in Romania3. 
Institutions involved in the management of
migration in Romania. Various institutions can
be involved in the monitoring and performance
of the migratory phenomena, playing different
roles. Taking them into account within the
framework of international migration reveals
that they carry out their activity at different lev-
els, as shown in table no. 1.
For instance, at supra-national level, among
state institutions involved in performing and
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Tableȱnr.ȱ1.ȱInstitutionalȱactorsȱinvolvedȱinȱinternationalȱmigrationȱȱ
Oȱ=ȱorigin;ȱD=ȱdestinationȱ
Level/Typeȱ
ofȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
institutionȱ
Stateȱ
authoritiesȱ
Privateȱ
companiesȱ
Voluntaryȱ
organizationsȱ
Informalȱ
transportȱandȱ
mediationȱ
networksȱ
SupraȬ
nationalȱ
Europeanȱ
Unionȱ
Corporationsȱ
(headhunting,ȱ
legal,ȱ
transport)ȱ
Internationalȱ
organizationsȱ
(IOM,ȱ
ILO,UNCHR*)ȱ
Transnationalȱ
communitiesȱ
Nationalȱ Governmentsȱ
(O/D)ȱ
Mediationȱ
companiesȱ
(O/D)ȱ
Voluntaryȱ
organizationsȱ
(D)ȱ
Migrants’ȱ
associationsȱ
(D)ȱ
Localȱ Localȱ
authorities,ȱ
governmentalȱ
agenciesȱ
Mediationȱ
companiesȱ
(O)ȱ
Voluntaryȱ
organizationsȱ
(D)ȱ
Migrants’ȱ
associationsȱ
(D)ȱ
ȱSource:ȱ L©z©roiuȱ S.ȱ (2002)ȱ „Migraôiaȱ circulatorieȱ aȱ forôeiȱ deȱ munc©ȱ dinȱ Romania.ȱ
Consecinôeȱasupraȱintegr©riiȱeuropene”ȱ–“CirculatoryȱMigrationȱofȱtheȱLabourȱForceȱinȱ
Romania.ȱConsequencesȱonȱtheȱEuropeanȱIntegration”ȱ,ȱwww.osf.roȱ
*ȱ IOMȱ =ȱ Theȱ Internationalȱ Organizationȱ forȱ Migration;ȱ ILOȱ =ȱ Internationalȱ Labourȱ
Organization;ȱUNCHRȱ=ȱUnitedȱNationȱHighȱCommissionerȱforȱHumanȱRightsȱmonitoring migration there is the European
Union, and among voluntary ones there is the
International Organization for Migration. 
At national level, in Romania, the main gov-
ernmental institutions involved in the migrato-
ry processes are the Ministry of Administration
and Interior, the Ministry of Labour, Social Soli-
darity and Family, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the Ministry of Education and
Research. The main migratory policies in Roma-
nia are implemented through many agencies
within or independent of the above mentioned
ministries, agencies whose activity is difficult to
coordinate. For instance, the emigration and
immigration phenomena are dealt with by dif-
ferent institutions, an in case that the same insti-
tution is handling both aspects of the migratory
phenomenon, they are undertaken by different,
specialized departments. 
There are also a number of non-governmen-
tal institutions involved in running or gathering
information on migration, such as:  private com-
panies mediating labour contracts abroad, the
local office of the International Organization for
Migration in Romania, the representative office
of the United Nation High Commissioner for
Refugees in Romania, the Foundation of the
Romanian National Council for Refugees, the
Romanian Forum for Refugees and Migrants,
and others. 
It has been noted that a large part of such
institutions carry out their activity helping
refugees and immigrants in Romania. An expla-
nation would be that measures taken by the
Romanian state have been considered insuffi-
cient in his field due to financial difficulties on
one hand (Romania is itself going through a
developing period) and because there is still a
large difference between the legal provisions
and what is in fact achieved by the Romanian
state (IOM, Migration Trends, 2003). On the
other hand, the low number of immigrants tar-
geting Romania (around 200 persons per year)
makes it difficult to test the legislation in the
field at a large scale.
The international experience in migration
administration and monitoring demonstrates
the close relationship between the legislative-
institutional dimension and the social-cultural
one. The elaboration and adoption of laws, the
creation of institutions, the development of cor-
responding strategies and policies represent
major components of this process, but their suc-
cess cannot be separated from the manner in
which the involved actors –governmental insti-
tutions, non-governmental organizations, mass-
media, communities, individuals – respond to
the so-called “behavioural challenges”, related
to participation, communication, mentalities
and attitudes. 
The migrant’s profile. Considering the
migration a social phenomenon that directly
affects a significant part of the population and
has complex implications on the entire society, it
is vital to know and to emphasize the migrant’s
profile – the profile of the emigrant from Roma-
nia and of the immigrant to our country. That
will enable an accurate development of the
measures related to the administration of
migration phenomenon and of the support pro-
vided to the migrants.
Within the dominant national tendency –
namely labour migration, the most representative
category is currently represented by young men
(18-35 years old), with an average education level,
as skilled workers from the big cities of Romania and
Bucharest, its capital.
The villages’ migration potential should not be
ignored either; relating to this issue Dumitru
Sandu has suggested the metaphor of the
“hydrographical network” (“community repre-
sents the spring of migration) and the transition
from the factorial approaches to the structural
and typological ones, that makes possible to
identify types of villages based on the dominant
cultural profile and the experience regarding
the international circulatory migration (Sandu,
2004).
Various studies have also stated a series of
hypotheses regarding the selective migration
flows, according to which the minority ethnical
or religious groups show a higher mobility level
than the one of the majority Orthodox Roman-
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3.The social-cultural issues accompanying the current migration
phenomenon in Romaniaian population (Sandu, 2000, Diminescu,
Lãzãroiu, 2002).
Even if at present Romania distinguishes on
the background of international migration as an
emigration country, with a labour market less
attractive to the immigrants, being more inter-
esting in terms of transit possibilities to the
developed countries (briefly, « More ‘Out’ than
‘In’ at the Crossroads Between Europe and
Balkans », according to the suggestive title of an
IOM country report from the autumn of 2003),
is expected that the attractiveness of Romania
will increase due to the EU integration perspec-
tive and thus  Romania will become even an
immigration country.
Up to now, the immigrant’s dominant profile –
a refugee, an asylum seeker, an immigrant for
labour, study or business purposes – is based on
men’s preponderance (as it happens with the
asylum seekers who have proven to be especial-
ly young men, aged between 21-30 years). Yet,
when the total number of immigrants is taken
into account, the gender based structure is quite
well balanced. 
Aspects regarding the integration within
the host country society. The migrant’s domi-
nant profile – an emigrant/immigrant from/in
Romania – involves a series of specific aspects
regarding the integration within the host coun-
try society. 
In general terms, for an immigrant the integra-
tion consists in the knowledge of the language
spoken in the host country (reading, writing
skills), the access to the educational system and
to the labour market within the respective coun-
try, the opportunity of increasing professional
mobility by attending to a higher level of edu-
cation and professional qualification, equity in
front of the law, cultural and religious freedom,
the respect towards the laws and the traditions
of the country he/she lives in. At the same time,
for the host society the integration of the
migrants supposes tolerance and openness, the
consent of welcoming the immigrants, the
understanding of the advantages and chal-
lenges of a multicultural society, providing an
unrestricted access to information related to the
advantages of integration, tolerance and inter-
cultural dialog, respecting and understanding
the status, tradition and culture of the immi-
grants, as well as the respect towards the immi-
grants’ rights (IOM, 2003a).
As far as the particular case of Romania is con-
cerned, given the lack of previous expertise in
this field, the still low number of immigrants
and refugees and the limited financial
resources, it has been noticed that the services
and the assistance for integration are not fully
satisfactory, despite the diligence within the last
years for the alignment to the international stan-
dards.
A special issue envisages the vulnerable
groups, especially the non accompanied minors, for
whom a reconsideration of the interviewing
procedures and an adequate training of the civil
servants are necessary, since malpractice could
have major traumatic effects. 
Besides the integration of the immigrants, a
multiple faced challenge for the Romanian soci-
ety is represented by the reintegration of the
Romanians who return to their home country after
an external migration experience. It focuses on
certain specific categories, such as the Roman-
ian students and graduates from foreign univer-
sities, the Rroma people, the victims of traffick-
ing in human beings, the unaccompanied
Romanian minors, the repatriated people, etc.
On the whole, the issues related to the rein-
tegration of the Romanians who come back to
their home country vary according to the edu-
cational level, their qualification, family status,
duration of their stay abroad etc., complex
social and psychological aid oriented pro-
grammes being necessary, so that re-emigration
be not the sole solution to such people
(Lãzãroiu, 2002).
Finally, besides the integration/ reintegration
on its territory, Romania must also care for cer-
tain aspects related to the integration of Romanian
emigrants within the host countries. In this context
the role of Romanian authorities should consist
in the contribution to promoting and increasing
of an accurate, objective image on the entire
Romanian Diaspora, that may represent a valu-
able share to the enrichment of the scientific and
cultural patrimony of the host countries, as well
as in preserving the connection between the
Diaspora and the mother- country. A special
aspect refers to the support that the Romanian
state must grant and that it actually grants to
the large Romanian groups living outside the
country’s borders due to historical reasons (in
the Republic of Moldova, as well as in Ukraine,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia) who need,
besides the support for the preservation of their
cultural identity,  support  at international level,
regarding the recognition of their rights within
the respective countries.
61 The Romanian Journal of European StudiesThe public opinion and mass-media. The
Romanian public opinion perceives the migra-
tion phenomenon mainly as labour migration.
A large number of people believe that migrants
earn money from a paid job and only a small
part of the public opinion think that they obtain
money from theft and begging. Yet, the results
of the opinion polls mentioned in this study
reveal a wrong perception – in some points - of
the negative aspects that accompany the Roma-
nians’ external migration, which proves that the
public opinion finds it difficult to distinguish
between certain objective hardships related to
the travel within the Schengen space and the
violation of the law, between the groups per-
forming illegal activities and the affiliation to a
social, ethnic or religious minority, which leads
to the creation of stereotypes, to attitudes that
feed delinquency, intolerance and xenophobia.
This perception could be set right by means of
joint, coherent efforts of mass-media, public
administration and civil society. 
Up to present, one cannot say that mass-
media has brought its necessary contribution to
the accurate rendering of external migration
phenomenon, with all its aspects and to the cre-
ation of an adequate social behaviour with
respect to both migration itself  and the integra-
tion/ reintegration process. It has been
remarked that migration is not systematically
rendered and assessed, in its entire complexity,
the emphasis being put on the narration of cer-
tain negative, sensational facts and less on the
orientation of the migrants within an universe
that makes them face numerous risk and uncer-
tainty components, on the prevention and com-
bating  delinquency, clandestine traveling and
corruption related to visa granting. To a consid-
erable extent, the partial and sometimes wrong
coverage of the migration phenomenon by
mass media is the result of the shortage of special-
ized journalists in this field; therefore is highly
recommended the organization of training
courses with respect to the investigation and
assessment of migration.
Our study appreciates and supports the pro-
posals converged in various documents regard-
ing migration (especially the IOM’s)  with refer-
ence to the introduction in the academic curricula of
subjects specialized on the study of the migration
phenomena (labour economics, law, medicine,
health policy, sociology, education sciences,
etc.), as well as the creation of a national migration
research center (to be set up by the Romanian
Government in partnership with IOM, UNCHR
and other international organizations), of some
faculties or departments of inter-disciplinary studies
on migration, so as to build up the necessary
expertise in public policies, social assistance,
human resources and migration management.
Apart from the economic, social, demo-
graphic implications, migration phenomenon in
the perspective of Romania’s accession to the
EU brings about specific requirements regard-
ing the establishment of a new legal and institu-
tional framework for migration management. As
migration mechanisms Romania - EU change,
legislation gets rapidly in line with the acquis
communautaire, whereas its implementation via
involved institutions is slower, but progressive.
An important progress has been recorded
after 2000 in legislation regarding the foreign-
ers’ regime in Romania, the status and the
regime of refugees, preventing and combating
the trafficking in human being, work permits,
whereas lower progress occurred in the legisla-
tion envisaging  the mutual recognition of
degrees and qualifications, discrimination of EU
citizens as compared the Romanians in getting a
job in Romania by giving priority to the Roman-
ian citizens.
The elaboration and adoption of laws, the
creation of institutions, the development of cor-
responding strategies and policies represent
major components of this process, but their suc-
cess cannot be separated from the so-called
“behavioural challenges”, related to participation,
communication, mentalities and attitudes,
which envisage all actors involved – govern-
mental institutions, non-governmental organiza-
tions, mass-media, communities. Major changes
should occur in the way that public opinion per-
ceives migration related phenomena as well as
in the contribution which should be brought by
mass-media to the prevention and combating
delinquency, clandestine travelling and corrup-
tion and to the orientation of the migrants with-
in an universe that makes them face numerous
risk and uncertainty components.
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Notes
1 Replacement migration refers to migration based on work force recruitment from outside the European Union for qualifica-
tions that are deficient within the Union and for jobs and qualifications that are not sought by the local people.
2 Among those the main are: Directive 89/48/CEE, Directive 92/51/CEE, Directive 1999/42/CE and Directive 2001/19/CE.
3 The Dublin mechanisms refers to a set of norms based on which it is appointed the member state responsible for processing
asylum application in the situation where a person has transited more than one member states and has submitted an asylum
application. Generally the state where that foreign persons has entered the European space is responsible. For such purposes,
there have been established an European database with fingerprints of all persons that have illegally entered, are illegally stay-
ing or apply for asylum in the member states – EURODAC. This database prevents the submission of several asylum applica-
tions successively or concomitantly in many member states. In this situation, the respective person, being also identified based
on the Dublin mechanism, is returned to the member state that have implemented for the first time the fingerprint of the
respective foreign person.The economic and social transition has overturned the demographic landscape of Romania. The fall in birth rate, the
upsurge in mortality rate and the international migration have deeply deteriorated the demographic panorama of the
country. The population decline and the increase of population ageing can be viewed as the most noticeable immediate
objectification of this deterioration. Within this context of a veritable breaking, a strange restructuring of internal migra-
tion flows between urban and rural areas could be observed and quantified. Under the pressure of economic and social
factors and changes  defining the transition-crisis, including the (mostly painful) economic reforms Romania experienced
after 1989, the traditional rural-urban migration flows started a continuous  downward trend and, by 1997, for the first
time in Romania's social history, the two streams reversed as magnitude. During the following years the movement con-
tinued and reinforced. This paper presents these dramatic changes, their origin, their characteristics and their conse-
quences on population number, population age and sex structure. The analysis at regional level is privileged.
Keywords: components of population change; internal migration (with change of permanent residence); Urban-Rural
and Rural-Urban migration; age and sex composition of migrants; migration by regions of development; return migra-
tion; international migration 
La démographie de la Roumanie a connu
des changements profonds dans les années 1990
et qui continuent de se manifester dans cette
première décennie du nouveau siècle, soit par
dynamique propre, soit par l’action d’un contexte
socio-économique en plein évolution. Une partie
de ces changements sont communs avec ceux qui
ont eu lieu dans l’ensemble des pays de l’espace
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Introduction
* Version révisée et améliorée du papier presenté au colloque international “Migrations, crises et conflits récents dans les Balkans”, Bel-
grade, 27-29 octobre 2005. Vasile Gheþãu (vasile.ghetau@digicom.ro).central et est européen se trouvant en transition
politique, économique et sociale, après l’effon-
drement du communisme. Il s’agit, surtout, de la
véritable chute de la natalité et, avec certaines
exceptions, de la recrudescence de la mortalité.
Mais, on peut saisir des particularités nationales
importantes, provenant de la manière dont les
reformes politiques et économiques ont été
conçues et appliquées, de différences de
développement économique, social et culturel
des pays, ainsi que de facteurs de nature his-
torique.  
Un examen même sommaire du degré de la
détérioration de la situation démographique en
Roumanie par rapport aux autres pays de la
région montre une position médiane, tant en ce
qui concerne la dimension de la baisse de la
natalité, ainsi que la magnitude de la détériora-
tion de la mortalité (Council of Europe, 2005).
Un déclin démographique bien installé encore
en 1990, alimenté par migration externe néga-
tive dans toute la période et par baisse naturelle
depuis 1992, et l’accélération du vieillissement
démographique définissent les l’essence de
l’actuel paysage démographique de la
Roumanie. Ce paysage est le résultat du con-
texte politique, économique et social qui a mod-
elé la population et les phénomènes démo-
graphiques après 1989 et ce contexte a été, dans
son essence, un contexte de crise. Crise
économique, surtout, mais aussi crise sociale.
Entre les recensements de janvier 1992 et
mars 2002 la population de la Roumanie a
connu une baisse de 1129 milles habitants, ça
veut dire un recul de 5 p.100. La baisse naturelle
a contribué avec seulement 27 p.100 à cette
baisse, la contribution majeure revenant à la
migration externe. Une contribution négative de
la migration n’est pas surprenante, elle étant
présente en Roumanie et avant et après 1989.
Mais, l’élément surprise a été représenté par la
magnitude de la baisse par migration et la
nature de cette migration. La partie connue sta-
tistiquement (immigrants et émigrants légaux,
enregistrés)  n’a contribué qu’avec 12 p.100 a la
baisse générale de la population, ce qui laisse
entrevoir qu’en proportion de plus de 60 p.100
(environ 700 milles habitants) la baisse bu nom-
bre d’habitants du pays s’est produite par une
nouvelle composante de la migration interna-
tionale. Il s’agit de roumains partis à l’étranger
(avec ou sans visa) et qui non pas été déclarés /
enregistrés au recensement de 2002. Cette nou-
velle composante de la migration internationale
en Roumanie est peu connue statistiquement
mais on sait que sa dimension a connu un
accroissement sensible après 2001, date à la
quelle les visas d’entré ont été supprimées pour
les roumains pour presque tous les pays
européens. Cette migration est, essentiellement,
une migration pour travail.
La baisse de 1,1 millions d’habitants est donc
le résultat des évolutions conjuguées de la
baisse naturelle et de la baisse par migration.
Dans les deux cas la crise économique et sociale
que la Roumanie a traversée et traverse encore
dans son passage du régime totalitaire vers l’é-
tat de droit, démocratie et économie de marché,
a joué le rôle majeur, même si des différences
peuvent être signalées d’un phénomène démo-
graphique à l’autre. La recrudescence de la mor-
talité aussi bien que la migration externe néga-
tive sont l’expression directe de la crise. Dans le
cas de la natalité, la situation est beaucoup plus
compliquée. Il s’agit d’un phénomène avec une
détermination complexe, d’une façon générale,
et - dans le cas de la Roumanie - des facteurs
spécifiques peuvent être identifiés. La politique
pro nataliste de l’ancien régime a maintenu
d’une manière forcée la natalité à un niveau rel-
ativement élevé avant 1990 et il était bien évi-
dent que l’abrogation des réglementations
restrictives en matière de contraception et d’a-
vortement  conduira automatiquement à la
baisse de la natalité. Et ce recul a eu lieu surtout
en 1990 et 1001. Il est fort probable que les fac-
teurs de crise ont accentué la baisse. 
Si l’analyse de la dynamique démographique
est poussée vers le niveau régional, on pourra
constater que ce que nous voyons au niveau
national est en fait le résultat des dynamiques
régionales différentes ou un rôle important
revient à une autre variable – la migration
interne. Cette composante a connu en Roumanie
dans les années de la transition des évolutions
d’exception, pas tellement au niveau de la
dimension globale, qu’au niveau de la structure
des flux migratoires entre régions et entre l’ur-
bain et le rural, les facteurs déterminants étant –
essentiellement – les multiples facettes de la crise
économique et sociale que la Roumanie a traver-
sé.  Cette communication se propose justement
d’analyser les changements que la migration
interne a connu après 1989, au niveau de la direc-
tion des flux, de la structure par âge et sexe des
migrants, ainsi qu’au niveau des conséquences
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région et par milieu urbain / rural.
Un regard rapide sur les régions de
développement en Roumanie. Caractéristiques 
Les unités territoriales agrégées de la
Roumanie sont les départements (judetze) et les
régions de développement. Il y a 41 départe-
ments et la municipalité de Bucarest, la Capitale
du pays. Ces unités sont groupées en huit
régions de développements. Voici la carte de ces
régions (dans l’Annexe 1 on peut trouver une
carte plus détaillée):
Les huit régions de développement ne sont
pas homogènes par caractéristiques
économiques et démographiques (voir Annexe
2). La superficie des régions est équilibrée pour
sept de huit régions – 12-14 p.100 de la superfi-
cie nationale, la seule exception étant la région
8-Bucarest (composée de la ville de Bucarest et
du département entourant la ville)  qui a un peu
moins de 1 p.100 du territoire national. Le nom-
bre de la population s’inscrit entre 1,9 millions
dans la région 5-Ouest et 3,7 millions dans la
région 1-Nord-Est. Le degré d’urbanisation
varie entre 41 p.100 dans la région 3-Sud et 60
p.100 dans la région 7-Centre (sans prendre en
considération la région 8-Bucarest, avec 91 p.100
de  population urbaine), dans le contexte ou la
Roumanie a un degré d’urbanisation faible
parmi les pays européens.
Les régions ont un profile économique et un
degré de développement économique dif-
férents. Les régions 1-Nord-Est et 3-Sud ont été
et continuent d’être  moins développées par
rapport aux régions 5-Ouest, 7-Centre et 8-
Bucarest. Le déclin des activités économiques
industrielles, peu performantes et grandes con-
sommatrices d’énergie, a affecté  l’ensemble des
régions mai avec une dureté plus forte les
régions 1-Nord-Est et 3-Sud. On peut même
remarquer un accroissement du décalage entre
ces régions et les régions 5-Ouest et 7-Centre
(plus 8-Bucarest), les investissements privilé-
giant ces dernières. Comme corollaire, le niveau
de vie est plus élevé dans ces régions.
Malgré le fait que les profiles démo-
graphiques des régions ont connu un rap-
prochement sur le fond de la détérioration de la
situation démographique générale, un nombre
de particularités se conservent. La natalité est
plus élevée dans la région 1-Nord-Est, tandis
que la mortalité reste plus élevée dans les
régions du sud et de l’ouest.
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Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIȱ
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Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIIȱ
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Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIIIȱ
ȱ
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1.12. Taux de mortalité infantile 
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Figureȱ1.ȱRoumanie.ȱLesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ–ȱIVȱ
ȱ
1.13. Indicateur conjoncturel de fécondité 
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1.14. Population de 60 ans et plus
(Ro=19,2)
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1.15. E spérance de vie à la naissance - 
Femmes, 2001-2003 (Ro=74,8)
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1.16. Espérance de vie à la naissance - 
Hommes, 2001-2003 (Ro=67,4)
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8Dynamique de la population au niveau
régional. Composantes des changements
Entre les deux derniers recensements  - jan-
vier 1992 et mars 2002 –la population de la
Roumanie  a connu une baisse de 5 p.100. Le
recul est général, dans toutes les huit régions,
mais des différences significatives existent en ce
qui concerne la magnitude de la baisse,  les
régions les plus touchées étant 5-Ouest, 7-Cen-
tre et 6-Nord-Ouest. Les données de stock
fournies par les deux recensements, combinées
avec les données de flux sur les naissances, les
décès et les changements de domicile (résidence
permanente) permettent d’estimer la contribu-
tion des trois composantes – croissance
naturelle, migration interne et migration
externe - sur la dynamique régionale de la pop-
ulation (tableau 1) 
Ce qu’on peut constater au niveau régional
n’est que le résultat combiné des mouvements
différents comme sens et intensité de la crois-
sance naturelle, de la migration interne et de la
migration externe.
Voici les principales observations:
—la croissance naturelle a été positive seule-
ment dans la region1-Nord-Est, son
apport étant de +2,5 p. 100 entre 1992 et
2002;
—la migration interne a favorisé les régions
plus développées – 5-Ouest, 8-Bucarest et
7-Centre; les régions fournisseurs de pop-
ulation ont été surtout 1-Nord-est et 6-
Nord-Ouest;
—la migration externe a été négative dans
toutes les régions, et plus particulièrement
au Centre et en Ouest.  
Quelques précisions s’imposent. Le degré
plus faible de développement économique de la
région 1-Nord-Est a maintenu dans cette région
une natalité plus élevée et qui a été la com-
posante principale de la croissance naturelle
positive dans cette région Les régions 3-Sud et
4-Sud-Ouest sont proches comme niveau de
développement de la région 1 mai elles ont une
structure par âge plus détériorées, ce qui
explique la mortalité plus élevée et une natalité
légèrement plus faible dans ces deux régions
par rapport à la région 1. Une croissance
naturelle positive et un niveau de développe-
ment plus faible ont déterminé une propension
plus forte vers  migration dans la région 1. Et la
destination de cette migration ont été les
régions plus développées et surtout les régions
5-Ouest et 8-Bucarest; sans l’apport positif de la
migration interne la dimension de la baisse de la
population dans ces deux régions aurait été sen-
siblement plus grande.      
En ce qui concerne la migration interna-
tionale, elle englobe aussi bien la migration à
long terme, légale et connue, que  la migration
temporaire pour travail, cette dernière com-
posante connaissant une véritable explosion
dans la deuxième partie des années 1990 et
notamment a partir de 2001, comme suite de la
suppression du visa d’entré dans les pays de
l’ouest. La migration externe nette a été négative
dans toutes les régions mai on s’attendait que le
niveau soit plus élevé dans les régions moins
développées, ou les facteurs de push sont plus
forts.  Mais, les données montrent que les
régions avec les pertes les plus importantes de
population par migration externe sont les
régions 5-Ouest et 7-Centre, régions plus
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Tableauȱ 1.ȱ Roumanie.ȱ Changementȱ duȱ nombreȱ deȱ laȱ
populationȱ 1992Ȭ2002ȱ etȱ composantesȱ duȱ changementȱ parȱ
régionȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ
dontȱ:ȱ ȱ
Régionȱ
ȱ
Croissanceȱ
totaleȱ
croissanceȱ
naturelleȱ
migrationȱ
interneȱ
netteȱ
migrationȱ
externeȱ
netteȱ
I.ȱCroissanceȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱetȱsesȱcomposantesȱ–ȱenȱmilliersȱ
1.ȱNordȬEstȱȬ 77,4ȱ +92,4ȱȬ 52,6ȱȬ 117,3ȱ
2.ȱSudȬEstȱȬ 115,0ȱȬ 21,4ȱ +1,2ȱȬ 94,7ȱ
3.ȱSudȱȬ 180,3ȱȬ 93,0ȱȬ 15,4ȱȬ 72,0ȱ
4.ȱSudȬOuestȱȬ 126,7ȱȬ 60,0ȱȬ 6,4ȱȬ 60,4ȱ
5.ȱOuestȱȬ 153,3ȱȬ 68,2ȱ +43,5ȱȬ 128,6ȱ
6.ȱNordȬOuestȱȬ 169,6ȱȬ 44,1ȱȬ 20,8ȱȬ 104,7ȱ
7.ȱCentreȱȬ 178,7ȱȬ 21,4ȱ +8,2ȱȬ 165,4ȱ
8.ȱBucarestȱȬ 128,1ȱȬ 88,2ȱ +42,3ȱȬ 82,2ȱ
RoumanieȱȬ 1129,1ȱȬ 303,8ȱ 0,0ȱȬ 825,3ȱ
ȱ
II.ȱCroissanceȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱetȱsesȱcomposantesȱ–ȱtauxȱp.ȱ1000
1.ȱNordȬEstȱȬ 20,8ȱ +24,9ȱȬ 14,2ȱȬ 31,6ȱ
2.ȱSudȬEstȱȬ 39,6ȱȬ 7,4ȱ +0,4ȱȬ 32,6ȱ
3.ȱSudȱȬ 52,0ȱȬ 26,8ȱȬ 4,4ȱȬ 20,7ȱ
4.ȱSudȬOuestȱȬ 52,9ȱȬ 25,0ȱȬ 2,7ȱȬ 25,2ȱ
5.ȱOuestȱȬ 75,3ȱȬ 33,5ȱ +21,4ȱȬ 63,2ȱ
6.ȱNordȬOuestȱȬ 60,0ȱȬ 15,6ȱȬ 7,4ȱȬ 37,1ȱ
7.ȱCentreȱȬ 68,4ȱȬ 8,2ȱ +3,1ȱȬ 63,3ȱ
8.ȱBucarestȱȬ 55,9ȱȬ 38,5ȱ +18,5ȱȬ 35,9ȱ
RoumanieȱȬ 50,8ȱȬ 13,7ȱ 0,0ȱȬ 37,1ȱ
ȱ
III.ȱChangementsȱ1992Ȭ2002ȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ
1.ȱNordȬEstȱȬ 2,1ȱ +2,5ȱ Ȭ1,4ȱȬ 3,1ȱ
2.ȱSudȬEstȱȬ 3,9ȱȬ 0,7ȱ 0,0ȱȬ 3,2ȱ
3.ȱSudȱȬ 5,1ȱȬ 2,6ȱȬ 0,4ȱȬ 2,0ȱ
4.ȱSudȬOuestȱȬ 5,2ȱȬ 2,4ȱȬ 0,3ȱȬ 2,5ȱ
5.ȱOuestȱȬ 7,3ȱȬ 3,2ȱ +2,1ȱ Ȭ6,1ȱ
6.ȱNordȬOuestȱȬ 5,8ȱȬ 1,5ȱȬ 0,7ȱȬ 3,6ȱ
7.ȱCentreȱȬ 6,6ȱȬ 0,8ȱ +0,3ȱ Ȭ6,1ȱ
8.ȱBucarestȱȬ 5,4ȱȬ 3,7ȱ +1,8ȱ Ȭ3,5ȱ
ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
RoumanieȱȬ 4,9ȱȬ 1,3ȱ 0,0ȱȬ 3,6ȱ
Sourceȱ:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱpubliéesȱparȱl’INSȱ
(InstitutȱNationalȱdeȱStatistique).ȱȱINS,ȱ1993ȱàȱ2005ȱ;ȱ1994ȱ;ȱ2001ȱ;ȱ2003ȱ;ȱ
2004aȱ;ȱ2005cȱ;ȱ2005d.ȱȱdéveloppées. L’explication n’est pas difficile
d’être trouvée. Ces régions ont eu et continue
d’avoir une structure ethnique de la population
plus hétérogène par rapport au Nord-Est et au
Sud et la mobilité est plus forte dans ce milieu
humain.  Au Centre et dans l’Ouest on a eu une
importante minorité allemande qui a émigré. La
migration actuelle de ces régions est composée,
presque en totalité,  de roumains. Par rapport
aux ethniques roumains du Nord-est et du Sud,
les roumains de l’Ouest et du Centre ont une
propension plus élevée de migrer vers les pays
de l’Europe occidentale (vers l’Allemagne
surtout), et qui peut s’expliquer  par la proxim-
ité géographique, le maintien des liaisons et des
contacts avec ceux qui ont quitte ces régions, un
niveau plus élevé de qualification
professionnelle et d’éducation.
D’autre part, en examinant la géogra-
phie de la migration  en Roumanie on
peut saisir des mouvements en
vagues: du  Nord-Est on part vers le
Centre et l’Ouest, tandis que du Cen-
tre et de l’Ouest on part vers l’é-
tranger (pour que le circuit soit com-
plète, on peut saisir plus récemment
un autre vague, de la République de
Moldova vers la région Nord-Est).   
Pour faire une remarque de syn-
thèse sur la migration interne en
Roumanie après 1989, on pourrait
dire que la migration interne a connu
un accroissement, dans un contexte
de libre circulation de l’individu,
d’une véritable chute des activités
économiques industrielles, surtout
dans les villes, de la restructuration de
la propriété agricole (la terre) et de l’a-
griculture. De plus, la crise
économique et sociale a eu une contri-
bution essentielle, liée à la dureté et aux
rigueurs de la transition à l’économie de
marche, mais aussi à la façon dont les reformes
structurelles ont été adoptées et appliquées.
L’industrialisation massive des années 1950-
1970 a encouragé et stimulé la migration rural-
urbain. Les conséquences démographiques et
économiques de cette politique n’ont pas tardé
d’apparaître: la main d’œuvre dans l’agricul-
ture est devenue déficitaire et la population
rurale est entrée dans un fort processus de vieil-
lissement et de féminisation. Devant une telle
situation, l’ancien régime a introduit, dès le
début des années 1980, des mesures restrictives
visant la migration vers les villes, surtout vers
les grandes villes, ce qui a conduit à une réduc-
tion significative de la migration interne avec
changement de domicile. Dans les années 1980
on avait autour de 10 migrants p.1000 habitants,
par rapport à 15 dans les années 1970. Dès que
les restrictions ont été éliminées, à la fin de 1989,
le nombre de migrants a explosé en 1990 – 34 p.
1000. C’était l’épuisement d’un stock, de ceux
qui vivaient et travaillaient pratiquement dans
les villes et qui pouvaient obtenir seulement un
visa de résidence temporaire (et pas de rési-
dence permanente – domicile). Après 1990 la
migration interne annuelle s’est située à 11-13 p.
1000, avec une légère tendance d’augmentation
en 2002-2004 (tableau 2). 
Restructuration des flux migratoires entre
l’urbain et le rural. Dimension
Un changement spectaculaire connu par la
migration interne en Roumanie après 1989 et
qui mérite d’être analysé est la naissance et la
consolidation d’une nouvelle configuration de
la migration interne entre l’urbain et le rural
(tableau 2). Il s’agit d’un changement dont les
causes et les mécanismes peuvent être détectés
mais qui est peu connu comme implications
économiques et démographiques, à long terme
surtout. 
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Tableauȱ2.ȱRoumanie.ȱMigrationȱinterneȱavecȱchangementsȱdeȱdomicile,ȱ
1985Ȭ2004.ȱ
Volumeȱetȱstructureȱparȱmilieuȱsocialȱ
Migrantsȱ Fluxȱentreȱmilieuxȱsociauxȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ Annéeȱ
Milliersȱ Tauxȱ–ȱ
p.1000ȱ
Urbainȱ
>ȱ
Urbainȱ
Urbainȱ
>ȱRuralȱ
Ruralȱ>ȱ
Ruralȱ
Ruralȱ>ȱ
urbainȱ
1985ȱ 196,1ȱ 8,6ȱ 20,0ȱ 6,5ȱ 16,1ȱ 57,4ȱ
1989ȱ 192,9ȱ 8,3ȱ 19,2ȱ 6,4ȱ 18,9ȱ 55,4ȱ
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
1990ȱ 786,5ȱ 33,9ȱ 18,1ȱ 3,5ȱ 8,5ȱ 69,8ȱ
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
1991ȱ 262,9ȱ 11,3ȱ 20,2ȱ 10,1ȱ 19,4ȱ 50,3ȱ
1992ȱ 293,2ȱ 12,9ȱ 24,3ȱ 13,7ȱ 22,8ȱ 39,2ȱ
1993ȱ 240,2ȱ 10,6ȱ 25,4ȱ 14,6ȱ 25,0ȱ 35,0ȱ
1994ȱ 266,7ȱ 11,7ȱ 25,6ȱ 18,4ȱ 25,5ȱ 30,5ȱ
1995ȱ 289,5ȱ 12,8ȱ 26,1ȱ 20,8ȱ 28,0ȱ 25,1ȱ
1996ȱ 292,9ȱ 13,0ȱ 27,4ȱ 23,4ȱ 24,5ȱ 24,7ȱ
1997ȱ 302,6ȱ 13,4ȱ 25,0ȱ 26,8ȱ 25,6ȱ 22,6ȱ
1998ȱ 276,2ȱ 12,3ȱ 26,0ȱ 28,5ȱ 23,6ȱ 22,0ȱ
1999ȱ 275,7ȱ 12,3ȱ 26,5ȱ 30,7ȱ 21,7ȱ 21,0ȱ
2000ȱ 244,5ȱ 10,9ȱ 23,7ȱ 33,8ȱ 23,0ȱ 19,5ȱ
2001ȱ 284,3ȱ 12,7ȱ 27,5ȱ 27,9ȱ 20,0ȱ 24,6ȱ
2002ȱ 320,8ȱ 14,7ȱ 25,8ȱ 30,1ȱ 21,6ȱ 22,4ȱ
2003ȱ 331,7ȱ 15,3ȱ 27,3ȱ 30,2ȱ 19,3ȱ 23,1ȱ
2004ȱ 369,9ȱ 17,1ȱ 26,1ȱ 31,8ȱ 21,1ȱ 21,1ȱ
Sourceȱ:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱINS,ȱ1993ȱàȱ2005ȱLe flux rural-urbain a dominé, depuis tou-
jours, largement, la migration interne en
Roumanie. Mais, le début des années 1990 mar-
que la naissance d’une dynamique différente de
deux flux (urbain-rural et rural-urbain) -  crois-
sance considérable de la composante urbain-
rural et  recul massif du flux opposé, rural-
urbain, de manière que en 1997, pour la pre-
mière fois dans l’histoire sociale de la
Roumanie, le flux urbain-rural a dépassé le flux
rural-urbain. Les tendances se sont maintenues
et dans les années suivantes (figure 2), même si
après 2000 la migration rural-urbain a connu un
revirement. Un tel changement impose un nom-
bre d’observations.
Dans un contexte de libre circulation de l’in-
dividu, un renversement de la dimension de la
migration entre l’urbain et le rural ne peut con-
stituer que le résultat d’un complexe de facteurs
socio-économiques très forts, dont l’origine se
trouve dans les changements que la société
roumaine a connu après 1989. Les conditions de
vie dans les villes se sont détériorées consid-
érablement, par l’apparition et l’expansion du
chômage, la baisse des revenus salariaux, l’éro-
sion du pouvoir d’achat, l’explosion des coûts
relatifs au logement. Pour certaines catégories
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Figure 2a. Roumanie. Migration interne 
urbain > rural et rural > urbain, 1991-2004
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Figure 2b. Roumanie.  Structure de la migration interne 
1985-2003
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de la population urbaine une force de pression
est ainsi parue et développée, force qui visait
l’abandon de la ville et la migration dans le
rural. Quelles catégories de la population
urbaine ont été les plus exposées à cette pres-
sion?  Celles qui étaient venues dans l’urbain
dans les années d’industrialisation massive et
qui  ont été directement touchées par la chute
des activités industrielles après 1989 et toutes
les conséquences de cette chute (au recensement
de 1992, 40 p.100 de la population urbaine était
née en rural). D’autre part, un facteur favorisant
la décision de retour dans le rural  est paru, la
loi du fond foncier, par laquelle les coopératives
agricoles de type soviétique ont été liquidées en
bonne partie et la terre a été retournée aux
anciens propriétaires. L’action conjuguée des
facteurs poussant vers le départ de l’urbain et
des facteurs encourageant le retour dans le rural
peut expliquer la dynamique de la migration
entre l’urbain  et le rural  dans les années 1990 et
le renversement de deux flux après 1996.
Quelle structure par âge ont eu les migrants
de l’urbain vers le rural (table 3)?
Les migrants de l’urbain vers le rural con-
stituent une population plus jeune que la popu-
lation rurale. Environ 55 p.100 des migrants
sont entre 20 et 50 ans, poids nettement
supérieur à la proportion de la même popula-
tion dans le rural – 34 p. 100, ce qui devrait être
un avantage du point de vue démographique et
économique, si on tient compte que la popula-
tion rurale est sensiblement plus âgée. D’autre
part, il n’est pas sans intérêt d’observer que les
migrants dans le rural  (années 1993-2003) sont
en proportion de 56 p.100 des personnes mar-
iées, poids plus élevé par rapport au poids des
mariés dans la population urbaine et rurale en
1992 (50 et 52 p.100, respectivement). Si on
ajoute que la proportion de la population âgée
de moins de 15 ans était, en 1992, de 24 p.100  en
urbain et de 21 p.100 en rural, on pourrait
avancer l’hypothèse que la décision de quitter la
ville pour la campagne a été plus forte dans la
population urbaine adulte, mariée et avec
enfants,  ou le choque de la transition a été  plus
dur.
Migration urbain-rural intra- et inter-
régionale. Origine et destination.
Un dernier aspect sur lequel nous nous pen-
chons dans les lignes suivantes est celui de la
façon dans laquelle la migration urbain-rural
s’est développée au niveaux des régions de
développement, compte tenu de leurs  carac-
téristiques économiques et démographiques,
déjà mentionnées.  Le tableau 4 nous offre des
détails.     
Evidemment, au niveau de chaque région le
flux urbain-rural a deux composantes en ce qui
concerne la région d’origine des
migrants: de l’urbain de la même région
et de l’urbain des autres sept régions.
Le poids de la première composante est,
au niveau des huit régions, dans les
années 1992-2003, de 74 p.100 de
l’ensemble de migrants urbain-rural,
seulement un quart revenant aux
migrants de l’urbain des autres sept
régions Une telle situation n’est pas sur-
prenante. La propension de migrer du
rural vers l’urbain du même départe-
ment et de départements voisins ou
proches (dans la même région) a été,
avant 1990, naturellement, plus forte
que la propension de migrer vers
d’autres régions, plus lointaines (pour
des  raisons évidentes: facilites plus grandes de
trouver un emploi et un logement  à travers les
apparentés et les amis, coûts plus faibles, possi-
bilité de maintenir des contacts plus étroites
avec les apparentés restés dans le département
d’origine). Si nous regardons la migration de la
perspective de la région de destination, nous
retrouverons les mêmes poids: 74% provient de
l’urbain de la même région et 26% de l’urbain
des autres sept régions         
Un examen de la structure des immigrants
en rural par régions, montre que la proportion
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Tableauȱ3.ȱRoumanie.ȱStructureȱparȱâgeȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱruraleȱ1992ȱetȱdesȱ
migrantsȱurbainȬrural,ȱȱ1993Ȭ2004ȱ
ȱ
Groupeȱd’âgeȱ
Populationȱruraleȱauȱ
recensementȱduȱȱ
7ȱjanvierȱ1992ȱ
Migrantsȱdeȱl’urbainȱ
versȱleȱrural,ȱ
1993Ȭ2004ȱ
Totalȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ
Moinsȱdeȱ20ȱansȱ 29,3ȱ 29,2ȱ
20Ȭ29ȱansȱ 13,0ȱ 20,9ȱ
30Ȭ39ȱansȱ 10,2ȱ 18,3ȱ
40Ȭ49ȱansȱ 11,1ȱ 15,8ȱ
50Ȭ59ȱansȱ 14,4ȱ 9,6ȱ
60ȱansȱetȱ+ȱ 22,1ȱ 6,2ȱ
Source:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱINS,ȱ1994ȱ;ȱ1993ȱàȱ2005.ȱdes migrants de l’urbain de la même région a les
valeurs les plus élevées – plus de 80 % - dans les
régions  plus développées 6-Nord-Ouest,  7-
Centre et 8-Bucarest. Nous pensons que l’expli-
cation se trouve dans le fait que dans ces régions
(et la région 5-Ouest) le développement de type
industriel d’avant 1990 a été plus fort que dans
les autres régions, ce qui a permis un absorption
supérieure du potentiel migratoire existent dans
le rural de ces  régions.  Et c’est ici l’explication
du fait que dans les nouvelles réalités
économiques d’après 1989 dans ces mêmes
régions le mouvement de retour de l’urbain vers
le rural de la même région a eu les valeurs rela-
tives les plus élevées. Ensuite viennent, comme
poids, mais à grande distance, les venus de
régions voisines, de l’Ouest pour la région
Nord-Ouest (7,4%),   de l’Ouest pour la région
Centre (5,1%)  et du Sud pour la région Bucarest
(7,3%).  On ne peut pas saisir le même schéma
dans le cas des régions Nord-Est et Sud. Seule-
ment 65% des venus dans le rural du Nord-Est
proviennent de l’urbain de la même région, des
proportions importantes revenant à l’urbain de
la région Ouest (10%) et de la région Centre
(8,2%). Autrement dit, le pouvoir d’absorption
de l’urbain de cette région, moins développée, a
été plus faible dans le passe et la migration de
son rural a été une migration de distance plus
longue par rapport à la migration rural-urbain
des régions plus développes Nord-Ouest, Cen-
tre, Ouest et Bucarest.   Le cas de la région Sud,
elle aussi ayant une proportion plus faible des
arrivés dans le rural de son propre urbain, est
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différent. La région Bucarest est une ”enclave”
dans le territoire de la  région Sud et la migra-
tion du rural de cette région vers Bucarest a été
extrêmement fort dans le passe, ce qui pourrait
expliquer la force du flux de retour Bucarest-
rural de la région Sud – 20% de l’ensemble des
arrives.
Au niveau agrégé, les poids des migrants de
l’urbain vers le rural de la même région et vers
le rural des autres sept régions constituent aussi
les poids des arrivés dans le rural de la même
région et dans le rural des autres sept régions (la
double facettes) – 74 et 26 p.100. Un regard sur
la structure des départs de l’urbain vers le rural
par régions de destination (tableau 4. section B)
apporte des renseignements complémentaires
sur la migration urbain-rural, par la mise en évi-
dence des structures différentes de la géogra-
phie des départs vis-à-vis de la géographie des
arrivées, au niveau régional. Tandis que dans
l’ensemble des arrivés dans le rural, au niveau
régional, on trouve une prédominance nette et
générale du flux de l’urbain de la même région,
la composition régionale des départs de l’urbain
met en évidence quelques particularités
régionales significatives et qui provient de l’o-
rigine régionale de la migration rural-urbain
dans le passe. Dans les régions moins dévelop-
pées Nord-Est et les trois régions du sud les
départs de l’urbain ont eu comme destination le
rural de la même région dans une proportion
très élevée – 80-90%, parce que les opportunités
de trouver un emploi dans les villes de la même
région ont été plus faibles dans le passe et rapi-
dement occupées par des migrants de leur pro-
pre rural. Ces régions n’ont pas constitué, dans
le passe, des régions d’attraction des migrants
originaires du rural des autres régions. Le cas le
plus éloquent est celui de la région Nord-Est.
Les migrants de l’urbain de cette région sont
partis en proportion de 90% vers le rural de la
région, d’ou ils sont venus dans le passé, parce
que l’urbain de cette région moins développée
n’a pas attiré les migrants du rural des autres
régions que dans une mesure très faible. Le cas
de la région Nord-Ouest, une région plus
développée mai ayant elle aussi une forte pro-
portion de migrants dans le rural provenant de
son propre urbain – 85%,  est plus nuancé. Les
besoins de main d’œuvre dans l’urbain de cette
région ont pu être satisfaits en bonne mesure
par son propre rural, trois de six départements
qui composent la région ayant un faible degré
d’urbanisation et deux de ces départements
ayant une croissance naturelle supérieure à la
moyenne nationale dans le passé.
Les régions qui présentent une autre géo-
graphie des destinations des migrants de l’ur-
bain sont Bucarest, Ouest et Centre. La région
Bucarest est composée seulement de la ville
(municipalité)  de Bucarest et le département
entourant la Capitale (Ilfov), qui a un fort carac-
tère rural. D’autre part, la région est située au
centre de la région Sud, une des plus grandes
régions du pays et ayant le plus faible niveau
d’urbanisation. La région Bucarest est la région
la plus développée  et elle a constitué un pole
d’attraction pour toute la moitie du sud du
pays. Dans ces conditions, il n’est pas sur-
prenant que seulement 27% de ceux qui ont
quitté la région Bucarest (la Capitale, en effet)
sont partis dans le rural du département
entourant la Capitale tandis que 40% ont eu
comme destination le rural de la région Sud. Ce
qui attire l’attention est  la proportion relative-
ment élevée des migrants vers le rural de la
région plus lointaine Nord-Est (presque 14%,
plus que dans les régions plus proches Sud-Est
et Sud-Ouest). Les régions Ouest et Centre
retient elle aussi l’attention par les poids rela-
tivement plus faibles des migrants urbains vers
leur propre rural – 53 et 70%. Dans la région
Ouest on peut trouver des valeurs importantes
des migrants vers le rural de la région Nord-est
– 17%, et de la région Sud-Ouest – 12%, ces
dernières deux régions étant moins développées
et fournisseurs, dans le passé, de migrants vers
l’urbain de la région plus développée Ouest. 
On peut résumer les caractéristiques de la
migration urbain-rural par région par les remar-
ques suivantes:
•en proportion de trois quarts la migration
régionale urbain-rural dans les années 1992-
2003 (environ un million de personnes) est com-
posée par des flux intra-régionaux et seulement
un quart représente des  flux inter-régionaux;
essentiellement, cette migration est une migra-
tion de retour, sa géographie étant similaire
avec la géographie de la migration rural-urbain
des années 1950-1990;
•au niveau des départs de l’urbain vers le
rural, dans les régions plus développées Centre
et Ouest la migration de retour dans le rural a
une composante plus importante de migration
inter-régionale, sur des distances plus longues,
vers les rural des régions moins développées
Nord-Est et Sud-Ouest, régions qui ont fourni
dans le passé, a large échelle, des migrants vers
l’urbain des régions plus développées;
77 The Romanian Journal of European Studies•les migrants urbain-rural de la région la
plus développée - Bucarest, ont comme destina-
tion majeure la région entourant Sud, mais aussi
la région plus lointaine et moins développée
Nord-Est;
•dans les régions moins développées Nord-
Est et celles du sud du pays le flux urbain-rural
est constitué en proportion de 80-90%  de flux
intra-régionaux; par rapport aux régions plus
développées, dans ces régions moins dévelop-
pées la migration vers l’urbain a été  composée
dans le passé surtout par des migrants
provenant leur propre rural;
•parmi les immigrants en rural, la propor-
tion de ceux qui viennent de
l’urbain de la même région est
de 75-85%; c’est l’expression de
la nette prédominance du mou-
vement rural-urbain dans la
même région dans le passé;
seulement dans les régions
moins développées Nord-Est et
Sud le poids des venus de l’ur-
bain des autres régions est plus
élevée; dans la première de ces
régions le sous-développement
a poussé les migrants de son
propre rural vers l’urbain des
régions plus développées, sur
des distances plus longues; quant à la région
Sud, l’attraction a été exercée dans le passé par la
ville de Bucarest (origine du fort flux de retour
dans le rural de la région Sud après 1989); 
•enfin, il est bien évident le fait que la région
Nord-Est détient une position particulière, soit
qu’il s’agit de l’origine des immigrants dans son
rural (une proportion plus grande d’immigrants
d’autres régions), soit qu’il s’agit des départs de
son urbain (presque en totalité vers son propre
rural); le sous-développement et une forte crois-
sance démographique peuvent expliquer cette
particularité.
Effets de la migration sur la structure par
sexe et âge de la population
La restructuration de la migration interne
entre l’urbain et le rural n’a pas apporté des
changements significatifs dans la structure par
sexe de la population urbaine et rurale, parce
que la structure par sexe des migrants urbain-
rural ne diffère pas de la structure par sexe de la
population rurale.  
De 1992 à 2005, environ un million de per-
sonnes ont quitté les villes pour s’établir en
rural. Ça ne signifie pas que l’urbain a gagné
cette population, parce que, dans la même péri-
ode, un nombre similaire de personnes ont quit-
té les villages pour s’établir en villes. C’est n’est
qu’à partir de 1997 que la balance migratoire est
favorable au rural  (+200 milles personnes entre
1996 et 2005). Mais, cet apport positif a été large-
ment contrebalancé par la baisse naturelle  et
par la migration externe nette négative. La
migration urbain-rural n’a pas eu un effet béné-
fique direct sur le nombre de la population
rurale mais elle a contribué sensiblement à la
diminution de la détérioration de la structure
par âge  en rural (tableau 5).
Dans un contexte de détérioration générale
de la structure par âge après 1989, la dimension
de cette détérioration est considérablement dif-
férentielle et favorable au rural, parce que les
migrants de l’urbain vers le rural ont eu une
structure par âge plus jeune que la population
rurale (tableau 3). La proportion de la popula-
tion jeune a connu une baisse nettement plus
forte en urbain. Le poids de la  population
adulte-jeune (20-39 ans) est resté stationnaire en
urbain et a connu un accroissement en rural,
tandis que la population adulte-agée (40-59 ans)
a été en baisse en rural et en augmentation en
urbain. Enfin, le poids de la population âgée (60
ans et plus) a été en hausse générale, en urbain
et en rurale, mais l’accroissement a été plus fort
en urbain,  même si le degré de vieillissement
reste considérablement plus élevé en rural.   
Remarques finales
La Roumanie se trouve dans son 16-èmme
année de détérioration de la situation démo-
graphique. Le recul massif de la natalité, une
migration externe négative (et en hausse) et le
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Tableauȱ5.ȱStructureȱdeȱlaȱpopulationȱurbaineȱetȱruraleȱparȱgroupesȱd’âge,ȱ1992ȱetȱ2005ȱ
Groupeȱd’âgeȱ Totalȱ Hommesȱ Femmesȱ Totalȱ Hommesȱ Femmesȱ
ȱ Urbainȱ1992ȱ Urbainȱ2005ȱ
0Ȭ19ȱansȱ 32,7ȱ 34,1ȱ 31,3ȱ 22,5ȱ 23,9ȱ 21,2ȱ
20Ȭ39ȱansȱ 33,4ȱ 33,0ȱ 33,8ȱ 33,6ȱ 34,4ȱ 32,8ȱ
40Ȭ59ȱansȱ 22,3ȱ 22,8ȱ 21,8ȱ 28,5ȱ 28,2ȱ 28,7ȱ
60ȱansȱetȱplusȱ 11,6ȱ 10,1ȱ 13,1ȱ 15,5ȱ 13,5ȱ 17,3ȱ
Totalȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ
ȱ Ruralȱ1992ȱ Ruralȱ2005ȱ
0Ȭ19ȱansȱ 29,3ȱ 30,3ȱ 28,2ȱ 25,5ȱ 26,4ȱ 24,7ȱ
20Ȭ39ȱansȱ 23,2ȱ 25,4ȱ 21,0ȱ 28,8ȱ 31,0ȱ 26,6ȱ
40Ȭ59ȱansȱ 25,4ȱ 24,7ȱ 26,2ȱ 21,7ȱ 22,1ȱ 21,3ȱ
60ȱansȱetȱplusȱ 22,1ȱ 19,5ȱ 24,6ȱ 24,0ȱ 20,5ȱ 27,4ȱ
Totalȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ 100,0ȱ
Source:ȱCalculsȱdeȱl’auteurȱsurȱlaȱbaseȱdesȱdonnéesȱINS,ȱ1994ȱ;ȱ2003.ȱmaintien de la mortalité à des valeurs élevées
pour un pays européen se trouvent à l’origine
de cette détérioration. Le déclin démographique
et l’accroissement du vieillissement démo-
graphique  sont les évolutions qui concrétisent
dans l’immédiat la détérioration. La stabilité du
nombre de naissances et le recul assez impor-
tant de la mortalité par âge (mais très faible au
niveau du nombre de décès et du taux brut de
mortalité) durant les dernières années peuvent
donner l’impression d’une diminution de la
détérioration de la situation démographique. La
prudence s’impose. On peut détecter des
mécanismes propres à la dynamique interne de
la construction  démographique qui préfigurent
une reprise plus forte de la détérioration à
l’avenir, par la baisse du nombre de naissances
le moment ou les générations nées après 1989
arriveront à l’age du mariage et de la maternité.
Et cet horizon n’est pas loin, tout étant une
question de terme moyen (United Nations,
2005 ; Ghetau, 2004). De plus, la dimension de la
migration externe après l’admission de la
Roumanie dans l’Union Européenne reste une
grande inconnue.  Dans ce contexte négatif, la
migration interne et, surtout, la surprenante
physionomie des flux migratoires entre l’urbain
et le rural sont elles aussi une réaction à la crise
économique et sociale dans laquelle se trouve la
Roumanie et aux changements rapides et pro-
fonds, douloureux en bonne partie, que le pays
connaît dans la phase actuelle de son évolution
historique. La restructuration de la migration
interne trouve donc l’explication causale dans
les réalités économiques et sociales de la transi-
tion. Certaines de ses conséquences semblent
être favorables au rural. Mais, des questions
graves se posent. Et si une bonne partie des
migrants retournés en rural a continué leur
mobilité vers les pays de l’Europe occidentale à
la recherche du travail, poussée par la pauvreté,
le niveau de vie très bas, le spectre du chômage
et les incertitudes de l’avenir? (Selon certaines
estimations, le nombre de roumains se trouvant
aujourd’hui dans les pays de l’Europe occiden-
tale pour travail pourrait atteindre 1,5-2 mil-
lions de personnes). La dimension et le poids de
la population active dans l’agriculture sont tout
a fait inhabituelles en Roumanie (30% de la pop-
ulation active du pays et 35% de la population
occupée, à la fin de 2003) (INS, 2004a; 2004b).
L’entré dans l’Union Européenne produira un
véritable choc dans l’agriculture roumaine,
morcelée, faiblement dotée de moyens tech-
niques  et ayant une productivité très faible
(Ciutacu, Constantin et Luminita Chivu, 2002).
De quelle manière sera affectée la population
rurale et la migration interne? Quelles motiva-
tions pourra-t-on avoir la continuation de la
migration urbain-rural dans un rural ayant déjà
une énorme population active agricole? Quelles
perspectives pour une  population agricole qui
sera obligée de  réduire ses dimensions par les
durs mécanismes de l’économie de marché?
Pourra-t-il l’urbain absorber cette population
dans des activités industrielles et dans les serv-
ices ?   Toutes ces questions, et on pourrait
ajouter d’autres,  montrent la complexité de la
situation et conduisent à la réflexion et à l’ac-
tion.
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Annexeȱ2.ȱRoumanie.ȱȱProfileȱéconomiqueȱetȱdémographiqueȱdesȱhuitȱrégionsȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ
*ȱ41ȱdépartementsȱplusȱlaȱMunicipalitéȱdeȱBucarestȱ;ȱ**ȱMunicipalitéȱdeȱBucarestȱplusȱunȱdépartementȱ(Ilfov)ȱ;ȱICF=indicateurȱ
conjoncturelȱdeȱlaȱfécondité.ȱ
ȱ
Sourceȱ:ȱINS,ȱ2004aȱ;ȱ2004bȱ;ȱȱcalculsȱdeȱl’auteur.ȱȱ
Régionȱdeȱdéveloppementȱ ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
Roumanieȱ
(Ro)ȱ
1ȱ
NordȬ
Estȱ
2ȱ
SudȬEstȱ
3ȱ
Sudȱ
4
SudȬ
Ouestȱ
5ȱ
Ouestȱ
6ȱ
NordȬ
Ouestȱ
7ȱ
Centreȱ
8ȱ
Bucarestȱ
I.ȱDonnéesȱgénéralesȱ
Nombreȱdeȱ
départementsȱ
ȱ
42*ȱ
ȱ
6ȱ
ȱ
6ȱ
ȱ
7ȱ
ȱ
5ȱ
ȱ
4ȱ
ȱ
6ȱ
ȱ
6ȱ
ȱ
2**ȱ
Superficieȱ–ȱkm2ȱ 238931ȱ 36850ȱ 35762ȱ 34453ȱ 29212ȱ 32034ȱ 34159ȱ 34100ȱ 1821ȱ
Superficieȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ 100ȱ 15,5ȱ 15,0ȱ 14,5ȱ 12,3ȱ 13,4ȱ 14,3ȱ 14,3ȱ 0,8ȱ
Populationȱ1.07.2004ȱ
Ȭȱmilliersȱ
ȱ
21673,3ȱ
ȱ
3738,6ȱ
ȱ
2850,3ȱ
ȱ
3342,0ȱ
ȱ
2317,6ȱ
ȱ
1939,5ȱ
ȱ
2738,5ȱ
ȱ
2539,2ȱ
ȱ
2207,6ȱ
Populationȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ 100ȱ 17,2ȱ 13,2ȱ 15,4ȱ 10,7ȱ 8,9ȱ 12,6ȱ 11,7ȱ 10,2ȱ
Populationȱurbaineȱ–ȱ
enȱ%ȱ 54,9ȱ 43,6ȱ 55,5ȱ 41,4ȱ 47,2ȱ 63,7ȱ 52,8ȱ 60,0ȱ 90,6ȱ
Densitéȱ–ȱparȱkm2ȱ 90,9ȱ 101,5ȱ 79,7ȱ 97,0ȱ 79,3ȱ 60,5ȱ 80,2ȱ 74,5ȱ 1212,3ȱ
II.ȱDonnéesȱéconomiquesȱ–ȱ2002ȱ
ProduitȱInterneȱ
BrutȱRégionalȱȬȱ%ȱ
dansȱleȱPIBȱnationalȱ
ȱ
100ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
12,3ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
11,3ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
12,4ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
8,6ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
9,7ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
11,9ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
12,6ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
21,1ȱ
ProduitȱInterneȱ
BrutȱRégionalȱȱ
parȱhab.ȱ–ȱmoyenneȱ
nationaleȱ=ȱ100ȱ
unîtesȱ
ȱ
ȱ
100ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
71,5ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
85,9ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
80,0ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
79,9ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
108,3ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
94,1ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
108,0ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
208,2ȱ
ȱ
Contributionȱ(enȱ%)ȱ
auȱPIBȱ:ȱ
- industrieȱ
- agricultureȱ
ȱ
ȱ
28,1ȱ
11,4ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
26,2ȱ
18,8ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
28,4ȱ
14,7ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
31,6ȱ
14,4ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
33,7ȱ
11,6ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
26,8ȱ
13,5ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
26,8ȱ
14,6ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
34,8ȱ
11,7ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
21,9ȱ
0,7ȱ
Revenuȱmoyenȱtotalȱ
parȱpersonneȱ/ȱmoisȱ;ȱ
moyenneȱnationaleȱ=ȱ
100ȱunîtesȱ
ȱ
100ȱ
ȱ
88,9ȱ
ȱ
95,8ȱ
ȱ
93,7ȱ
ȱ
93,8ȱ
ȱ
102,6ȱ
ȱ
103,0ȱ
ȱ
106,0ȱ
ȱ
127,9ȱ
III.ȱDonnéesȱdémographiquesȱ–ȱ2003ȱ
Tauxȱbrutȱdeȱnatalitéȱ
–ȱp.ȱ1000ȱ 9,8ȱ 11,5ȱ 9,8ȱ 9,4ȱ 9,1ȱ 8,9ȱ 10,0ȱ 10,2ȱ 8,3ȱ
Tauxȱbrutȱdeȱ
mortalitéȱ–ȱp.ȱ1000ȱ 12,3ȱ 11,5ȱ 11,8ȱ 13,6ȱ 13,3ȱ 12,9ȱ 12,4ȱ 11,3ȱ 11,4ȱ
Tauxȱ
dȇaccroissementȱ
naturelȱ–ȱp.ȱ1000ȱ
Ȭ2,5ȱ 0,0ȱȬ 2,0ȱȬ 4,2ȱȬ 4,2ȱȬ 4,0ȱȬ 2,4ȱȬ 1,1ȱȬ 3,1ȱ
Tauxȱdeȱmortalitéȱ
infantileȱ–ȱp.1000ȱ
naissancesȱ
16,7ȱ 20,1ȱ 18,2ȱ 19,3ȱ 15,1ȱ 15,6ȱ 14,2ȱ 15,1ȱ 10,4ȱ
ICFȱ–ȱp.ȱfemmeȱ 1,23ȱ 1,51ȱ 1,27ȱ 1,27ȱ 1,23ȱ 1,18ȱ 1,28ȱ 1,28ȱ 0,97ȱ
Populationȱâgéeȱdeȱ
60ȱansȱetȱplusȱ–ȱenȱ%ȱ
19,2ȱ 18,5ȱ 18,8ȱ 21,3ȱ 20,9ȱ 19,0ȱ 18,2ȱ 18,0ȱ 18,9ȱ
Espéranceȱdeȱvieȱaȱlaȱ
naissanceȱ
(2001Ȭ2003)ȱȬȱansȱ:ȱ
- Hommesȱ
- Femmesȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,4ȱ
74,8ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,4ȱ
74,7ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
66,9ȱ
74,8ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,2ȱ
74,8ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,9ȱ
74,5ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,1ȱ
74,1ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
66,5ȱ
73,9ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
67,8ȱ
75,5ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
ȱ
69,5ȱ
76,4ȱ83 The Romanian Journal of European Studies
Annexeȱ3.ȱ
UrbainȱetȱruralȱenȱRoumanieȱ
ȱ
L’urbainȱestȱcomposéȱdeȱvillesȱ(orase).ȱUneȱlocalitéȱreçoitȱlaȱqualitéȱdeȱvilleȱparȱloi.ȱAuȱ1erȱjanvierȱ2005ȱonȱavaitȱenȱ
Roumanieȱ314ȱvilles.ȱLesȱvillesȱlesȱplusȱimportantesȱsontȱdénomméesȱmunicipalitésȱ(96).ȱLeȱruralȱestȱcomposéȱdeȱ
communesȱ(comune).ȱIlȱyȱaȱ2827ȱcommunes.ȱ
ȱ
Villesȱetȱcommunes.ȱNombreȱetȱpopulationȱauȱ1erȱjanvierȱ2005ȱ
ȱ
Lesȱvillesȱ Lesȱcommunesȱ
TailleȱȬȱhabitantsȱ Nombreȱ Populationȱ TailleȱȬȱ
habitantsȱ
Nombreȱ Populationȱ
Ensembleȱ 314ȱ 11901033ȱ(54,9ȱ%)ȱ Totalȱ 2827ȱ 9757495ȱ(45,1ȱ%)ȱ
Moinsȱdeȱ10000ȱ 115ȱ 776506ȱ Moinsȱdeȱ1000ȱ 63ȱ 46693ȱ
10000Ȭ19999ȱ 93ȱ 1244347ȱ 1000Ȭ2999ȱ 1312ȱ 2789446ȱ
20000Ȭ49999ȱ 60ȱ 1812545ȱ 3000Ȭ4999ȱ 980ȱ 3773418ȱ
50000Ȭ99999ȱ 21ȱ 1491949ȱ 5000Ȭ6999ȱ 318ȱ 1833071ȱ
100000Ȭ199999ȱ 14ȱ 1875946ȱ 7000Ȭ8999ȱ 113ȱ 886677ȱ
200000Ȭ299999ȱ 9ȱ 1542213ȱ 9000Ȭ9999ȱ 19ȱ 179663ȱ
300000Ȭ399999ȱ 4ȱ 1230079ȱ 10000Ȭ11999ȱ 17ȱ 183940ȱ
400000ȱetȱplusȱ 1ȱ 1927448ȱ 12000ȱetȱplusȱ 5ȱ 64587ȱ
Tailleȱmoyenneȱ ȱ 37901ȱ Tailleȱ
moyenneȱ
ȱ 3451ȱ
Sourceȱ:ȱINS,ȱ2005b.ȱ
ȱ